State v. Moody

• Decision Date: 07 March 1997
• Docket Number: No. 64A96,64A96
• Citation: 481 S.E.2d 629,345 N.C. 563
• Parties: STATE of North Carolina v. Patrick Lane MOODY.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Page 629

481 S.E.2d 629

345 N.C. 563

STATE of North Carolina v. Patrick Lane MOODY.

No. 64A96.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

March 7, 1997.

Michael F. Easley, Attorney General by John G. Barnwell, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.

William F. Massengale and Marilyn G. Ozer, Chapel Hill, for defendant-appellant.

FRYE, Justice.

Defendant, Patrick Lane Moody, was indicted on 9 January 1995 for the 16 September 1994 first-degree murder of Donnie Ray Robbins. On 14 July 1995, during the State's presentation of evidence, defendant changed his plea to guilty of first-degree murder. Following the entry and acceptance of the guilty plea, the trial court held a capital sentencing proceeding pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 15A-2000, and the jury recommended a sentence of death. The jury found as aggravating circumstances that defendant had been previously convicted of a felony involving the use of violence and that the murder was committed for pecuniary gain. The jury also found six of the twenty-one statutory and nonstatutory mitigating circumstances submitted to it. On 20 July 1995, the trial judge, in accordance with the jury recommendation, imposed a sentence of death for the first-degree murder conviction.

Defendant makes thirteen arguments on appeal to this Court. We reject each of these arguments and conclude that defendant's capital sentencing proceeding was free of prejudicial error and that the death sentence is not disproportionate.

The State's evidence in the guilt and sentencing phases tended to show the following facts and circumstances. In July 1994, defendant started having an affair with Wanda Robbins (Wanda), the wife of the victim, Donnie Robbins (Donnie). Over the course of their affair, defendant and Wanda discussed various plans to murder Wanda's husband and share the insurance proceeds. On 16 September 1994, defendant went to Loman's Trailer Park in Thomasville, North Defendant and Wanda had agreed to meet at the hospital following the murder. While at the hospital, defendant identified himself as Darryl Thompson to investigating officers and consented to taking a gunshot residue test. Defendant then left the hospital. Early the next morning, defendant was apprehended and taken into custody. Later that morning, following defendant's directions, the police found the murder weapon, the black jacket defendant had been wearing, and other items of evidence. After being arrested, defendant waived his Miranda rights and made a statement.

Carolina, to the home of Donnie and Wanda Robbins. Defendant identified himself as Darryl Thompson and pretended to be interested in buying Donnie's old Chevrolet automobile. He and Donnie went to a field near the trailer park where the automobile was located. Defendant asked Donnie to measure the automobile, purportedly to determine whether it would fit on a "roll-back" truck. As Donnie leaned over the hood of the automobile to measure it, defendant shot him in the back of the head with a .32-caliber semiautomatic pistol he had stolen the previous day from a house near the trailer park.

At trial, after the State had begun its case-in-chief and had presented evidence from seven witnesses, defendant withdrew his plea of not guilty and entered a plea of guilty to murder in the first degree. The court found that there was a factual basis for the plea, defendant was competent to stand trial, defendant was satisfied with his attorney, and the plea was made freely and voluntarily. The trial court then accepted the plea.

The State began the presentation of its capital sentencing proceeding evidence following the announcement of defendant's change of plea to the jury. Two residents and the owner of the trailer park testified that Donnie and Wanda argued often and that on at least two occasions these residents had identified mercury in the beer that Donnie was drinking. A life insurance agent also testified that Wanda Robbins had called her at 5:30 a.m. the morning after the murder to complete the paperwork necessary for Wanda's claim for the insurance benefits payable upon Donnie's death. In addition, SBI Special Agent Timothy Thayer testified that he interviewed defendant on 21 September 1994, and Agent Thayer read the transcription of his notes from that interview which described defendant's life during the summer before the murder. At the conclusion of the State's evidence, defendant's prior convictions in Florida for attempted first-degree murder and conspiracy to commit first-degree murder were introduced.

Defendant's evidence at the capital sentencing proceeding tended to show the following facts and circumstances. Defendant was involved with a religious group called "His Laboring Few Bikers' Ministry," which focused on the spiritual needs of bikers at biker rallies. Two members of the ministry took defendant into their home after meeting defendant in Florida and sending him a bus ticket to come to High Point to live with them. Steve Ervin, an ordained minister with the ministry, testified that defendant had become involved with the ministry but later had become distant upon meeting Wanda Robbins.

Defendant's half-brother and mother testified as to defendant's traumatic and abusive childhood. Dr. Jerry Noble, a psychologist, diagnosed defendant as suffering from an attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, alcohol dependence, a mixed personality disorder, child abuse syndrome, and psychologically caused physical problems. Dr. Noble testified that defendant had borderline intellectual functioning with a full scale IQ of 81.

Defendant testified as the last witness in the sentencing phase of the trial. He affirmed that he shot and killed the victim but denied that he did so in order to get insurance money. On cross-examination, defendant testified that he killed the victim because Wanda threatened to notify the police about his outstanding warrants in Florida.

In his first argument, defendant contends that the trial court erred by failing to suppress a series of inflammatory and irrelevant letters that were published to the jury during the capital sentencing proceeding. Defendant first contends that the trial court erred in overruling his objection to the introduction of the letters on the basis that any probative During the capital sentencing proceeding, the State moved to introduce a series of exhibits into evidence, one of which was three letters written by the victim to his wife, who was not living in their home at the time. The letters express the victim's love for his wife and his pain and anguish that she had left him. Defendant objected, arguing that the letters should be excluded under Rule 403 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence. The trial court overruled his objection, and defendant challenges this ruling as error.

value of the letters would be substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. In addition, defendant argues that the letters were not properly admitted because they are hearsay and were not properly authenticated. Finally, defendant argues that the letters were improperly admitted as victim-impact evidence.

Rule 403 provides:

Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.

N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 403 (1992). "Necessarily, evidence which is probative in the State's case will have a prejudicial effect on the defendant; the question is one of degree." State v. Weathers, 339 N.C. 441, 449, 451 S.E.2d 266, 270 (1994). Relevant evidence is properly admissible "unless the judge determines that it must be excluded, for instance, because of the risk of 'unfair prejudice.' " State v. Mercer, 317 N.C. 87, 94, 343 S.E.2d 885, 889 (1986). " 'Unfair prejudice,' as used in Rule 403, means 'an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, as an emotional one.' " State v. DeLeonardo, 315 N.C. 762, 772, 340 S.E.2d 350, 357 (1986) (quoting N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 403 commentary (Supp.1985)).

In the instant case, the letters were introduced for the purpose of corroborating testimony that the victim loved his wife and did not abuse her, rebutting one of defendant's theories of mitigation, that is, that defendant believed that Wanda was being abused by the victim. While the letters expressed heartfelt emotion on the part of the victim, we find nothing in the instant case to suggest that the jury's decision to recommend a sentence of death was based on any unfair prejudice that may have been created by these letters. "In general, the exclusion of evidence under the balancing test of Rule 403 of the North Carolina Rules of Evidence is within the trial court's sound discretion." State v. Hennis, 323 N.C. 279, 285, 372 S.E.2d 523, 527 (1988). We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the three letters.

Defendant also contends that it was error to admit the letters because they are hearsay and were not properly authenticated. Defendant did not object to the admission of the letters on these bases at trial and therefore our review is for plain error. See State v. Sierra, 335 N.C. 753, 761, 440 S.E.2d 791, 796 (1994). "In order to prevail under a plain error analysis, defendant must establish not only that the trial court committed error, but that 'absent the error, the jury probably would have reached a different result.' " Id. (quoting State v. Jordan, 333 N.C. 431, 440, 426 S.E.2d 692, 697 (1993)). Despite the emotional nature of the letters, we conclude that the jury probably would not have reached a different result if the letters had not been admitted, and thus, we find no plain error.

Finally, defendant contends that the prosecutor's closing argument improperly treated the content of the letters as victim-impact evidence and...