State v. Mora
| Decision Date | 25 April 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 33,590,33,590 |
| Parties | STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MICHAEL MORA, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of New Mexico |
This memorandum opinion was not selected for publication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date.
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SAN MIGUEL COUNTY
Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General
Santa Fe, NM
Jacqueline R. Medina, Assistant Attorney General
for Appellant
Bennett J. Bauer, Acting Chief Public Defender
Tania Shahani, Assistant Appellate Defender
Santa Fe, NM
for Appellee
{1} Defendant was parked in a restaurant parking lot during routine business hours when Officer Whitfield, pursuing an anonymous "Drunk Busters"1 phone tip, parked behind him and activated the emergency lights on his patrol car. Officer Whitfield approached Defendant, and Defendant rolled down his truck window. The district court suppressed all evidence gathered after Defendant rolled down his window at the officer's approach, holding that the State's argument that Defendant had been seized pursuant to the "community caretaking" exception to the Fourth Amendment was unsupported by the evidence. The State appealed. Finding no error, we affirm the district court.
{2} Whether a motion to suppress was properly granted is a mixed question of law and fact. State v. Bolin, 2010-NMCA-066, ¶ 12, 148 N.M.489, 238 P.3d 363.We view the facts of the case in the light most favorable to the prevailing party where thosefacts are supported by substantial evidence. State v. Ryon, 2005-NMSC-005, ¶ 11, 137 N.M. 174, 108 P.3d 1032 (). Given the limited written findings entered in its order of suppression, we consider the district court's verbal comments in granting it to the extent such comments might clarify its written ruling. State v. Harris, 2013-NMCA-031, ¶ 8, 297 P.3d 374.
{3} "The question for the reviewing court is whether the trial court's result is supported by substantial evidence, not whether the trial court could have reached a different conclusion." State v. Walters, 1997-NMCA-013, ¶ 8, 123 N.M. 88, 934 P.2d 282 (). We defer to the district court with respect to factual findings and indulge all reasonable inferences that support the court's decision; we also review the constitutional question of the reasonableness of a seizure de novo. State v. Light, 2013-NMCA-075, ¶ 19, 306 P.3d 534.
{4} Before trial, Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained as aresult of Officer Whitfield's stop of Defendant, alleging that Officer Whitfield's actions were unlawful, being neither the result of reasonable suspicion nor in pursuit of community caretaker responsibilities. Defendant's motion to suppress was made under Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution that protects against unreasonable searches and seizures. See State v. Leyva, 2011-NMSC-009, ¶¶ 49, 51, 149 N.M. 435, 250 P.3d 861 ().
{5} The State's response to Defendant's motion to suppress asserted only that there was "no traffic stop," because Officer Whitfield was "operating under the 'community caretaker' function of law enforcement[,]" under which an officer can "stop a vehicle for a specific, articulable safety concern." The State cited Walters in this regard. 1997-NMCA-013, ¶ 10 (). According to the State, for purposes of public safety checks, this approach to Defendant leading to his rolling down his window was not a seizure, and Officer Whitfield required no reasonable suspicion to approach Defendant, whose "vehicle was parked where the Drunk Buster call said it would be."
However, the State argued that Officer Whitfield acquired reasonable suspicion at the point "when officers smelled the odor of alcohol emanating from [D]efendant." That occurred only after Defendant had rolled down his window at the officers' approach and engaged their questions. The State's sole argument to the district court was that Defendant's seizure was justified by the "community caretaker" exception to the warrant requirement. On appeal, the State argues that it preserved the argument that "the encounter was not initially a seizure and that any seizure was lawfully based on reasonable suspicion." We disagree; the State did not argue below that the seizure was supported by reasonable suspicion, but rather that suspicion was acquired well into the encounter with Defendant, after he had submitted to Officer Whitfield's authority.
{6} The State's appellate stance emphasizing reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop was not argued below. To preserve an issue for appeal, even the State must make a timely objection that specifically apprises the district court of the nature of the claimed error and invokes an intelligent ruling thereon. See State v. Varela, 1999-NMSC-045, ¶ 25, 128 N.M. 454, 993 P.2d 1280. To the extent the State now attempts to raise reasonable suspicion as grounds for a valid warrantless seizure, they may not. "A litigant may not stand on one ground of objection in the [district] court and urge another here." Scofield v. J. W. Jones Constr. Co., 1958-NMSC-091, ¶ 21, 64 N.M. 319, 328 P.2d 389. We decline the State's invitation to address the matter further.
Accordingly, we proceed to analyze only the State's justification for the stop under the community caretaking exception.
{7} Community caretaking encounters can be consensual or non-consensual. See Ryon, 2005-NMSC-005, ¶ 1 (). However, if Defendant was detained by Officer Whitfield's pursuit of community caretaking, the detention must be based on an articulated, reasonable concern for public safety. Id. ¶ 30; State v. Sheehan, 2015-NMCA-021, ¶ 13, 344 P.3d 1064, cert. denied, 2015-NMCERT-002, 346 P.3d 370. This equates to having "reasonable grounds to believe that there is an emergency at hand and an immediate need for [police] assistance for the protection of life or property." Ryon, 2005-NMSC-005, ¶ 29 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The primary objective of the contact must be public safety and not criminal investigation. The stopping of a vehicle for a safety concern requires an objective assessment of whether the officer had a reasonable concern for public safety. Sheehan, 2015-NMCA-021, ¶ 12. The subjective motivation of the officer is a factor to be considered in this regard, Ryon, 2005-NMSC-005, ¶ 37, to distinguish the use of public safety "as a subterfuge or pretext when the real purpose of the search is toarrest a suspect or gather evidence without probable cause." Id. ¶ 34. Thus, detaining Defendant for the primary purpose of investigating possible criminal behavior is beyond the scope of safety concerns, and appropriate only in circumstances where there is a reasonable suspicion that the law is or has been broken. Sheehan, 2015-NMCA-021, ¶ 12. However, if Defendant was initially validly detained because of a community caretaking encounter, that encounter could be validly expanded at the point Officer Whitfield acquired sufficient reasonable suspicion to pursue the DWI investigation. State v. Randy J., 2011-NMCA-105, ¶ 34, 150 N.M. 683, 265 P.3d 734. This is the crux of the State's argument as it was presented below. We regard the argument as unavailing for reasons that follow.
{8} At the hearing on Defendant's motion, Officer Whitfield was the sole witness providing evidence. He was dispatched at approximately 7:30 p.m. to the parking lot serving a local grocery store and a Lotaburger in response to an anonymous "Drunk Buster" tip reporting a vehicle driving erratically that had parked there. Officer Whitfield testified that after his receipt of the dispatch, he proceeded not in pursuit of a DWI investigation, but out of concern that the driver of the vehicle in question was experiencing a medical emergency. According to Officer Whitfield, it is his custom to handle all "Drunk Buster calls" as an emergency based upon a belief that the personmight be having a heart attack or emergency health concern. He testified that he definitely was not proceeding as if he was investigating a DWI. By the same token, Officer Whitfield testified that he could not articulate what the emergency was to which he was responding, saying that "dispatch came out that it was erratic driving." Officer Whitfield's police report did not mention any suspicion of a health problem to be investigated, erratic driving, or any driving at all.
{9} Upon reaching the parking lot, Officer Whitfield saw a truck conforming to...
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