State v. Mong

Docket Number19-0911
Decision Date24 March 2023
Citation988 N.W.2d 305
Parties STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Anthony Alexander MONG, Appellant.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

Cathleen J. Siebrecht of Siebrecht Law Firm, Des Moines, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Bridget A. Chambers, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

McDonald, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which all participating justices joined. May, J., took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

McDONALD, Justice.

Anthony Mong shot at and attempted to kill Ricco Martin, but he missed and inadvertently shot and injured Shane Woods. Under Iowa law, "[a] party is liable for a wrongful act, where there exists a criminal intent," notwithstanding that the act done "is not that which was intended." State v. Ruhl , 8 Iowa (Clarke) 447, 448 (1859). "The wrongful intent to do one act, is transposed to the other, and constitutes the same offense." Id. The transposition of the defendant's criminal intent to establish criminal liability is known as the doctrine of transferred intent. Based on transferred intent, a jury found Mong guilty of the attempted murder of Woods, intimidation with a dangerous weapon with respect to Woods, willful injury causing bodily injury with respect to Woods, and going armed with intent.

The district court entered judgment and sentence following the jury's verdict, and Mong timely appealed his convictions. We transferred Mong's appeal to the court of appeals. The court of appeals concluded there was insufficient evidence Mong had the intent to kill or injure Woods to support the convictions for attempted murder, intimidation with a dangerous weapon, and willful injury; the court of appeals thus reversed those convictions. The court of appeals conditionally affirmed Mong's conviction for going armed with intent and remanded the matter to the district court to afford Mong an additional opportunity to develop a fair-cross-section challenge to the jury pool.

We granted the State's application for further review. "On further review, we have the discretion to review any issue raised on appeal." State v. Crawford , 972 N.W.2d 189, 203 (Iowa 2022) (quoting State v. Vandermark , 965 N.W.2d 888, 891 (Iowa 2021) ). We exercise that discretion to review only those portions of the court of appeals decision regarding the jury selection process and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting Mong's convictions. The court of appeals decision is final as to all other issues.

I.

Mong and Madison Cobb began dating in 2017. The relationship was rocky because, among other things, Mong suspected Cobb was also involved in a relationship with Ricco Martin. Mong confronted Martin about Martin's relationship with Cobb. In 2017, Mong sent Martin thirty to forty intimidating text messages. In addition, several of the State's witnesses testified Mong was jealous of Martin and had threatened him. They testified Mong told Martin that "he didn't want to fight anymore, that he was just going to shoot him."

The shooting at issue in this case occurred several days after Cobb ended her relationship with Mong. Cobb lived with her parents Todd and Heather Hines. On the night of June 1, 2018, Cobb, Todd, Shane Woods (Cobb's uncle), David Woods (Cobb's cousin), and Martin were gathered in front of the Hines residence. Around 8:00 p.m., Mong drove past the residence, made a U-turn, then parked on the street in front of the home. The State and Mong agree on these facts, but they disagree on what happened next.

According to the State, Mong shot at Martin, missed, and hit Shane. Todd testified that when Mong drove by the house, Todd heard the sound of someone racking a gun. Upon hearing the sound, Todd went inside to get his gun. When Todd came back outside, he saw a gun in Mong's hand. Todd drew his gun, accidentally dropped it, and then ran into his home. Todd testified that between the time he dropped his gun and the time he ran inside, he heard, but did not see, two shots fired. Todd yelled at Shane to get in the house. Shane, still standing in the driveway, yelled, "I'm hit. I'm hit." And he was. A bullet entered the left side of his back, exited through his chest, and then went through his arm. At the time Shane was hit, he was six to eight feet from Martin.

At trial, Shane identified Mong as the shooter. Martin testified that he saw Mong shoot Shane. During the confrontation, David retrieved a baseball bat from the garage. When David exited the garage, he saw Shane bleeding. David also saw Mong get into his car. David chased Mong's car with the baseball bat as it drove away. Todd called 911, and Shane was later transported to the hospital and treated for the gunshot wound. Police later found a shell casing in the street where Mong would have been.

According to Mong, he was the victim in this incident. Mong testified he and his best friend, Brandon Henlon, went to the Hines residence to retrieve Mong's Cadillac, which Todd had been working on. Mong testified he arrived at the house, parked in the street, told Henlon to stay in the car, and exited the vehicle with a black iPhone in his hand. Mong testified he never had a gun with him. Mong testified that, as he crossed the sidewalk, he noticed Todd had a gun. Mong testified that Martin started "going for the firearm." Mong testified that when he saw Martin reach for Todd's gun, Mong ducked behind a big tree in the yard to avoid being shot. Mong testified he heard the sound of a shot from where the group was standing and then the sound of another shot from behind him. Mong testified he did not see who fired either shot. He testified he ran back to his vehicle. When he got in the vehicle, Henlon had a gun in his hand. Mong testified that until that point, he did not know Henlon had a gun. Henlon died of a drug overdose prior to trial and was unable to testify about these events.

After the shooting, Mong drove away from the scene. He testified he dropped the car off at a friend's house. When police later found the car, they discovered in it "a live round shell casing with a bullet that had not been fired yet." Rather than returning home or contacting the police, Mong went on the run. He testified he did so because he was afraid of being shot. He testified he stayed that night at a local hotel, which his friend Raymond had booked for him. When asked Raymond's last name, Mong responded he "was not sure of his last name." Mong testified that Raymond, whose last name Mong did not know, then drove him to Las Vegas. Mong testified that his mother lived in Las Vegas, that "she was sick," and that he "needed to see her." He testified that he did not contact the police to report Henlon because Henlon was his best friend and that he did not want to get Henlon in trouble. In August 2018, police arrested Mong in Las Vegas. He was then returned to Iowa to face the charges at issue here.

The State charged Mong with the attempted murder of Shane Woods, in violation of Iowa Code section 707.11(1) (2018); intimidation of Shane Woods with a dangerous weapon, in violation of Iowa Code section 708.6 ; felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of Iowa Code section 724.26(1) ; willful injury causing serious injury to Shane Woods, in violation of Iowa Code section 708.4(1) ; and going armed with intent, in violation of Iowa Code section 708.8. The State also pursued a sentencing enhancement under Iowa Code section 902.7, which required the district court to impose a mandatory minimum sentence upon a finding that Mong used a dangerous weapon during the commission of a forcible felony. At the beginning of trial, the State dismissed the charge of felon in possession of a firearm.

The party's respective theories of the case were presented clearly to the jury. The State's theory was one of transferred intent: Mong attempted to shoot Martin, missed Martin, and inadvertently shot and injured Shane. The district court instructed the jury on this theory. The prosecutor clearly explained the theory and the instruction to the jury during closing argument:

[T]here is what is called "transferred intent." Read it. It means you become liable. So if your intent is against A and you hit B, you get prosecuted for hitting B. That's the law. Not because [I] said it, but you have an instruction that says that.

Mong's theory of the case did not challenge transferred intent but instead challenged the underlying conduct. Indeed, he agreed with the prosecutor on the transferred intent issue. His counsel explained as much during closing argument:

[Y]ou're going to see in many different places in your marshaling instructions that Defendant specifically intended to cause the death of Shane Woods as one of the elements. And you all know that hasn't been shown. Every time you see that, you know there wasn't the specific intent to do anything to Shane Woods.
....
So it has to be Ricco Martin, ladies and gentlemen. It has to be Ricco Martin under the "transferred intent" theory, that there was a specific intent. There's just not enough evidence. The evidence, ladies and gentlemen, shows the specific intent to hide.

On this point, Mong wholly denied he was in possession of a gun or shot at anyone. As his counsel put it, "What we are denying is that my client had a gun that day. And we are denying that my client shot a gun that day." Mong argued Woods was shot by Henlon or accidentally by Todd.

The jury resolved this factual dispute in favor of the State. The jury found Mong guilty of the attempted murder of Woods, intimidation of Woods with a dangerous weapon, and going armed with intent. With respect to each charge, the jury answered a special interrogatory related to the sentencing enhancement and found Mong "was in the immediate possession and control of a dangerous weapon, displayed a dangerous weapon in a threatening manner or was armed with a dangerous weapon." The jury acquitted Mong of willful injury causing serious...

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1 cases
  • State v. Vanderflught
    • United States
    • Iowa Court of Appeals
    • 30 Agosto 2023
    ...But under the doctrine of transferred intent, any motive he had to harm Newton transferred to the vehicle's occupants. See State v. Mong, 988 N.W.2d 305, 313 (Iowa 2023) ("Iowa's courts have repeatedly applied the doctrine of transferred intent to impose liability where a criminal defendant......

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