State v. Morgan

• Decision Date: 01 February 1980
• Docket Number: No. 71,71
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of North Carolina v. Tommy MORGAN.

Page 827

261 S.E.2d 827

299 N.C. 191

STATE of North Carolina v. Tommy MORGAN.

No. 71.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Feb. 1, 1980.

Kenneth S. Etheridge, Laurinburg, for defendant-appellant.

BRITT, Justice.

In his brief defendant brings forward and argues 29 assignments of error. We find no merit in any of the assignments and will discuss only those which we consider important.

Defendant makes a two-pronged attack on the admissibility of evidence relating to statements he allegedly made to police officers at the sheriff's offices on 6 March 1978. He argues that the statements were unconstitutionally obtained in that they were given (1) involuntarily as the products of psychological coercion, and (2) pursuant to an illegal arrest. We are not impressed with either argument.

Prior to admitting the challenged evidence, the court conducted an extensive voir dire hearing in the absence of the jury. Following the hearing the court made findings of fact which are fully supported by the evidence, consequently we are bound by the findings. 4 Strong's N.C. Index 3d, Criminal Law § 76.10. The court also made conclusions of law which are fully supported by the findings of fact.

Portions of the court's findings of fact pertinent to the questions being discussed are summarized as follows:

1. On or about 6 March 1978 Detective A. W. Oxendine and Sgt. Walter Sims of the Scotland County Sheriff's Department were investigating the disappearance of Bobby Smith who allegedly disappeared on 28 August 1976. Det. Oxendine, after receiving information that defendant had made an offer to sell a CB radio to one James Larkin, asked Sgt. Sims to go with him to defendant's home. They arrived at defendant's residence around 8:30 a. m. Det. Oxendine blew the car horn and defendant, without a shirt on, came out of his residence. Det. Oxendine identified himself and told defendant that they would like to talk to him at the sheriff's department. Defendant returned to the inside of his home and later came back to the police vehicle and entered the backseat. Neither officer at this time told defendant what they wanted to discuss with him. On the way to the sheriff's department, there was no conversation between defendant and the officers. The officers did not have an arrest warrant.

2. The officers and defendant arrived at the sheriff's department around 8:50 a. m. They went into a deputies office which is about 22 feet by 22 feet; the office has a window and there were several desks with chairs in the office; and there was also a telephone which was operational.

3. After the three of them entered the deputies office, the officers left temporarily and called S.B.I. Agent Van Parker who was also investigating the case. Upon returning to the office, Det. Oxendine and Sgt. Sims advised defendant that they had received information that defendant had tried to sell a CB radio to James Larkin; that the radio was similar to one that Bobby Smith had at the time he disappeared; and that they wanted to ask defendant some questions "about that matter".

4. Det. Oxendine then advised defendant of his constitutional rights. Defendant appeared to understand his rights and said that he did not want a lawyer present. Defendant was advised of his rights around 9:00 a. m. and he signed a waiver of rights form in the presence of Oxendine and Sims.

5. Thereafter Officers Oxendine and Sims began to question defendant about the CB radio. Defendant gave several conflicting statements about the radio including an assertion that he had stolen it from a car at the Cinema Theater parking lot.

6. At around 11:00 a. m., after Oxendine and Sims had alternated in asking defendant questions about the radio, Oxendine asked defendant if he wanted to leave or go to work and defendant replied that he was not going to work. Oxendine asked him if he wanted to call anybody and defendant replied that his wife knew where he was. The officers also told defendant that he was free to leave at any time he chose to do so.

7. Defendant declined to leave and Sims asked him again about the CB radio. He told defendant that he was not a "rogue" or "thief" and to tell him where the radio was. Sims also asked defendant if he wanted anything, and defendant replied that he wanted a Mountain Dew, some crackers and some cigarettes. Defendant gave Sims a dollar after which Sims went and purchased and brought to defendant the cigarettes, crackers and Mountain Dew which he requested.

8. Thereafter Sims left the room and Agent Parker and Det. Siler went in and questioned defendant. This questioning continued until about 2:00 p. m. A little later Sims returned to the room where defendant was alone and asked defendant again about the CB radio. Shortly thereafter, defendant gave the officers the incriminating statements hereinbefore summarized.

9. Defendant first made the incriminating statements shortly after 2:00 p. m. Thereafter, and until around 5:45 p. m., the officers engaged in the process of reducing their questions and defendant's answers and statements to writing.

10. Defendant was 20 years of age and had a ninth grade education at the time the statements were allegedly made. He was in good physical and mental condition and while in the deputies office he was offered food and was also given permission to use the telephone to call anyone he desired.

11. Defendant was not under arrest at the time he was questioned by the officers and at the time he made his incriminating statements. He was free to leave at any time and was so advised by the officers. Defendant voluntarily, understandingly, knowingly and intelligently made the statements to Officers Oxendine, Sims and Parker.

The court concluded as a matter of law that defendant was properly advised of his constitutional rights as set forth under the Miranda decision; that he was in full understanding of his constitutional rights to remain silent, his right to counsel and all other rights; and that defendant purposely, freely, knowingly, understandingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived each of those rights and made statements to the officers above named.

Defendant points to the facts and circumstances surrounding his presence at the sheriff's offices and urges this court to conclude that the totality of the attendant circumstances amounted to psychological coercion of a confession.

It is a basic principle of criminal law that an involuntary confession is inadmissible. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); State v. Braxton, 294 N.C. 446, 242 S.E.2d 769 (1978). A confession is involuntary when it is coerced, either by physical force, See, e. g., Beecher v. Alabama, 408 U.S. 234, 92 S.Ct. 2282, 33 L.Ed.2d 317 (1972) (per curiam); Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707, 87 S.Ct. 1338, 18 L.Ed.2d 423 (1967), or by mental pressure, Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 83 S.Ct. 917, 9 L.Ed.2d 922 (1963); State v. Chamberlain, 263 N.C. 406, 139 S.E.2d 620 (1965). There is no suggestion or evidence in the present case that there was any physical force exerted against defendant. Our inquiry, therefore, is confined to the consideration of whether, from the totality of circumstances, See generally Cook, Constitutional Rights of the Accused: Trial Rights § 74 (1974), such mental or psychological pressure was brought to bear against defendant so as to overcome his will and thereby induce a confession that he was otherwise not disposed to make. We agree with the trial court that the officers in this case did not exert such pressure.

While it is true that defendant was questioned for a substantial period of time, before he first made his incriminating statement, approximately six hours, in a foreign environment, there is nothing in the record which indicates that he was subjected to deprivation or abuse in the course of the questioning.

Psychological coercion sufficient to render a confession involuntary manifests itself in a number of ways. See generally 3 Wharton's Criminal Evidence §§ 674-685 (13th ed. 1973). Interrogation by law enforcement officers may be so prolonged as to render a confession involuntary. Clewis v. Texas, supra; Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 86 S.Ct. 1761, 16 L.Ed.2d 895 (1966). While defendant was questioned for approximately six hours before he first made his incriminating statements, on at least two occasions he was told that he was free to leave. He did not leave but remained seated in the office and continued to answer questions.

The use of multiple interrogators is a factor which may cause a confession to be deemed involuntary. See generally, Cook, Constitutional Rights of the Accused: Trial Rights § 74 (1974). In Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 64 S.Ct. 921, 88 L.Ed. 1192 (1944), the defendant was questioned continuously for thirty-six hours by relays of officers. The procedure was found to be so inherently coercive that it rendered the confession obtained from the accused to be involuntary. However, a careful consideration of the cases which have addressed this issue shows that the multiplicity of interrogators becomes an important factor in determining the voluntariness of a confession when the interrogation complained of extends over a prolonged period. See, e. g., Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 69 S.Ct. 1347, 93 L.Ed. 1801 (1949); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 68 S.Ct. 302, 92 L.Ed. 224 (1948).

The period of time in which defendant was questioned in the case at hand was less than one-fourth the time the defendant was questioned in Ashcraft. We observed earlier that the interrogation was not so protracted that it resulted in an involuntary confession in light of the fact that defendant was informed that he was free to leave and go to work but instead elected to remain in the office and talk with the officers. While four different officers participated in questioning defendant, there is nothing in the record which indicates that their questioning was so...