State v. Morin
| Decision Date | 20 March 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 40120-3-I.,40120-3-I. |
| Citation | 100 Wash.App. 25,995 P.2d 113 |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Sean T. MORIN, Appellant. |
James W. Nelson, Mount Vernon, for Appellant.
Erik Pedersen, Skagit County Prosecuting Attorney, Mount Vernon, for Respondent.
Sean Morin broke into a retirement center, pulled down the pajamas of a 95-year-old blind woman, touched her in her vaginal area, and covered her mouth to keep her quiet. He then stole her wallet. Morin was convicted of robbery in the first degree, burglary in the first degree, and indecent liberties by forcible compulsion. Because he had previously been convicted of rape in the first degree, Morin was sentenced to life in prison without parole under Washington's Persistent Offender Accountability Act (POAA). His appeal challenges the constitutionality of the "two strikes" version of the statute and raises certain trial issues.1 We hold the sentence is not unconstitutional, reject Morin's other arguments, and affirm.
In 1996, Ann Smith was 95 years old and blind. She lived alone at the Cap Sante Court Retirement Center, an independent living complex. On July 19, Sean Morin broke into Smith's apartment through her window. After a neighbor heard some commotion in Smith's room, police were contacted, and Morin was apprehended trying to escape through the window.
The police found Smith in bed with her pajama bottoms around her knees and nothing else covering her. Her chin was scraped, and the left side of her face had blood on it. She was visibly shaken. Smith told the police: She also told the officer that "[h]e stuck his hand down here," pointing to her vagina. She said that when the defendant touched her, she screamed, and he put his hand over her mouth and told her to shut up. Morin told her that he would not hurt her if she kept quiet.
Smith related the same story to paramedics and to a doctor in the emergency room. The doctor noted that the small cut and bruise on the left side of her face could be consistent with someone having placed a hand on her face with some force. The next morning, Smith saw her family physician and told him that a man had broken into her apartment, wanted some money, and put his hand down the front of her pajamas. Her physician also noted that Smith had some abrasions on her cheek.
At the police station, Morin admitted that he broke into Smith's apartment because he wanted money. He admitted to taking two wallets from Smith, although he saw no money in them. He told the detective that when Smith started screaming, he put his hand over her mouth and told her to shut up, and that if she kept quiet, he would not hurt her. When he heard a knock at the door, Morin attempted to flee through the window.
Morin was charged with robbery in the first degree, burglary in the first degree, and indecent liberties by forcible compulsion. A jury found him guilty on all counts. Before sentencing, Morin stipulated to a prior conviction of rape in the first degree. Morin was sentenced to life in prison without possibility of parole.
Washington's Persistent Offender Accountability Act (POAA), RCW 9.94A.120(4), also known as the "three strikes law," has been upheld under both the federal and state constitutions.2 In 1996, the legislature amended the law to classify certain sex offenders as persistent offenders after two convictions.3 Morin was sentenced under this amendment.
Morin contends his sentence of life without the possibility of parole violates the federal and state constitutions. The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the infliction of "cruel and unusual punishment," and article I, section 14 of the Washington Constitution prohibits "cruel punishment." The prohibition in the Washington Constitution affords greater protection than its federal counterpart.4 Therefore, if the state provision is not violated, the statute violates neither constitution.5
A sentence violates article I, section 14 of the Washington State constitution when it is grossly disproportionate to the crime for which it is imposed. The factors for consideration were set forth in State v. Fain6: (1) the nature of the offense; (2) the legislative purpose behind the statute; (3) the punishment the defendant would have received in other jurisdictions; and (4) the punishment imposed for other offenses in the same jurisdiction.7 The question is whether, after consideration of these factors, the sentence of life in prison without possibility of parole is grossly disproportionate to the offense committed.8
As to the nature of the offenses, rape in the first degree (Morin's "first strike") is considered a "serious violent offense,"9 and indecent liberties by forcible compulsion (his "second strike") is a "violent offense."10 Both are also categorized as "most serious offenses."11 Both crimes were committed against persons as opposed to property, a factor given considerable weight by our Supreme Court in upholding the three strikes law.
For example, in Rivers, the court considered the predicate crime of second degree robbery. Rivers robbed an espresso bar employee of the evening's cash receipts by claiming to have a gun. After a struggle, Rivers ran off with the bank bag. When the employee chased him and caught up, Rivers pretended to have a gun in his pocket and threatened to "blow your head off." The court noted that the "nature of the crime of robbery includes the threat of violence against another person," and that Rivers' crime "involved a threat of violence toward another person and therefore is a far more serious offense than the second degree theft committed by the defendant in Fain."12
Here, indecent liberties by forcible compulsion necessarily involves some force or threat of force against a person.13 As with robbery in the second degree, the degree of force may vary. Robbery in the second degree is committed (without infliction of actual injury) by use or threatened use of force, violence or fear of injury; the degree of force is immaterial.14 Thus, no clear basis exists for distinguishing indecent liberties by forcible compulsion from other strike offenses.
The nature of the offense is also a factual question; proportionality standards apply "to a specific set of facts."15 Morin's crime involves both threat and use of actual force, and a resulting injury. Thus, the nature of Morin's crime is a factor consistent with the constitutionality of the statute.
Second, we consider the legislative purpose behind the statute. The legislative history of the 1996 amendment is scant. A summary of House Bill 2320 notes only that "[a] concern exists that a person who commits certain violent sex offenses should qualify as a persistent offender after only two such offenses, instead of three."16 It adds that the "three strikes" law is not supplanted.17 Thus, the intent of the 1996 amendments to the POAA is simply an extension of the original purpose of the three strikes initiative "to provide a mandatory sentence based on the seriousness of the crime and a predetermined number of prior convictions for the most serious offenses."18 Discussing persistent offender statutes generally, the Thorne court noted that the purpose of the POAA "includes deterrence of criminals who commit three `most serious offenses' and the segregation of those criminals from the rest of society."19 Morin's sentence is consistent with this purpose.
The third consideration is the punishment the defendant would have received in other jurisdictions. When it upheld the "three strikes" law, the Washington Supreme Court did not undertake an exhaustive analysis of laws in other jurisdictions, but simply stated that Washington's "three strikes" law is similar to state and federal legislation throughout much of the United States.20
The State contends that at least nine states have some type of "two strikes" law. In Georgia, for example, any person who has been previously convicted of a "serious violent felony," which includes aggravated sexual battery,21 and commits a second serious violent felony, is sentenced to imprisonment for life without parole.22 The Georgia Supreme Court upheld the law, finding that it did not violate the state or federal constitution on the basis of cruel and unusual punishment.23 California has enacted a "one strike" law for defendants found guilty of committing sexual offenses under specified aggravating circumstances. California law also provides that persons convicted of a second offense, including rape by force, rape of a spouse by force, and penetration of genital or anal openings by foreign or unknown objects, shall be sentenced to life and shall not be eligible for parole for 25 years.24 A California appellate court found that this provision did not violate the state or federal constitution.25
As the State illustrated, other jurisdictions continue to impose stringent sentences for sex offenders. Nevertheless, Washington's two strikes law as applied to the crime of indecent liberties by forcible compulsion may be one of the most stringent. Of the "two strike" laws analyzed by the State, almost all apply to aggravated sex offense crimes requiring both some degree of penetration and the infliction of serious bodily injury. In addition, while our court has held that the distinction between life sentences with and without parole is not significant,26 only four of the other two strikes states impose sentences of life without parole; one imposes death. It is unclear what sentence Morin would receive in other jurisdictions, but it appears unlikely that an indecent liberties "second strike" would result in life without parole.
The fourth factor is the punishment imposed for other offenses in the same...
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