State v. Morales
| Decision Date | 14 December 2020 |
| Docket Number | A19-2077 |
| Parties | State of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Leticia Rene Morales, Appellant. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded
Kandiyohi County District Court
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Edwin W. Stockmeyer, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Shane Baker, Kandiyohi County Attorney, Willmar, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Suzanne M. Senecal-Hill, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Reyes, Judge; and Gaïtas, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
In this direct appeal from the final judgment of conviction and sentence for pattern of stalking conduct, appellant Leticia Rene Morales argues that her conviction must be reversed because the state relied on a stalking-by-telephone provision that is facially unconstitutional to prove the pattern of stalking conduct. She also argues that the evidence is insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she is guilty of two counts of threats of violence. We affirm the pattern-of-stalking conviction and conclude that sufficient evidence supports the guilty verdicts for threats of violence, but we reverse and remand for the district court to set aside the three unadjudicated verdicts for stalking by telephone and to dismiss the underlying stalking-by-telephone charges.
Morales had a brief romantic relationship with R.M.C. After the relationship ended, R.M.C. obtained an order for protection (OFP) that prohibited Morales from contacting him in person, by phone, or by social media. A deputy sheriff served the OFP on Morales on December 28, 2017.
In the months that followed, Morales repeatedly called R.M.C., sent him text messages, and came to the auto shop owned by R.M.C.'s brother where R.M.C. worked as a mechanic. Morales's conduct at the auto shop, which included damaging vehicles, drove customers away at times and, on at least one occasion, caused R.M.C.'s brother to close the shop. Morales's actions took such a toll on R.M.C. that he considered moving away or asking his brother to sell the business. On four separate occasions, R.M.C. reported Morales's contacts with him to law enforcement. Those reports led to the charges in this case.
On February 14, 2018, Morales came to the auto shop and began yelling and kicking and pulling on the locked front door while R.M.C. was inside. R.M.C. called the police.When the responding officer arrived, R.M.C. showed the officer a video of the incident that he recorded on his cellphone. In the video, Morales screams and repeatedly demands that R.M.C. "open the f-----g door." While R.M.C. was speaking with the officer, R.M.C.'s phone rang. The contact information indicated that it was Morales calling, and the officer answered the phone with a "hello." The officer heard what sounded like two female voices, but the caller hung up without replying.
R.M.C. also showed the responding officer a series of several hundred text messages that Morales had sent him over the past few weeks. The text messages from Morales included many statements expressing both love and hatred for R.M.C. Morales stated that she knew R.M.C. was dating someone new, and her messages on that topic included an offer to "let" R.M.C. have relations with the other woman if Morales could be present. She also told R.M.C. multiple times that she would make him "pay" for what he had done, stating that she would ruin his life and did not care if she went to prison. R.M.C. also reported that, the day before the February 14 incident at the shop, Morales told him during a phone call that she was going to kill him and his new girlfriend.
On March 8, 2018, Morales again came to the auto shop and attempted to enter. When R.M.C. told her that he was going to call the police, she got in her vehicle and began to drive away. R.M.C. followed her outside and took pictures on his cell phone to document that she had been there, but as he was doing so, Morales circled the block, turned back into the parking lot, and drove her car directly toward him. R.M.C. jumped out of the way to avoid being struck. When a police officer arrived, R.M.C. showed the officer thephotos on his phone and also showed the officer a text message he received the day after the February 14 incident in which Morales again threatened to kill him.
A few weeks later, R.M.C. reported to police that Morales had called him 20 to 30 times within the past day. R.M.C. also reported that Morales drove past him when he left the auto shop earlier that day. He pulled over, intending to tell Morales to stop calling him. Morales turned around, drove towards R.M.C., bumped the front of his car with her car, and drove away. The officer took pictures of R.M.C.'s car, which had minor front-end damage, and R.M.C. later sent the officer screenshots showing Morales's multiple calls.
About five months later, in August 2018, R.M.C. informed law enforcement that Morales had sent him more text messages, including photographs of herself. R.M.C. told the responding officer that Morales had been sending him messages for the past month and showed an officer the messages.
The state initially charged Morales with several offenses following the February 14 incident. After the additional incidents, the state amended the complaint to charge a total of twelve counts: one count of pattern of stalking, Minn. Stat. § 609.749, subd. 5(a) (2016); two counts of threats of violence, Minn. Stat. § 609.713, subd. 1 (2016); four counts of stalking by telephone, Minn. Stat. § 609.749, subd. 2(4) (2016); four counts of violating an order for protection, Minn. Stat. § 518B.01, subd. 14(b) (2016); and one count of failing to stop for a collision, Minn. Stat. § 169.09, subd. 2 (2016). The case proceeded to a jury trial. After the close of evidence, the state dismissed one of the stalking-by-telephone counts. The jury found Morales guilty of all remaining counts except for the charge of failure to stop after a collision.
At sentencing, the district court adjudicated Morales guilty of the pattern-of-stalking offense and left the other nine counts unadjudicated. The district court sentenced Morales to 18 months' imprisonment, stayed execution of the prison sentence, and placed her on probation for five years.
This appeal follows.
The foundation for Morales's appeal is a claim that she was convicted of multiple counts of stalking by telephone under an unconstitutional statute. Morales argues that the state then relied on the unconstitutional stalking-by-telephone offenses to form the pattern for the separate offense of pattern of stalking conduct. Because the pattern conviction is premised on violations of an unconstitutional statute, Morales claims that this conviction is also improper. Finally, Morales attacks the sufficiency of the evidence underlying the jury's guilty verdicts for threats of violence—offenses that also may comprise the pattern of stalking conduct.
We first consider Morales's foundational argument that she was improperly convicted under an unconstitutional statute. Then, we address her claims regarding the pattern offense and threats-of-violence offenses.
Morales seeks reversal of her three "convictions" for violations of Minnesota Statutes section 609.749, subdivision 2(4)—the stalking-by-telephone statute—because this court held in State v. Peterson that this particular statutory provision is faciallyunconstitutional. 936 N.W.2d 912 (Minn. App. 2019), review denied (Minn. Feb. 26, 2020). Morales was not convicted of the stalking-by-telephone offenses, though; the district court did not enter convictions or sentences for those guilty verdicts, which the warrant of commitment accurately reflects. We accordingly construe her request as one to reverse the jury's three guilty verdicts for stalking by telephone.
The state agrees that under Peterson, section 609.749, subdivision 2(4), is facially unconstitutional and Morales cannot be convicted of the stalking-by-telephone charges in this case. Thus, the state also agrees that the three unadjudicated guilty verdicts for these offenses should be reversed.
Under the stalking-by-telephone statute, a person who "stalks another" by "repeatedly mak[ing] telephone calls, send[ing] text messages, or induc[ing] a victim to make telephone calls to the actor, whether or not conversation ensues" is guilty of a gross misdemeanor. Minn. Stat. § 609.749, subd. 2(4). "Stalking" is defined in section 609.749, subdivision 1, as "engag[ing] in conduct which the actor knows or has reason to know would cause the victim under the circumstances to feel frightened, threatened, oppressed, persecuted, or intimidated, and causes this reaction on the part of the victim regardless of the relationship between the actor and victim." In Peterson, we held that the stalking-by-telephone provision prohibits a substantial amount of constitutionally protected speech and is therefore facially overbroad. 936 N.W.2d at 920-21. We also held that the statute is not susceptible to a judicial remedy and is thus invalid. Id. at 921-22.
"When a statute is unconstitutional, it is not a law and it is as inoperative as if it had never been enacted." Fedziuk v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety, 696 N.W.2d 340, 349 (Minn.2005). Accordingly, Morales should not have been charged with and cannot be convicted of stalking by telephone. We remand to the district court to set aside the jury's three guilty verdicts for stalking by telephone, dismiss those particular charges, and correct the warrant of commitment.1 See State v. Schmidt, 612 N.W.2d 871, 874, 877 (Minn. 2000).
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