State v. Moore

• Decision Date: 28 June 1994
• Docket Number: No. 64688,64688
• Parties: STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Edward MOORE, Appellant.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

Page 253

882 S.W.2d 253

STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Edward MOORE, Appellant.

No. 64688.

Missouri Court of Appeals,

Eastern District,

Division Three.

June 28, 1994.

Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to

Supreme Court Denied Aug. 4, 1994.

Application to Transfer Denied Sept. 20, 1994.

Edward Moore, pro se.

Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Atty. Gen., Breck K. Burgess, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.

SIMON, Presiding Judge.

Appellant, Edward Moore, appeals his jury conviction for assault in the first degree, § 565.050 R.S.Mo.1986 (all further statutory references shall be to R.S.Mo.1986 unless otherwise noted) for which he was sentenced as a Class X offender, § 558.019, to thirty years in the Missouri Department of Corrections.

On appeal, appellant, acting pro se, contends the trial court erred in: (1) denying his motion for judgment of acquittal; (2) refusing his proposed jury instruction on second degree assault; (3) denying a hearing on his motion to dismiss pursuant to the interstate agreement on detainers and on his motion to dismiss for denial of a speedy trial; (4) coercing him into waiving his right to a speedy trial; (5) denying his motion to dismiss pursuant to the interstate agreement on detainers; (6) denying his motion to dismiss for denial of a speedy trial; (7) denying his motion for continuance; (8) denying his motion to dismiss the information for failure to provide fair notice of the charges; (9) denying his motion to dismiss the information on the basis that § 565.050 violates due process; (10) overruling his objection to the verdict directing instruction; (11) denying a hearing on his motion to suppress marital communications; (12) overruling his objection to the disclosure of privileged marital communications; (13) sustaining the state's objections to various questions during cross-examination of a state's witness; (14) accepting his waiver of his right to counsel; (15) denying his request for substitution of appointed counsel; (16) denying his right to self-representation; (17) admitting into evidence a receipt for a motel room; (18) denying his request for out-of-state witnesses; and (19) overruling his objection to MAI-CR3d 302.04, defining reasonable doubt. We affirm.

Viewed in a light most favorable to the verdicts, the evidence establishes that on November 29, 1989, appellant and Sherry Frank, after returning to Texas, maintained her silence about the incident in fear of appellant's threats. Eventually, several months later, Frank's father told her that he dreamed she was standing in a room or lobby over a dead body. At that point, she told her parents about what happened, and eventually spoke to an FBI agent and police officers from St. Louis County, and gave statements regarding the assault. Thereafter, appellant was charged with first degree assault, and after a jury trial, was convicted.

                Frank, having driven from Texas, checked into a motel in St. Louis County.  At some point in the late evening or early morning hours, Frank went by herself to the vending machine area to get some sodas.  In the vending machine area was the victim, whom Frank described as having a messy appearance, talking on the telephone.  As Frank was leaving the vending area, the victim hung up the phone and asked Frank if she "wanted to get laid."   Frank did not respond, but went back up to her room and told appellant what happened.  Appellant requested Frank to get some ice, but she refused stating she was scared to go back to get ice.  Appellant went and got some ice, brought it back to the room, and left for approximately four or five minutes.  When appellant returned again he had splotches of blood on his jeans from the middle of the thigh down, and also on his shoes, and he looked angry.  Appellant grabbed Frank by the arm and took her to the lobby.  Appellant shoved her into the door and said, "This is what I done for you.  I broke his neck.  He's dead."   Frank observed the victim lying on the floor with a puddle of blood around his head.  The two then went back to their room and appellant told Frank that if she said anything he would do the same thing to her or "tag her toe."   Appellant then took off his jeans and put them in the shower, and asked Frank to clean his shoes.  She intentionally left some blood on his shoes, and left the bloody washrag that she had used under the sink.  At some point, they heard sirens outside and went to a nearby restaurant.  They left the restaurant without finishing eating when two police officers entered, and they went back to the motel.  When they got back, appellant left for several hours.  The next morning, appellant went to the lobby to register for another night, and was questioned by the St. Louis County police if he recalled seeing a man in the lobby the night before.  Appellant told the police that he had come to the vending area twice the night before and saw a man seated in the corner dressed in old clothes.  The police officer inspected appellant's shoes and pants and found no evidence of blood.  The victim was taken to a nearby hospital, and diagnosed with abrasions and contusions on his head and face, and a laceration of his lip.  His external injuries included extracranial soft tissue swelling indicating massive impact to the head, consistent with having been struck with a fist, foot or some type of a blunt object.  The victim also suffered underlying injury to the brain causing him to remain in a very unresponsive state, with very slim hope for any change.  He had a tracheotomy to assist him in breathing, and a feeding gastrectomy was inserted in his stomach to maintain his nutritional status.  In addition, he has repeated problems with episodes of pneumonia in his lungs and kidney infections.  During the fifteen months he spent in the hospital, the victim was not able to speak, and responded only to very painful stimuli
                

In his first point, appellant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal and thereby denied appellant due process of law in that the evidence is insufficient to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Frank's testimony refers to the victim and, further, contains destructive contradictions which rob her testimony of probative value.

On review we accept as true all of the evidence favorable to the state, including all favorable inferences drawn from the evidence and disregard all contrary evidence and inferences. State v. Grim, 854 S.W.2d 403, 405 (Mo. banc 1993). In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, appellate review is limited to a determination of whether there is sufficient evidence from which a reasonable juror might have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. The testimony of a single witness is sufficient to support a conviction even though testimony of that witness might be Here, the evidence established that appellant took Frank to the vending machine area of the motel, and showed her the man he had assaulted. Frank testified this was the same man who had made the earlier remark to her. She testified as to the position of his body on the floor, and that there was blood around his head. When the victim was later found by the police and paramedics, he was on the floor in the vending machine area with a large amount of blood under his head. Thus, the evidence is sufficient for the jury to infer that the man Frank saw and who appellant stated he had assaulted, was the victim.

inconsistent, as any inconsistencies are for the jury to resolve. State v. Rodney, 760 S.W.2d 500, 503[3, 4] (Mo.App.1988). Similarly, contradictions in a witness' testimony do not prevent it from constituting substantial evidence. Id.

Appellant argues, however, that Frank's testimony contains destructive contradictions which rob her testimony of probative value. Appellant argues that the time of day when Frank saw a man lying on the floor of the vending area of the motel is dispositive of the question whether this man was the victim, and that whether it was night or day when she saw a man lying on the floor of the vending area of the motel is a vital question in the case. He points to Frank's testimony where she states that she remembered it being light and she remembered it being dark when the incident occurred. She testified that it was dark later on when she heard sirens, and she also testified that she did not remember what time the incident occurred. The credibility and weight given trial testimony is determined by the trier of fact. State v. Ash, 840 S.W.2d 304, 305 (Mo.App.1992). We do not find the inconsistencies in Frank's trial statements regarding material matters to be so inconsistent with each other that her testimony loses its probative value. Point denied.

Appellant's second point is that the trial court erred in denying his requested instruction on second degree assault by recklessly causing serious physical injury because the trial court was required to give the instruction in that there is an evidentiary basis for acquitting him of first degree assault. He argues that the testimony of Dr. Lawrence Billy, that the victim's only external injuries were an abrasion on the cheek and forehead, a black eye and a very small laceration of the lip, supports only one inference, i.e., appellant endeavored to give the victim a black eye and a fat lip. He argues also that the victim's only serious injury, closed head trauma, was an internal injury about which appellant could not have known and which is therefore in no way indicative of appellant's intent.

Trial courts are not obligated to instruct on a lesser included offense unless there is a basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the greater offense and convicting him of the included offense. State v. Mease, 842 S.W.2d 98, 110-11 (Mo. banc 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 918, 113 S.Ct. 2363, 124 L.Ed.2d 269 (1993). There must be some affirmative evidence of a lack of an essential...