State v. Moore
Decision Date | 13 December 1892 |
Citation | 16 S.E. 384,111 N.C. 667 |
Parties | STATE v. MOORE. |
Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
Appeal from superior court, Cumberland county; E. T. BOYKIN, Judge.
E. F Moore was convicted of receiving money under false pretenses. Defendant appeals. Reversed.
In a prosecution for receiving money under false pretenses it appeared that, on January 1st, the prosecutor gave defendant a note, which defendant discounted at a bank. Before its maturity the prosecutor received a notice from the bank that the note indorsed by defendant was due April 1st. The prosecutor gave defendant another note to renew the one due on that day in the bank. July 1st prosecutor gave defendant a third renewal note, this note being negotiable and payable at the same bank. No payment was made on either note until December, when the prosecutor made several payments to defendant, but did not ask defendant for the note until after making the last payment. None of these payments were indorsed on the note. Held, that there was no false representation of ownership of this note on the part of defendant.
Among other prayers for instructions the following were submitted by the defendant:
G. M. Rose, C. M. Cooke, and W. W. Fuller, for appellant.
The Attorney General, for the State.
It was essential to the successful prosecution of the indictment to show that the prosecuting witness, Ritter, was induced by a reasonable reliance upon false representations made by the defendant to pay to the latter money to be applied to the gradual extinction of his note theretofore executed. The question that confronts us at the threshold of our investigation is whether the testimony of Ritter tended to prove that any false statement was made by Moore in reference to ownership of the note, which was calculated to deceive or did deceive him, and influence him to pay the money to the defendant. As well in civil actions, brought to recover of another losses incurred by false representations, as in criminal prosecutions founded upon the same species of fraud the burden is on the actor or prosecutor to show, not only the false representation, but that a reasonable reliance upon its truth induced the plaintiff or prosecutor to part with his money or property, the only difference being as to the quantum of proof. State v. Phifer, 65 N.C. 325; Walsh v. Hall, 66 N.C. 240. Hence it is that both indictments (relied upon as separate counts of one indictment) charged that the fraud was accomplished, and the money paid over to the defendant, because of his fraudulent representation...
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