State v. Morley
| Decision Date | 12 March 1998 |
| Docket Number | 65252-0,Nos. 62662-6,s. 62662-6 |
| Citation | 952 P.2d 167,134 Wn.2d 588 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | The STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Martin Joseph MORLEY, Appellant. The STATE of Washington, Appellant, v. David Lee JAMES, Respondent. |
Snohomish County Public Defender Association, Charles Dold, Everett, for Appellant Morley.
Washington Appellate Project, Richard Tassano, Lisa D. Ridgedale, Seattle, for Respondent David Lee James.
Jim Krider, Snohomish County Prosecutor, S. Aaron Fine, David Thiele, Deputies, Everett, for Respondent State of Washington.
Norm Maleng, King County Prosecutor, Pamela Mohr, Deborah A. Dwyer, Deputies, Seattle, for Appellant State of Washington.
These consolidated cases question whether a general court-martial qualifies as a prior criminal conviction under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981(SRA) (RCW 9.94A). We find Defendants' general courts-martial do constitute prior criminal convictions. We also find Defendants' prior court-martial convictions qualify as "strikes" under Initiative 593 (I-593), the Persistent Offender Accountability Act. Laws of 1994, ch. 1.
Facing a potential life sentence under I-593, Defendant Morley pleaded guilty to three counts of second degree child molestation. The sentencing court found Morley's current conviction counted as a third strike, and it sentenced him to life in prison as a persistent offender. The sentencing order was signed by the judge on January 27, 1995. The second strike was a 1989 conviction for first degree child molestation. The first strike was a 1982 military court-martial for robbery and assault.
In the 1982 court-martial, Morley was tried and found guilty by a military judge. Pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 860, his conviction and sentence were then reviewed by the convening authority. Morley then appealed under 10 U.S.C. § 866, and a three-judge panel from the United States Army Court of Military Review affirmed his conviction. Finally, Morley petitioned the United States Court of Military Appeals for grant of review, which was denied. Morley challenges the use of this 1982 court-martial in sentencing for his current conviction.
Defendant James pleaded guilty to first degree burglary with sexual motivation. At the time of the guilty plea, the State claims it was aware of just one prior strike in James' criminal history--a 1981 Pierce County conviction for first degree assault with the intent to commit rape. James' sentencing range, given his perceived criminal history of one prior conviction, was 26-to-34 months.
The burglary victims were upset with the low sentencing range for James' offense, so they hired a law firm to represent them in urging the court to impose an exceptional sentence on James. It appears one of the victim's attorneys discovered James had been court-martialed in 1979 for sodomy, robbery and attempted rape. After this discovery, the State filed a motion requesting the court to declare the court-martial as a prior strike and sentence James to life in prison as a persistent offender. In the alternative, the State urged the court to vacate James' guilty plea, without precluding the State from seeking a persistent offender status should James subsequently be tried and convicted.
The trial court determined the court-martial counted toward James' offender score under the SRA, but the court prohibited the State from seeking a life sentence under I-593, stating:
[I]t would be unconscionable for the State to do so because at the time the parties entered into plea negotiations neither contemplated that the military Court-Martial conviction was a "prior conviction" for purposes of sentencing under the Sentencing Reform Act. The Court makes no finding that the King County Prosecuting Attorney's Office knew of the existence of the prior Court-Martial conviction of the defendant.
Clerk's Papers at 125. The court determined James' new sentencing range, with his court-martial factored into the offender score, was 41-to-52 months. The court then found an exceptional sentence was justified, and on July 14, 1995, James was sentenced to 108 months in prison. The State appeals, arguing it should be allowed to seek a life sentence for James under I-593. James cross-appeals, claiming courts-martial are unconstitutional and cannot be counted as prior strikes under I-593 or used to increase his offender score.
The record before us reveals the details of James' 1979 court-martial. He pleaded guilty to charges of sodomy, robbery, and attempted rape. After his conviction, he submitted a written request for appellate defense counsel, which was granted. The convening authority reviewed his court-martial and modified the sentence. James then appealed, and the United States Army Court of Military Review affirmed the conviction but further modified the sentence. James was given written notice of his right to petition the United States Court of Military Appeals for grant of review, but the record does not show any petition being filed.
As a preliminary matter, we must limit the scope of our holding. There are four different levels of courts-martial described in the Uniform Code of Military Justice (U.C.M.J.). 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-941. The lowest level of court-martial is commonly referred to as an "Article 15" proceeding. 10 U.S.C. § 815 (). The next three levels of proceedings are summary courts-martial, special courts-martial, and general courts-martial. 10 U.S.C. § 816. Both Defendants in these cases were tried by general courts-martial, so we restrict our analysis solely to general courts-martial. Our use of the term "court-martial" throughout this decision should be read as encompassing only general courts-martial, unless otherwise noted.
First Issue: Are courts-martial counted under the SRA?
This first issue addresses the general, statutory question of whether a court-martial may constitute part of an offender's criminal history for sentencing purposes. This statutory analysis has three aspects. First we must look at the definitions of "conviction" and "criminal history" in the SRA to see if those definitions include courts-martial. Then we will question whether a court-martial may count toward a defendant's offender score under RCW 9.94A.360. Finally, we will look at I-593 to determine if a court-martial may qualify as a prior strike.
RCW 9.94A.030 defines many terms used throughout the SRA. Defendants claim their courts-martial do not meet the statutory definition of "conviction." RCW 9.94A.030(9). That subsection provides:
"Conviction" means an adjudication of guilt pursuant to Titles 10 or 13 RCW and includes a verdict of guilty, a finding of guilty, and acceptance of a plea of guilty.
RCW 9.94A.030(9). Our discussion will focus on Title 10, since Title 13 involves juvenile proceedings, which are not at issue in these consolidated cases.
Morley was court-martialed and found guilty by a military judge. James pleaded guilty to the crimes for which he was court-martialed. Neither Defendant challenges the "guilty" aspect of his proceeding; rather, Defendants claim their courts-martial are not convictions pursuant to Title 10.
Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1986) defines "pursuant to" as "in the course of carrying out: in conformance to or agreement with: according to...." Webster's at 1848. Defendants claim a foreign judgment does not qualify as a conviction under the SRA unless the judgment conforms with the criminal procedures set out in Title 10. Under Defendants' interpretation, before a sentencing court can consider an out-of-state criminal judgment, it has to sift through all of the foreign jurisdiction's procedural statutes and compare them to Title 10. The out-of-state judgment counts as a conviction only if the procedures in the out-of-state jurisdiction conform with Washington's criminal procedures. Otherwise, the foreign judgment cannot be used against the defendant in sentencing.
We agree the definition of RCW 9.94A.030(9) appears plain and unambiguous on its face. It states a conviction is an adjudication of guilty pursuant to Titles 10 and 13 RCW. While it makes sense to apply this definition to convictions from this state, it would be absolutely unworkable to require out-of-state convictions to comply with Washington criminal procedure before allowing the out-of-state convictions to be included in a defendant's criminal history. Nothing in the SRA states or implies that a sentencing court must conduct the tedious task of comparing out-of-state criminal procedures to in-state procedures. When we look to some of the leading authorities on the SRA, David Boerner, Sentencing in Washington (1985); State of Wash. Sentencing Guidelines Comm'n, Adult Sentencing Guidelines Manual (1996); and State of Wash. Sentencing Guidelines Comm'n, Report to the Legislature (1983), we find no mention of a sentencing court having to conduct such a ridiculous inquiry.
Title 10 RCW contains over three dozen chapters concerning a wide range of matters, including the following list of chapters which would probably be implicated in every criminal proceeding:
RCW 10.16 Preliminary hearings.
RCW 10.19 Bail and appearance bonds.
RCW 10.25 Jurisdiction and venue.
RCW 10.31 Warrants and arrests.
RCW 10.40 Arraignment.
RCW 10.46 Superior court trial.
RCW 10.52 Witnesses--Generally.
RCW 10.58 Evidence.
RCW 10.61 Verdicts.
RCW 10.64 Judgments and sentences.
Additionally, RCW 10.58 arguably incorporates our Rules of Evidence, and our Criminal Rules of Procedure may also be implicated by these chapters, thereby requiring a sentencing court to review those court rules from other jurisdictions as well. We cannot believe any state's procedures and court rules would fully comply with all of Washington's rules and statutes of criminal procedure. If we required prior out-of-state...
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