State v. Moore

• Decision Date: 20 November 1995
• Docket Number: No. 21662,21662
• Citation: 127 Idaho 780,906 P.2d 150
• Parties: STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. James Robert Lee MOORE, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Idaho Court of Appeals

Page 150

906 P.2d 150

127 Idaho 780

STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. James Robert Lee MOORE, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 21662.

Court of Appeals of Idaho.

Nov. 20, 1995.

G. LaMarr Kofoed, Fruitland, for appellant.

Alan G. Lance, Attorney General; Myrna A.I. Stahman, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.

LANSING, Judge

On January 20, 1994, James Robert Lee "Bobby" Moore shot and killed Ronald Wade Feldner, a New Plymouth police officer. Moore pleaded guilty to first degree murder, I.C. §§ 18-4001, -4002, -4003(b). Although Moore was fourteen years old at the time of the offense, he was prosecuted and sentenced as an adult pursuant to I.C. § 16-1806A. On appeal Moore contends that his sentence of twenty-five years to life violates the constitutional ban on cruel and unusual punishment and represents an abuse of the trial court's discretion. ¹ We affirm.

The following recitation of facts is drawn directly from the district court's colloquy at sentencing:

Because the defendant has entered a guilty plea to the charges, the record of the incident giving rise to these charges is found mainly in the police reports and in the reports of police interviews with the defendant, the other people who were with him on the early morning hours of January 20th, 1994, and interviews with associates and companions of the defendant.

The record, and particularly the statement made by the defendant, establishes that sometime prior to midnight on the 19th day of January, 1994, the defendant and two companions, stole a 1969 Volkswagen which they drove to New Plymouth. Their purpose in going to New Plymouth was to see a girl friend of one of the youths. They decided to wait at the high school until the following morning and talk to her when she came to school. At approximately 2:30 a.m., Officer Feldner saw the car parked on the school grounds and went to check on it. He approached the car and asked the defendant, who was driving the automobile, for his license and registration. He was given the registration which Moore found under the seat in the car. Officer Feldner then went back to his car and radioed his dispatcher with the information on the registration and was informed that the automobile had been reported as stolen by the owner. The defendant heard the radio transmission when the dispatcher informed the defendant [sic] that the car was stolen. It is not clear from the record whether Bobby Moore decided to shoot the officer when he asked for the registration, or when he heard the radio transmission. In either event, when Officer Feldner walked back to the Volkswagen and asked the occupants to step out of the car the defendant shot Officer Feldner four times with a .25 calibre pistol from point blank range. Officer Feldner died there in the parking lot of the school grounds.

A. The Sentence Was Not Cruel and Unusual Punishment

We consider first Moore's contention that his sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Art. I, § 6 of the Idaho Constitution. Moore argues for application of the three-part proportionality analysis set forth in Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 77 L.Ed.2d 637 (1983). This analysis would require the court to consider (1) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; (2) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (3) the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions. Moore fails to recognize, however, that Solem is superseded by the United States Supreme Court's more recent decision in Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991). Our Supreme Court had occasion in State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385, 825 P.2d 482 (1992), to consider the extent to which the Solem analysis remains operative after Harmelin. After considering the separate opinions in Harmelin, none of which commanded a majority, the Idaho Supreme Court concluded that Harmelin, "seriously erodes the three-step proportionality analysis in Solem." Brown, 121 Idaho at 394, 825 P.2d at 490. The Court then continued:

Following the opinion of Justice Kennedy, in which Justices O'Connor and Souter joined, we first must make a threshold comparison of the crime committed and the sentence imposed to determine whether the sentence leads to an inference of gross disproportionality. U.S. at [1004-06], 111 S.Ct. at 2707.

. . . . .

In [State v. Broadhead, [120 Idaho 141, 814 P.2d 401 (1991) ] we relied on State v. Evans, 73 Idaho 50, 245 P.2d 788 (1952)], which held that under our state constitution a criminal sentence is cruel and unusual punishment only when it is "out of proportion to the gravity of the offense committed, and such as to shock the conscience of reasonable [people]." Broadhead, 120 Idaho 141, 148, 814 P.2d 401, 408. This traditional Idaho constitutional rule focusing on the gravity of the offense is well established and appropriate and is essentially equivalent to the "grossly disproportionate" test used by Justice Kennedy's opinion in Harmelin.

. . . . .

We limit our proportionality analysis to death penalty cases and, under the Idaho Constitution as contemplated in State v. Evans, to those cases which are "out of proportion to the gravity of the offense committed" in the cruel and unusual punishment setting similar to the "grossly disproportionate" analysis of the eighth amendment urged by Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, and Souter in Harmelin. The lack of objective standards for evaluating differing terms of imprisonment, see Harmelin, , 111 S.Ct. at 2704-05, gives proportionality review outside these two limited areas the potential of essentially allowing, if not requiring, this Court to second guess the trial court's discretionary determination of the criminal sentence that best fits the criminal defendant and the crime within the reasonable limits of the sentencing options.

Brown, 121 Idaho at 394, 825 P.2d at 491. See also State v. Matteson, 123 Idaho 622, 626, 851 P.2d 336, 340 (1993). Applying this guideline from Brown, we must make a threshold comparison of Moore's crime and the sentence imposed to determine whether the sentence leads to an inference of gross disproportionality. For purposes of this analysis, we treat the fixed portion of the sentence, twenty-five years, as the term of confinement. Id.

Moore argues that in conducting this analysis, consideration must be given to the youth and immaturity of the offender, a proposition with which we agree. In Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 108 S.Ct. 2687, 101 L.Ed.2d 702 (1988), the United States Supreme Court held that the death penalty constituted cruel and unusual punishment for a fifteen-year-old convicted of first degree murder. In a plurality opinion in which three other justices joined, Justice Stevens stated:

[T]he Court has already endorsed the proposition that less culpability should attach to a crime committed by a juvenile than to a comparable crime committed by an adult. The basis for this conclusion is too obvious to require extensive explanation. Inexperience, less education, and less intelligence make the teenager less able to evaluate the consequences of his or her conduct while at the same time he or she is much more apt to be motivated by mere emotion or peer pressure than is an adult. The reasons why juveniles are not trusted with the privileges and responsibilities of an adult also explain why their irresponsible conduct is not as morally reprehensible as that of an adult.

Id. at 835, 108 S.Ct. at 2688.

After considering Moore's age and the nature and circumstance of his crime, however, we do not find that a twenty-five year term of confinement leads to an inference of gross disproportionality. Moore killed another human being by shooting the victim four times at point-blank range without any provocation. The utter disregard for human life demonstrated in the commission of this crime, coupled with the fact that it was committed against a law enforcement officer, might well have led to imposition of the death penalty or a fixed life sentence if the perpetrator had been an adult. See I.C. §§ 18-4004 and 19-2515. Under these circumstances, even in view of Moore's youth, we cannot say that the sentence is out of all proportion to the gravity of the offense or such as to shock the conscience of reasonable people. Consequently, it is unnecessary to conduct any further proportionality review. Brown, 121 Idaho at 394, 825 P.2d at 491.

B. The District Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Sentencing

Moore next contends that his sentence, even if not violative of constitutional standards, is excessive and unreasonable. When such a challenge to a sentence is presented on appeal, we review the sentence for an abuse of the trial court's discretion. State v. Brown, 121 Idaho at 393, 825 P.2d at 490; State v. Broadhead, 120 Idaho 141, 814 P.2d 401 (1991), overruled on other grounds by Brown, 121 Idaho at 394, 825 P.2d at 491; State v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 582 P.2d 728 (1978). We conduct an independent examination of the record giving attention to the nature of the offense and the character of the offender. State v. Young, 119 Idaho 510, 511, 808 P.2d 429, 430 (Ct.App.1991); State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771, 772, 653 P.2d 1183, 1184 (Ct.App.1982). The reasonableness of the term of confinement chosen by the sentencing court must be measured against the sentencing goals of protecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation and retribution. State v. Espinoza, 127 Idaho 194, 196, 898 P.2d 1105, 1107 (Ct.App.1995); State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct.App.1982).

The determinate portion of Moore's sentence, twenty-five years, is treated as the term of confinement for purposes of appellate review. State v....