State v. Morehouse

• Decision Date: 25 November 1910
• Docket Number: 2139
• Court: Utah Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE ex rel. BISHOP v. MOREHOUSE et al., Trustees of Fish Springs School District No. 13, Juab County

112 P. 169

38 Utah 234

STATE ex rel. BISHOP v. MOREHOUSE et al., Trustees of Fish Springs School District No. 13, Juab County

No. 2139

Supreme Court of Utah

November 25, 1910

Application for mandamus by the State, on the relation of Alfred J. Bishop, against George W. Morehouse and others as trustees of the Fish Springs School District No. 13, Juab County, State of Utah.

APPLICATION DISMISSED.

J. W Thompson for plaintiff.

A. R Barnes for defendants.

FRICK, J. STRAUP, C. J., and McCARTY, J., concur.

OPINION

FRICK, J.

Plaintiff applied for an alternative writ of mandate against the defendants as trustees of the Fish Springs School District in Juab County, Utah. After alleging the official capacity of the defendants and other jurisdictional facts, the plaintiff, in substance, alleges that said Fish Springs School District, for the convenience of the school children residing therein, was divided into three divisions, which are know as "Callao," "Trout Creek," and "Ragan" divisions respectively; that the plaintiff is a resident and taxpayer of said Trout Creek division in said Fish Springs district, is the father of two children of school age, both of whom live with him, and are desirous of attending school in said division; that, in addition to plaintiff's said children, there are "at the present time" seven other children of school age residents of said division and whose parents are taxpayers therein; that the children last named "are accustomed to and entitled to the right of attending school in said division," and, if a peremptory writ be granted, will attend school in said division; that said Fish Springs School District is situated in the extreme westerly portion of Juab County, and is practically within the Great Salt Lake Desert, where there are but few residents, all of whom live widely apart from one another; that the divisions aforesaid are so located that the town of Callao, in Callao division, is about twenty miles north of the town of Trout Creek, in Trout Creek division, and the town of Ragan, in Ragan division, is about twenty miles south of Trout Creek; that it is impracticable, if not impossible, for the children of the three divisions, or of any two of them, to attend school at the same place; that, by reason of that fact, Fish Springs School District was divided into divisions as aforesaid, and, while three terms of school have heretofore been held annually in said district, one of said terms in each year was held to one of said divisions for the convenience of the children resident therein; that there are not fifteen children of school age resident within any one of the divisions aforesaid; that, since the beginning of the current year, school has been held only in Callao division, and the defendants as the trustees of said school district declare it as their intention and purpose and will continue the school in said Callao division, and refuse to hold a term of school in said Trout Creek division, although they have been requested to do so; that there are sufficient funds available for school purposes derived from taxes levied and paid in said Fish Springs district to hold school for a period of nine months in said district, and thus to hold a term of school in each one of said divisions, and that a place to hold such school can be obtained in each one of said divisions, and that it is entirely practicable to hold a term of school in each one of said divisions; that said defendants as the trustees of said school district, arbitrarily and capriciously refuse to do their duty in providing proper facilities and conveniences for holding school in all of said divisions, and arbitrarily refuse to cause a term of school to be held in any division except said Callao division, by reason of which the children of plaintiff and those of other parents similarly situated are wrongfully deprived of school privileges. For the foregoing reasons, it is contended that this court should issue a peremptory writ of mandate requiring said defendants as the trustees of Fish Springs School District to cause a term of school to be taught in said Trout Creek division.

The Attorney General appeared for the defendants, and in their behalf has filed a general demurrer to the petition. The case was submitted upon the demurrer by both parties. The only question for solution is: Does the law when applied to the facts stated in the petition authorize this court to direct the defendants by a writ of mandate to do what the petitioner demands from them? The solution of this question, to some extent, depends upon the duties that the statute imposes upon the defendants. Section 1816, Comp. Laws 1907, provides that the trustees "shall organize, maintain and conveniently locate schools for the education of the children of school age within the district, or change or discontinue any of them according to law." Section 1824, in substance, provides that, if a petition is presented to the trustees which is signed by persons who are charged with the support and who have the custody and care of fifteen or more children of school age, the trustees may organize, locate, and maintain a school and employ a teacher for such children. By section 1825 it is provided that the trustees shall determine and fix the length of time that school shall be taught in the district in each year and when each term shall begin and end; that the trustees "shall so arrange such terms as to accommodate and furnish school privileges equally and equitably to pupils of school age...." And, further, that "any school may be discontinued when the average attendance of pupils therein for twenty consecutive days shall be less than eight." From what is contained in the foregoing sections no one can doubt that it was the intention of the legislature to vest the trustees with the power of exercising at least some judgment and discretion in discharging their official duties. If this be so, then our inquiry must be (1) whether the plaintiff is clearly entitled to what he demands; and (2) whether it is clearly the duty of the defendants to act, or if in granting...