State v. Moore
| Decision Date | 14 August 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. 2017-0483,2017-0483 |
| Citation | 111 N.E.3d 1146,154 Ohio St.3d 94,2018 Ohio 3237 |
| Parties | The STATE of Ohio, Appellant, v. MOORE, Appellee. |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Kevin Baxter, Erie County Prosecuting Attorney, and Martha S. Schultes, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney; and Michael C. O'Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Frank Romeo Zeleznikar, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant.
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Allen Vender, Assistant Public Defender, for appellee.
DeWine, J.{¶ 1} An offender who has been locked up in jail prior to being sentenced to prison is entitled to a credit against his prison term for any time that the offender spent in confinement awaiting trial and sentencing. But an exception in Ohio law dictates that this "jail-time credit" does not apply to the portion of a prison sentence that is imposed for a firearm specification. The primary question presented is whether the exception as applied in this case violates equal-protection guarantees. We conclude that it does not. The court of appeals below held otherwise, so we reverse.
{¶ 2} Following guilty pleas to four felony offenses, Gerry Moore Sr., a.k.a. Gary Moore Sr., was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of 8 years and 11 months. The aggregate sentence included two mandatory terms for firearm specifications—one a 3-year specification and the other a 1-year specification—that Moore was required to serve consecutively to each other and prior to the rest of the sentence. See R.C. 2929.14(C)(1)(a). Before sentencing, Moore moved the trial court to credit the 283 days that he had served in jail prior to sentencing toward the 4 years that he needed to serve for the firearm specifications. Moore wanted the jail-time credit applied to the prison terms for the firearm specifications because doing so would enable him to apply for judicial release sooner than if it was applied to the prison terms for the underlying felonies.
{¶ 3} Pursuant to R.C. 2929.20(B), "an eligible offender" may move the sentencing court for a reduction of his aggregated nonmandatory prison term through judicial release. The timing of an offender's application for judicial release depends upon the length of his nonmandatory prison term and whether his sentence includes a mandatory prison term. A prisoner who, like Moore, is sentenced to a nonmandatory prison term of between two and five years is eligible to apply for judicial release "not earlier than one hundred eighty days after the expiration of all mandatory prison terms." R.C. 2929.20(C)(2). Thus, crediting the jail time that Moore served prior to sentencing toward the mandatory terms imposed for the firearm specifications would allow him to apply for release three years and nine months into his sentence. On the other hand, if the jail-time credit is applied only to the terms imposed for the underlying felonies as opposed to those for the specifications, he will need to serve the four years of his prison terms for the firearm specifications and then wait six months before applying for judicial release. If judicial release is granted, an offender is placed on probation on conditions set by the trial court, and the court may reimpose the sentence that it reduced if the offender violates those conditions. R.C. 2929.20(K).
{¶ 4} The trial court determined that the jail-time credit should be applied only to Moore's prison terms imposed for the underlying felonies. Moore appealed, arguing that the trial court had improperly construed the applicable statutes in refusing to apply the credit to the terms for the firearm specifications.
{¶ 5} The court of appeals reversed the trial court's judgment but did so on an issue that was neither raised nor briefed by the parties. In a two-to-one decision, the Sixth District found that the failure to apply jail-time credit to Moore's firearm-specification terms might risk an equal-protection violation at some point in the future should Moore be granted judicial release. 2017-Ohio-673, 85 N.E.3d 547, ¶ 27. The court explained that if Moore were successful in achieving judicial release, he might not be able to fully use the jail-time credit that he had earned. It reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case to the trial court with the instruction to credit Moore's 283 days of time served to his firearm-specification terms. Id. at ¶ 29.
{¶ 6} We accepted the state's discretionary appeal, which challenged the appellate court's conclusion on the equal-protection issue. 149 Ohio St.3d 1431, 2017-Ohio-4396, 76 N.E.3d 1207. Moore maintains that the court of appeals' judgment can be sustained on both statutory and equal-protection grounds.
{¶ 7} Because this court decides constitutional issues only when absolutely necessary, we first consider Moore's statutory argument. Norandex, Inc. v. Limbach , 69 Ohio St.3d 26, 28, 630 N.E.2d 329 (1994).
{¶ 8} Ohio law allows for the additional punishment of an offender when a firearm is involved in the offense. R.C. 2929.14(B). This is accomplished through a "specification," which must be set forth in the indictment for the underlying felony. See, e.g. , R.C. 2941.141. For example, an offender who had a firearm on his person or under his control while committing the offense is subject to a one-year prison term for the specification. Id .; R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(a)(iii). An offender who displays, brandishes, or uses the firearm to facilitate the underlying offense is subject to an additional three-year prison term. R.C. 2941.145 ; R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(a)(ii). A sentence for a specification must be served consecutively to and prior to any sentence for the underlying felony offense. R.C. 2929.14(C)(1)(a).
{¶ 9} The prison term for the firearm specification is mandatory. R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(a). Moreover, the term "shall not be reduced pursuant to section 2967.19 [], section 2929.20 [], section 2967.193 [], or any other provision of Chapter 2967 or Chapter 5120 of the Revised Code." (Emphasis added.) R.C. 2929.14(B)(1)(b) ("the specification provision").
{¶ 10} In this case, Moore seeks to have the time he spent in the county jail credited toward his sentence pursuant to R.C. 2967.191 ("the jail-time-credit provision"). According to the provision, "[t]he department of rehabilitation and correction shall reduce the stated prison term of a prisoner * * * by the total number of days that the prisoner was confined for any reason arising out of the offense for which the prisoner was convicted and sentenced, including confinement in lieu of bail while awaiting trial * * * as determined by the sentencing court." R.C. 2967.191. The jail-time-credit provision plainly constitutes "any other provision of Chapter 2967." Under the terms of the specification provision, then, Moore's prison terms for the firearm specifications could not be reduced based upon the time he served in jail prior to sentencing.
{¶ 11} As he did before the court of appeals, Moore seeks to avoid this result by pointing to the definitions of "prison term" and "stated prison term" set forth in R.C. 2929.01 :
In Moore's view, the specification provision does not prohibit reduction of a prison term for a firearm specification by the amount of time spent in jail prior to sentencing, because that reduction is already included in the definition of "stated prison term."
{¶ 12} But Moore's reading is impossible to square with the rest of the statutory scheme. Remember, the jail-time-credit provision requires that the department of rehabilitation and correction "reduce the stated prison term of the prisoner" by the amount of time that has already been served. R.C. 2967.191. To adopt Moore's reading would mean that the prisoner gets two-for-one credit for days served prior to his prison sentence: days served in jail would be subtracted once pursuant to the definition of "stated prison term." And then those same days would again be subtracted pursuant to the jail-time-credit provision.
{¶ 13} As an alternative to such a nonsensical reading, Moore proposes that we treat the jail-time-credit provision simply as "the mechanism to apply confinement credit, which is part of the prison term." But to read the provision in this manner would make it superfluous to the definitional statute. We must assume that the General Assembly does not use words unnecessarily—particularly not entire statutory provisions—and we avoid construing any statute in a manner that might render some portion of the provision "meaningless or inoperative." State ex rel. Myers v. Spencer Twp. Rural School Dist. Bd. of Edn. , 95 Ohio St. 367, 373, 116 N.E. 516 (1917).
{¶ 14} There is another problem with Moore's argument. Even if we were to buy his premise that a stated prison term by definition already includes a reduction for jail-time credit, a court would still need to decide how to apply the credit to the stated prison term. That is, should the credit be applied toward the portion imposed for firearm specifications? Moore offers...
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