State v. Espinoza

• Decision Date: 28 June 1995
• Docket Number: No. 21643,21643
• Citation: 898 P.2d 1105,127 Idaho 194
• Parties: STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Santiago ESPINOZA, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Idaho Court of Appeals

Page 1105

898 P.2d 1105

127 Idaho 194

STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Santiago ESPINOZA, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 21643.

Court of Appeals of Idaho.

June 28, 1995.

[127 Idaho 195] Whittier, Souza and Clark, Cht., Pocatello, for appellant.

Alan G. Lance, Atty. Gen., and Myrna A.I. Stahman, Deputy Atty. Gen., Boise, for respondent.

WALTERS, Chief Judge.

Santiago Espinoza appeals from a judgment of conviction and sentence for murder in the second degree, a felony. I.C. §§ 18-4001, -4002 and -4003. On appeal, Espinoza asserts that the district court erred in denying his motion either to dismiss the murder charge or, in the alternative, to adjudicate him as a juvenile under the Youth Rehabilitation Act (YRA), I.C. § 16-1801, et seq. Espinoza also argues that the court abused its discretion in imposing a unified life sentence with a minimum period of confinement of twenty-five years. For the reasons set forth, we affirm the judgment of conviction and sentence.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On April 8, 1994, fourteen-year old Santiago Espinoza and his male companion, I.R., left a friend's apartment in American Falls with the intent to stop by a local fast food restaurant and then to go "cruising." Espinoza had been drinking alcohol and smoking marijuana, and both young men had armed themselves with knives before leaving the apartment.

On the same evening, seventeen-year old Patrick Caldwell and a male friend, J.B., left their homes to throw eggs at cars and buildings. Neither were carrying any weapons. According to J.B., Caldwell and J.B. were accosted by two Hispanic males, but Caldwell and J.B. immediately left the scene. They then split up and J.B. went home. Espinoza later informed the presentence investigator that he and I.R. found Caldwell standing next to the car Espinoza and I.R. were planning to drive. There is some uncertainty as to whether Caldwell was in the car or was standing next to it. Caldwell evidently said something that made Espinoza angry. Espinoza and I.R. hit Caldwell several times with their fists. Espinoza then stabbed Caldwell seventeen times. Several of the wounds were to Caldwell's head and were hard enough to crack his skull. The remaining knife wounds were to Caldwell's torso, front shoulders and the left side of his upper body. After Espinoza and I.R. left the scene, Espinoza washed the blood from himself and disposed of the knives. Later that night, Espinoza turned himself in to the police. In the meantime, Caldwell was picked up by a passerby and was taken to the hospital where Caldwell died a short time later.

Espinoza initially was charged with first degree murder. He filed a motion for dismissal or to adjudicate him as a youthful offender under the YRA. The court denied the motion. Espinoza then pled guilty to a reduced charge of murder in the second degree. After reviewing the presentence investigation report (PSI) and a psychological evaluation, the district court imposed a unified life sentence, with a fixed period of confinement of twenty-five years. Espinoza appeals from the judgment of conviction and sentence.

ANALYSIS

We first address Espinoza's claim that the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss or to adjudicate him as a juvenile pursuant to the YRA. Espinoza argues that I.C. § 16-1806A is unconstitutional and denies him his due process and equal protection rights because (1) the statute allows the state to circumvent the juvenile justice system, which affords a hearing before the court may waive juvenile court jurisdiction in all cases involving juveniles who commit crimes, except for those offenses specifically enumerated in I.C. § 16-1806A; (2) although he was fourteen years old at the time of the murder, he was considered "developmentally immature" for a fourteen-year old youth; and (3) I.C. § 16-1806A erroneously limits the list of violent offenses.

As noted by both parties, this Court reviewed the constitutionality of I.C. § 16-1806A in State v. Anderson, 108 Idaho 454, 700 P.2d 76 (Ct.App.1985). There, we stated that the legislative intent behind I.C. § 16-1806A was to exclude certain violent criminal acts, when committed by minors of a certain age, from jurisdiction pursuant to the Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 1989 (JJRA). Id. at 457, 700 P.2d at 79. We held that the accused was not entitled to the advantaged position granted to those within the purview of the JJRA and that he suffered no due process violation by operation of the statute. Id. at 458, 700 P.2d at 80. We also rejected an equal protection challenge to the statute, concluding that I.C. § 16-1806A passed constitutional scrutiny. Id. We have upheld these conclusions in several subsequent opinions. State v. Juhasz, 124 Idaho 851, 853, 865 P.2d 178, 180 (Ct.App.1993); State v. Lute, 108 Idaho 905, 907, 702 P.2d 1365, 1367 (Ct.App.1985); State v. Matthews, 108 Idaho 453, 454, 700 P.2d 75, 76 (Ct.App.1985); State v. McKeown, 108 Idaho 452, 453, 700 P.2d 74, 75 (Ct.App.1985). We decline to revisit the issue in this case.

We next address Espinoza's assertion that the district court abused its discretion by imposing a unified life sentence, with the first twenty-five years determinate. When a sentence is challenged on appeal, we review the sentence to determine whether it is unreasonable and therefore constitutes an abuse of the trial court's discretion. The objectives of sentencing against which the reasonableness of a sentence is measured are the protection of society, the deterrence of crime, the rehabilitation of the offender and punishment or retribution. State v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384, 582 P.2d 728, 730 (1978); State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct.App.1983).

We base our review on the probable length of confinement. For sentences imposed under the Unified Sentencing Act, I.C. § 19-2513, the probable length of confinement is the minimum period of incarceration imposed by...