State v. Morris

Decision Date20 November 2001
Docket NumberNo. COA00-1224.,COA00-1224.
Citation147 NC App. 247,555 S.E.2d 353
PartiesSTATE of North Carolina v. Antoinne Lamont MORRIS.
CourtNorth Carolina Court of Appeals

Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Jennie Wilhelm Mau, for the State.

Public Defender Isabel Scott Day, by Assistant Public Defender Julie Ramseur Lewis, for defendant-appellant.

McGEE, Judge.

Antoinne Lamont Morris (defendant) was indicted for second degree rape and second degree kidnapping on 15 September 1997. A jury found defendant guilty of both charges. Defendant was sentenced on 8 June 2000 to consecutive terms of 100 to 129 months in prison for the second degree rape charge, and twenty-nine to forty-four months in prison for the second degree kidnapping charge. Defendant appeals.

Evidence presented by the State at trial tended to show that the victim saw defendant in the cafeteria between 11:00 a.m. and 12:00 noon at West Mecklenburg High School in Charlotte, North Carolina on 18 August 1997, the first day of school. The victim recognized defendant because she had attended summer school with him and also had previously dated his cousin. Defendant asked the victim if she would follow him to a friend's house because he thought something was wrong with his car, and she agreed.

At the apartment, defendant went upstairs and when he came back down, the victim asked him for a drink of water. He went into the kitchen and fixed her some water, then returned upstairs. Defendant called the victim to come upstairs, and he began to rub her shoulders and breasts. The victim was uncomfortable, walked downstairs, and told defendant she was about to leave. Defendant pushed her away from the door. When she attempted to leave a second time, defendant punched her in the face, and she blacked out. When the victim awoke, defendant was on top of her. She was not wearing her shorts or underwear. She screamed for defendant to get off and began hitting and scratching him. Defendant hit her in the face again, and she lost consciousness. She awoke the next morning around 6:00 a.m. in the storage closet outside the apartment. She was wearing only a tank top and felt sore all over her body. She tried to yell but her tongue was stuck to the bottom of her mouth. She managed to kick open the door and crawl to a neighbor's apartment. The neighbors found her hysterical and difficult to understand. They found clothes for her to wear and called the police.

Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Officer R.L. Matthews responded to the call. Officer Matthews found the victim difficult to understand. She appeared to be in a drugged state, but she did not smell of alcohol. The victim was transported to Carolinas Medical Center where she was examined by Tina Haning, a registered nurse, who prepared a sexual assault kit. She was also examined by Dr. Douglas Swanson. The victim gave a statement to the police which was substantially similar to the information she gave to both the nurse and doctor. The police prepared a photographic lineup and presented it to the victim the next day in the hospital. She immediately identified defendant as the perpetrator.

Lenora Barbour, a Crime Scene Search technician, searched the apartment where the alleged incident occurred and found a white plastic trash bag in the laundry area containing a pair of underwear, a pair of shorts, a soiled sanitary napkin, a possibly blood-stained towel, and a used condom.

At trial, defendant admitted he had lied to the police in an earlier interview when he stated he had not been with the victim on 18 August 1997, had not taken her to his friend's house, and had not engaged in sexual intercourse with her, either consensually or forcibly. Defendant testified at trial that he had asked the victim to come to his friend's house; they engaged in consensual sexual intercourse; he stopped having sex with the victim when he realized she was having her menstrual cycle; when he left the apartment, he left her alone in his friend's bedroom; and he did not place her into the storage closet. He testified he had earlier lied to the police because he was seventeen at the time, scared, and he did not trust the police, nor feel they would believe his story. Defendant's mother testified she saw her son late in the afternoon of 18 August 1997, but she did not see any scratches on his neck. Defendant's friend, Anthony Thame, corroborated defendant's testimony that defendant picked up Thame about 2:15 p.m. after school on 18 August 1997.

Defendant first argues the trial court erred in denying defendant's motion to dismiss the charge of second degree kidnapping because the evidence was insufficient for the jury to find each element of the crime charged in the indictment beyond a reasonable doubt; specifically, the evidence was insufficient to show defendant confined or restrained the victim for the purpose of facilitating the rape. We agree. "It has long been the law of this state that a defendant must be convicted, if convicted at all, of the particular offense charged in the warrant or bill of indictment." State v. Faircloth, 297 N.C. 100, 107, 253 S.E.2d 890, 894,cert. denied, 444 U.S. 874, 100 S.Ct. 156, 62 L.Ed.2d 102 (1979). An "indictment will not support a conviction for a crime unless all the elements of the crime are accurately and clearly alleged in the indictment." State v. Brooks, 138 N.C.App. 185, 192, 530 S.E.2d 849, 854 (2000). A motion to dismiss based on a fatal variance in the indictment "is based on the assertion, not that there is no proof of a crime having been committed, but that there is none which tends to prove that the particular offense charged in the bill has been committed. In other words, the proof does not fit the allegation." State v. Gibson, 169 N.C. 318, 322, 85 S.E. 7, 9 (1915).

Kidnapping is defined in N.C. Gen.Stat. § 14-39(a) (1999):

Any person who shall unlawfully confine, restrain, or remove from one place to another, any other person 16 years of age or over without the consent of such person... shall be guilty of kidnapping if such confinement, restraint, or removal is for the purpose of:
...
(2) Facilitating the commission of any felony or facilitating flight of any person following the commission of a felony[.]

The indictment for second degree kidnapping stated defendant kidnapped the victim "for the purpose of facilitating the commission of a felony." The indictment made no mention of facilitating defendant's flight following the commission of a felony. At trial, the State again asserted only that the kidnapping facilitated the felony of second degree rape.

In Faircloth, the defendant forced the victim from a parking lot with a knife, drove her to a secluded area, robbed her, and raped her. The police arrived and arrested him before he could attempt an escape. The defendant was indicted for and convicted of second degree kidnapping for the purpose of facilitating flight. However, our Supreme Court held the evidence showed a kidnapping for the purpose of facilitating rape, not facilitating the flight following the rape. The Court therefore reversed the trial court's judgment. Faircloth, 297 N.C. at 108, 253 S.E.2d at 895.

Similarly, in Brooks, the defendant was indicted for and convicted of kidnapping for the purpose of facilitating assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury. Our Court held that "in order for the State to prove kidnapping as alleged in the indictment, the evidence at trial must have shown that defendant kidnapped [the victim] before he shot her." Brooks, 138 N.C.App. at 192, 530 S.E.2d at 854. We found no such evidence was presented at the trial. Our Court found defendant confined and restrained the victim only after he shot her. The defendant successfully argued under these facts the "only theory of kidnapping available to the State was that it was done `to facilitate [defendant's] flight' following the commission of a felony." Brooks at 190, 530 S.E.2d at 853. However, the defendant was not indicted for this charge. Consequently, our Court reversed defendant's kidnapping conviction.

In the case before us, the evidence presented shows the victim was confined in the apartment living room, she was knocked unconscious, she awoke once to find defendant on top of her and her clothes removed, she was knocked unconscious again, and when she awoke a second time, she was locked in the storage closet outside. The evidence presented could possibly show defendant kidnapped the victim for the purpose of facilitating the flight from the commission of a felony; however, this crime was not charged. There is no evidence defendant removed the victim to the storage closet for the purpose of raping her there. All of the physical evidence of a rape was found inside the apartment. While there was testimony that the victim kicked her way out of the storage closet, there was no evidence of a struggle or a rape inside the storage closet.

The State argues the evidence is sufficient to show the kidnapping facilitated the rape under the continuous transaction doctrine. The continuous transaction doctrine has been applied where the defendant has committed a murder and within a short period surrounding the murder also committed arson, an armed robbery, a sex offense, a rape, or a kidnapping. See State v. Campbell, 332 N.C. 116, 120, 418 S.E.2d 476, 478 (1992) (holding the doctrine of continuous transaction applies to murder/arson cases); State v. Olson, 330 N.C. 557, 566, 411 S.E.2d 592, 597 (1992) (armed...

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5 cases
  • State v. Elder
    • United States
    • North Carolina Supreme Court
    • December 16, 2022
    ...occurred after the commission of the rape had concluded. A majority of the Court of Appeals held, in reliance upon State v. Morris , 147 N.C. App. 247, 555 S.E.2d 353 (2001), aff'd per curiam , 355 N.C. 488, 562 S.E.2d 421 (2002) , that the second of defendant's first-degree kidnapping con......
  • State v. Elder
    • United States
    • North Carolina Court of Appeals
    • July 20, 2021
    ...after the commission of a felony, the State is obliged to prove the allegations made in the indictment. See State v. Morris , 147 N.C. App. 247, 251–53, 555 S.E.2d 353, 355–56 (2001) (reversing kidnapping conviction where the State alleged that the defendant kidnapped the victim to facilita......
  • State v. Yarborough
    • United States
    • North Carolina Court of Appeals
    • July 7, 2009
    ...See, e.g., State v. White, 307 N.C. 42, 296 S.E.2d 267; State v. Faircloth, 297 N.C. 100, 253 S.E.2d 890; and State v. Morris, 147 N.C.App. 247, 555 S.E.2d 353 (2001). We conclude that there was no evidence that Defendant kidnapped any of the victims for the purpose of committing murder, as......
  • State v. Robertson, COA01-111.
    • United States
    • North Carolina Court of Appeals
    • April 2, 2002
    ...or restraint of a person for the purpose of committing the felony alleged in the indictment. See N.C.G.S. 14-39(a); State v. Morris, 147 N.C.App. 247, 555 S.E.2d 353 (2001) (reversing a conviction for kidnapping where the evidence did not support what was alleged in the indictment). "[T]he ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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