State v. Morant
| Decision Date | 26 August 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 15194,15194 |
| Citation | 701 A.2d 1,242 Conn. 666 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE of Connecticut v. Stefon MORANT. |
Lauren Weisfeld, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant (defendant).
Christopher T. Godialis, Deputy Assistant State's Attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Michael Dearington, State's Attorney, and David P. Gold, Supervisory Assistant State's Attorney, for appellee (State).
Before BORDEN, BERDON, NORCOTT, KATZ and McDONALD, JJ.
The defendant, Stefon Morant, appeals from the judgment of conviction, after a jury trial, of two counts of felony murder in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 1989) § 53a-54c. 1 The trial court sentenced the defendant to thirty-five years imprisonment on each count, to run consecutively, for an effective sentence of seventy years. The defendant appeals from the judgment of conviction to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 (b)(3). The defendant claims that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of the two counts of felony murder, (2) the trial court improperly refused to order a competency examination of the state's key witness in abuse of its discretion and in violation of his federal and state constitutional rights to confrontation, (3) the trial court improperly instructed the jury regarding his alibi witnesses, and (4) the trial court improperly instructed the jury on the concept of reasonable doubt. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. In 1990, the defendant and Scott Lewis were partners engaged in the sale of drugs from a Clay Street house and on Exchange Street, both in New Haven. As part of this drug operation, Ricardo Turner stored drugs and cash in his second floor apartment at 634 Howard Avenue, New Haven. During the night of October 10 and the early morning hours of October 11, 1990, the defendant and Lewis were at the Clay Street house and discussed the possibility that Turner might take the money and leave. Ovil Ruiz and several other individuals who sold drugs for the defendant and Lewis were also present at the Clay Street house during this discussion.
Two handguns, a .357 caliber and a .38 caliber, were stored in the house. In the early morning hours of October 11, 1990, either the defendant or Lewis told Ruiz to get the guns, and Ruiz gave the guns to Lewis. The defendant, Lewis and Ruiz then proceeded to travel in Lewis' automobile to Turner's apartment on Howard Avenue. On the way, the defendant stated, "whatever happens, you know, keep it between us." At the apartment, the defendant and Lewis exited the automobile and Ruiz got into the driver's seat. Ruiz then waited in the car while the defendant and Lewis went inside. When the two of them entered the apartment house, the defendant was carrying the .38 caliber handgun and Lewis was carrying the .357 caliber handgun.
The defendant and Lewis forced their way into Turner's apartment. They were in the apartment for thirty minutes when, shortly after 4 a.m., they fatally shot Turner and his roommate, Lamont Fields. Turner was shot in the head, the back and the side. The bullet that went into his side traveled through his body and into his left arm. Fields was shot twice in the back. One bullet passed through the floor and punctured a waterbed in the apartment below. All of the bullet fragments later recovered by police had been fired from a .357 caliber handgun.
The defendant and Lewis then ran out of the apartment, down the stairs, and into the waiting car. The defendant took from the apartment a bag that contained money, and Lewis took another bag that contained several ounces of cocaine. As they drove away from the scene, Lewis asked the defendant whether the defendant thought he, Lewis, had killed Turner and Fields. The defendant responded, "whatever happened, happened."
In January, 1991, the defendant gave a statement to police in which he admitted that he was with Lewis during the early morning hours of October 11, 1990. He stated that Lewis was taking him home when Lewis stopped on Howard Avenue near the victims' apartment. The defendant stated that Lewis said "he had to take care of some business" and would be right back, and that Lewis then entered the apartment building while the defendant waited in the car. The defendant further stated that Lewis was perspiring when he came running from the apartment building to the car five or ten minutes later.
The defendant also told police that Lewis sold narcotics and that, when he and Lewis stopped on Howard Avenue, he thought Lewis was going to take care of some drug-related business. The defendant stated that the next day he learned that there had been a murder on Howard Avenue, and that a few days later, Lewis told the defendant that Lewis "did what [he] had to do" because one of the victims had owed Lewis "a couple dollars." The defendant further stated that at some later time he observed Lewis throw the gun that Lewis had used to commit the murders into the Mill River under the Chapel Street Bridge in New Haven.
The defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions of felony murder. The defendant was charged with committing a robbery with another person and in the course of and in furtherance of that robbery, the defendant or the other person caused the deaths of Turner and Fields. The defendant argues that the state's evidence does not establish that he engaged in a robbery, and, therefore, that the state failed to prove an essential element of the felony murder charges. Specifically, the defendant argues that he cannot be convicted of committing of a robbery because the evidence establishes that the drugs and money that he and Lewis took from Turner's apartment belonged to him and Lewis. We find no merit to the defendant's claim.
In order to prove the commission of a robbery, the state must prove that the defendant used or threatened the use of force in the commission of a larceny. See General Statutes § 53a-133; State v. Crosswell, 223 Conn. 243, 250, 612 A.2d 1174 (1992). "A person commits larceny when, with intent to deprive another of property or to appropriate the same to himself or a third person, he wrongfully takes, obtains or withholds such property from an owner. ..." (Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 53a-119. "An 'owner' means any person who has a right to possession superior to that of a taker, obtainer or withholder." General Statutes § 53a-118 (a)(5); see State v. Taylor, 196 Conn. 225, 229, 492 A.2d 155 (1985).
We agree with the defendant that the evidence establishes that he and Lewis operated a drug business and that Turner stored the drugs and money in his apartment as a part of the business. The defendant further asserts, however, that he was the "owner" of the drugs and money taken from Turner's apartment, and that he, therefore, could not commit larceny of his own property. We disagree.
The property in which the defendant claims an ownership interest is "contraband" as defined in General Statutes § 54-36a (1): "[A]ny property, the possession of which is prohibited by any provision of the general statutes...." We note that we have never answered the precise question of whether a person may legally regain contraband from another's possession. Although we recognize that General Statutes § 53a-118 (a)(1) could be read to include contraband under the definition of property; (" '[p]roperty' means any money, personal property ... or article of value of any kind"); we have serious doubts about allowing a person to claim a property interest in contraband, the possession of which is per se illegal. A person should not be allowed to vest himself with a possessory interest by crime or to invoke the law in order to disengage himself from the unlawfulness of his conduct. It is more reasonable to interpret § 53a-118 (a)(1) to preclude the defendant's ownership of cocaine and the money made from its sale. See United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 52-54, 72 S.Ct. 93, 95-96, 96 L.Ed. 59 (1951) (); United States v. Parks, 684 F.2d 1078, 1083 n. 7 (5th Cir.1982). We, therefore, conclude that the defendant here had no legal right to recover the cocaine or the money made from the sale of cocaine.
We further conclude that a person commits a robbery when he forcibly takes contraband from another person's possession. We find that it would be contrary to our statutes and absurd to hold that the defendant cannot be convicted of robbery in the first degree when he takes contraband from another person. To hold that a person may use violence to recover contraband "would be to give our imprimatur to an act the completion of which is itself a criminal offense...." Townsend v. United States, 549 A.2d 724, 727 n. 6 (D.C.App.1988). Several courts have held that a person may not use force to retake drugs and collect illegal debts from another person. Id.; Cates v. State, 21 Md.App. 363, 374, 320 A.2d 75 (1974); People v. Karasek, 63 Mich.App. 706, 712-13, 234 N.W.2d 761 (1975); People v. Reid, 69 N.Y.2d 469, 475, 508 N.E.2d 661, 515 N.Y.S.2d 750 (1987); Commonwealth v. Sleighter, 495 Pa. 262, 267, 433 A.2d 469 (1981). "For the law to approve the collection of an illegal obligation would serve only to encourage the use of violence in the collection of such debts...." Commonwealth v. Sleighter, supra, at 267, 433 A.2d 469. The Maryland Appellate Court stated: "[W]e decline ... to substitute in this State the 'rule of the gun' for the 'rule of reason.' " Cates v. State, supra, at 374, 320 A.2d 75; see also People v. English, 32 Ill.App.3d 691, 693, 336 N.E.2d 199 (1975) (); State v. Mejia, 141 N.J. 475, 499, 662 A.2d 308 (1995) (...
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...that he could not be considered to have stolen "his" drugs and drug money is controlled by our recent decision in State v. Morant, 242 Conn. 666, 671-72, 701 A.2d 1 (1997). In that case, we concluded that the definition of "property" in § 53a-118(a)(1) "preclude[s] the defendant's ownership......
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