State v. Moreiiead
Citation | 20 S.E. 544,42 S.C. 211 |
Parties | STATE . v. MOREIIEAD. |
Decision Date | 15 December 1894 |
Court | United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina |
Hawkers and Peddlers—Statute—Construction—Who Are.
1. Act 1893 (21 St. 407), provides that no person, "as hawker or peddler, " shall sell any goods without a license; that the act shall not apply to venders of newspapers, vegetables, etc., or to sales by sample by persons traveling for commercial houses, but shall apply to venders of every other class of goods, "and to sales, by samples or otherwise, by such hawkers and peddlers of * * * sewing machines, pianos, or organs." Held that, in order to make the sale of any of the prohibited articles without a license a violation of the statute, the seller must be a hawker or peddler. Gary, J., dissenting.
2. A person who solicits orders, by sample, for sewing machines and their parts and attachments, for a foreign sewing-machine company which has a store and stock of goods in the state, from which such orders are filled, is not a "hawker or peddler, " within the meaning of such act, though he occasionally sells a sample machine out of his wagon.
Appeal from common pleas circuit court of Richland county; T. B. Praser, Judge.
I. H. Morehead was convicted of selling goods as a hawker and peddler without a license, and he appeals. Reversed.
Andrew Crawford and Barron & Ray, for appellant.
P. H. Nelson and Abney & Thomas, for the State.
The defendant has been indicted for, and convicted of, a violation of the act of 1893, entitled "An act to amend the law as to hawkers and peddlers" (21 St. 407), and this appeal presents two questions: (1) Whether the defendant is a hawker and peddler, and as such amenable to the provisions of said act. (2) If so, whether the act is constitutional.
We do not understand that the act of 1893 purports either to define the long-established offense of hawking and peddling, or to enlarge its definition as heretofore recognized, but simply declares in its first section that "no person shall, as hawker or peddler, ex pose for sale, or sell, any goods, wares or merchandise, " without a license. In its second section the act prescribes who shall issue the required license, and other particulars as to such license. In the third section certain public officers are required, and any citizen is authorized, to demand and inspect the license of any hawker or peddler, and cause to be arrested any hawker or peddler found without a license, and have him brought to justice. The provisions of the fourth section, upon which the first question in this case mainly turns, are as follows: "That the provisions of this act shall not extend to venders of newspapers, magazines, vegetables, tobacco, provisions of any kind, or agricultural products, or to sales, by sample, by persons travelling for established commercial houses; but shall extend and apply to venders of every other class and kind of goods, wares and merchandise and to sales, by samples or otherwise, by such hawkers and peddlers of stoves, ranges, clocks, lightning rods, sewing machines, pianos, or organs." The other provisions of this act, not being pertinent to our present inquiry, need not be stated. Prom this brief review of the provisions of the act it seems to us that there is nothing in the act to indicate any intention on the part of the legislature to give any new definition of the words "hawkers and peddlers, " but the sole purpose was to regulate the granting of licenses to persons falling within the well-recognized definition of those words, to declare what classes of goods might and might not be sold by such persons, and to prescribe the penalties for violating the provisions of the act Thus, by the express provision of section 4, any person, even though he may be a hawker and peddler, may with impunity sell newspapers, magazines, vegetables, tobacco, provisions of any kind, or agricultural products, or may sell by sample, if traveling for an established commercial house; but a sale by a hawker or peddler of every other class of goods, wares, and merchandise, or a sale, by sample or otherwise, of stoves, ranges, clocks, lightning rods, sewing machines, pianos, or organs, is expressly forbidden. It will be observed that in the permissive clause of this section any person may sell the classes of articles there specified, viz. newspapers, etc.; but in the prohibitory clause of the section the language used is not so general, but, on the contrary, the prohibition is confined to a particular class of persons, as is plainly shown by the use of the words, "by such hawkers and peddlers." Hence, in order to render one amenable to the penal provisions of the act, it must be shown, not only that he has sold one of the prohibited articles, but also that such sale was made by him as a hawker or peddler. Any other view would subject any citizen, who sells to his neighbor a sewing machine, a clock, or a piano, to the penalties of the act; and this, surely, was not the intention of the legislature.
Such being our construction of the law, the only remaining inquiry is whether the conceded facts of this case are sufficient to bring the appellant within the provisions of the act The facts are stated in the "case" as follows: Now, while these facts do unquestionably show that a sewing machine was sold by the defendant at the time and place charged, yet we are of opinion that they entirely fail to show that such sale was made by him as a hawker or peddler. We do not think that the testimony brings the defendant within any recognized definition of the terms "hawker and ped dler, " for which see 9 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 307, 308; State v. Belcher, 1 McMul. 40. See, also, City of Davenport v. Rice, 75 Iowa, 74, 39 N. W. 191, and Com. v. Farnum, 114 Mass. 267. This Massachusetts case was very much like the case under consideration. There the court, after stating the facts, used this language: It seems to us that the defendant was nothing more than the clerk or salesman of the Singer Manufacturing Company, a foreign corporation, which had an established place of business in the city of Columbia, S. C., where it paid its taxes, state, county, and city, on its business and property in the city of Columbia; and its agent or salesman cannot, in any proper sense, be regarded as a hawker or peddler. Under this view of the case, the question as to the constitutionality of the act of 1893 does not necessarily arise, and therefore we do not feel called upon to express any opinion as to that question. The judgment of this court is that the judgment of the circuit court...
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