State v. Morales
| Decision Date | 07 April 2021 |
| Docket Number | Appellate Case No. 2017-001796,Opinion No. 5814 |
| Citation | 433 S.C. 196,857 S.E.2d 383 |
| Parties | The STATE, Respondent, v. Guadalupe Guzman MORALES, Appellant. |
| Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
Appellate Defender Katherine Haggard Hudgins, of Columbia, for Appellant.
Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Senior Assistant Deputy Attorney General William M. Blitch, Jr., both of Columbia, for Respondent.
Guadalupe Guzman Morales appealed his convictions for assault with intent to commit criminal sexual conduct (CSC) with a minor, second degree; CSC with a minor, second degree; and CSC with a minor, first degree. This court affirmed his convictions. State v. Morales , Op. No. 2020-UP-001, 2020 WL 91599 (S.C. Ct. App. filed Jan. 8, 2020). The supreme court granted certiorari and reversed and remanded this court's opinion. State v. Morales , Op. No. 2020-MO-009, 2020 WL 5652504 (S.C. Sup. Ct. filed Sept. 23, 2020). This mandate resulted from the supreme court's opinion, State v. Perry , 430 S.C. 24, 37, 842 S.E.2d 654, 661 (2020), in which it overruled State v. Wallace , 384 S.C. 428, 683 S.E.2d 275 (2009), a case that was an integral part of this court's original analysis. Upon reconsideration on remand from the supreme court, we reverse and remand.
Morales was arrested in 2002 for CSC with a minor based on allegations of abusing the victim (Victim) between 1999 and 2000. In 2016, a Lancaster County grand jury indicted Morales. 1
At a pretrial hearing, the State moved to allow Victim's sister (Sister) to testify about prior bad acts by Morales. According to the State's theory, Sister experienced similar abuse as Victim, and Sister's testimony fit the common scheme or plan exception under Rule 404(b), SCRE. Sister testified Morales attempted to have intercourse with her when she was in the third grade; she explained that one night she had difficulty falling asleep and Morales invited her into bed. She recalled that when she got into bed with Morales, he pulled her underpants down and "his penis was touching [her butt]." She also described a couple of prior occasions when Morales put his hands down her pants. She stated the abuse began when she was three years old and occurred on three occasions; she explained the abuse occurred at home when her mother was not there.
Morales objected after Sister's testimony and argued, The State argued Sister's testimony would not be prejudicial because Morales had the opportunity to cross-examine her and the jury could determine her credibility at trial. The trial court issued a conditional ruling admitting Sister's testimony over Morales's objection.
At trial, Victim explained Morales was not her biological father but she grew up believing he was. She stated Morales began touching her in a sexual manner when she was four years old. She further described an escalating period of abuse that began with touching and progressed to digital penetration. According to Victim's account, this period of abuse led to an incident on her eleventh birthday when Morales threatened to withhold her birthday trip to Carowinds if she did not get in bed with him. She recalled Morales engaging in intercourse with her when she got in the bed. She also stated the intercourse continued after her eleventh birthday. She testified Morales abused her at home, in the car, and at the river. She recalled her mother and siblings were ordinarily out of the house when the abuse occurred.
Prior to Sister's testimony at trial, Morales requested a final ruling on the admissibility of Sister's testimony. Morales objected to the admission of her testimony, arguing:
It appears to me that it is becoming a little bit more clear as to where the conspiracy is, if that's what you want to call it; the pattern. And I think that now I'm seeing a pattern of ... conspiracy. But the consortium of witnesses that are saying the same thing for the same reason. We believe it's vindication. We believe ... it's stemming from the grandmother.[3 ] But now after hearing [Victim's] testimony it appears to be clear that's what it is. So we think that the testimony of [Sister] ... will be improper bolstering of [Victim's] testimony. We think it is improper and should not be allowed.
The trial court denied the motion without hearing from the State and explained: "I do find that the similarities outweigh the dissimilarities and taking their testimony would tend to show a common scheme or plan by Mr. Morales." Sister testified last for the State. She testified about the alleged abuse from Morales; her trial testimony was consistent with her pretrial hearing testimony. Sister also confirmed she grew up believing Morales was her biological father; however, she explained she was unsure if Morales actually was her biological father and had asked him to take a paternity test.
Following Sister's testimony, the State rested, and Morales moved for a directed verdict. The trial court denied the motion, and Morales testified in his defense. At the close of trial, the jury found Morales guilty as indicted. The trial court sentenced him to thirty years’ imprisonment for CSC with a minor, first degree; ten years’ imprisonment to be served consecutively for CSC with a minor, second degree; and ten years’ imprisonment to be served concurrently for assault with intent to commit CSC with a minor, second degree. This appeal followed.
State v. Washington , 379 S.C. 120, 123-24, 665 S.E.2d 602, 604 (2008) (citation omitted).
Morales contends Sister's testimony does not fall within the common scheme or plan exception for the admission of prior bad act evidence. We agree.
Because this court relied on Wallace in originally deciding Morales's appeal, we must now re-examine it under the analytical framework set forth in Perry . In Perry , the court rejected the test adopted in Wallace that determined whether prior bad acts established a common scheme or plan based exclusively on the similarities between the prior acts and the pending charges. 430 S.C. at 35-37, 842 S.E.2d at 660-61.
According to Perry ’s majority opinion, a similarities-only test abandoned the long-standing "logical connection" test established in the seminal prior bad act case, Lyle . Id.
For the first time in our jurisprudence, contrary to over eighty years of interpretation of Rule 404(b) and its pre-Rules predecessor Lyle , the [c]ourt [in Wallace ] stated, "A close degree of similarity establishes the required connection between the two acts and no further ‘connection’ must be shown for admissibility." 384 S.C. at 436, 683 S.E.2d at 279.... We find this statement from—and the reasoning and holding in—our opinion in Wallace is based on a misunderstanding of Rule 404(b) and our cases interpreting it, particularly the "seminal" case Lyle . The decision in Wallace effectively created a new rule of evidence, and rendered meaningless the restrictive application of the common scheme or plan exception that is so deeply embedded in our precedent. ... We now overrule Wallace .
Id. (footnotes omitted).
The Perry court instructed that the proper question for determining whether prior bad act evidence is admissible to prove common scheme or plan under Rule 404(b) is whether there is a "logical connection." Id. at 44, 842 S.E.2d at 664-65. In explaining this connection, the Perry court offered the example of State v. McClellan , 283 S.C. 389, 323 S.E.2d 772 (1984). Perry , 430 S.C. at 41, 842 S.E.2d at 663.
Id. at 41-42, 842 S.E.2d at 663-64.
The supreme court decided two other cases the same day it issued the Perry opinion and employed its clarified analytical framework to affirm in both instances. Perry discusses these two cases— State v. Durant , 430 S.C. 98, 844 S.E.2d 49 (2020), and State v. Cotton , 430 S.C. 112, 844 S.E.2d 56 (2020) —as examples of how courts should apply the "logical connection"...
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