State v. Morrow

• Citation: 188 S.W. 75
• Decision Date: 05 July 1916
• Docket Number: 19381
• Parties: STATE v. MORROW.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

188 S.W. 75

STATE v. MORROW.

No. 19381

Supreme Court of Missouri, Second Division

July 5, 1916

Appeal from Criminal Court, Jackson County; Ralph S. Latshaw, Judge.

Coran Morrow, alias Pearl Morrow, was convicted of manslaughter and from the judgment and an order denying a new trial he appeals. Affirmed.

E. E Hairgrove, of Kansas City, C. H. Coppinger and Tillie Jane Hairgrove, of Kansas City, for appellant.

John T. Barker, Atty. Gen. (Kenneth C. Sears, Asst. Atty. Gen., of counsel), for the State.

OPINION

FARIS P. J.

Defendant was charged with murder in the second degree and convicted of manslaughter in the fourth degree. He was sentenced to the penitentiary for two years. From that sentence he has appealed.

Defendant killed William Bradley on August 13, 1915, in Kansas City. Deceased was a negro; defendant is also a negro, a native of Porto Rico, but has lived in Kansas City 10 years; he is 37 years old, has no wife, but "keeps a woman," to wit, a certain Laura Broaddus. He has been a section hand on the railroad ever since he came to Kansas City. Defendant is a good, regular worker, except that he usually goes on a drunk when he cashes his pay check. He was convicted of larceny and put in jail, and deceased paid the money necessary to get him out. As time went by, deceased became insistent that he should be repaid. He followed defendant on a certain pay day to get the money. Defendant preferred to buy a pistol with his money rather than to pay the debt due to deceased. As deceased approached defendant the latter fired two or three times, killing the former. The evidence for the state tended to show that deceased was unarmed; that for the defendant was to the effect that deceased had threatened defendant, and was, at the instant of the shooting, approaching him with an open knife. On his direct examination, defendant said:

"When I got right in front of the saloon there, Mr. Bradley came right across with his hand up. He was wild, kind of a fractious fellow. He said ‘Here, wait there, we are going to have a lawsuit about that money. I want you to sign some papers.’ He was trying to--this Mrs. Davis and this other colored girl and the man, they were coming on. They got pretty close to us, and he said, ‘We are going to have this money,’ and he said, ‘Come on here, Addie,’ and they came running up at the same time and he went right in his pocket. I couldn’t tell you what kind of a handle the knife was. I seen the blade, and he kept on coming, and I said, ‘Don’t come on me. Please don’t come on me," because I knew he meant to do me injury. He kept crowding me and I let it go twice. I did not intend to harm the fellow. I did not intend to hurt the fellow. I have been here 15 years in the United States, and I never did any of them harm. That is all I can say."

He was then asked, "Why did you shoot him?" and answered, "I shot him to protect my life."

The learned trial court (obviously basing his action in such behalf upon the above testimony of defendant, since there was none other apposite), instructed on the theory of an involuntary homicide, under section 4467, R. S. 1909, which thus provides:

"The involuntary killing of another by a weapon, or by means neither cruel nor unusual, in the heat of passion, in any case other than justifiable homicide, shall be deemed manslaughter in the fourth degree."

Defendant’s motion for a new trial contained among others, these assignments of error, viz.: (a) "That the verdict is against the evidence and against the law under the evidence; " and (b) that "the court erred in the instructions given to the jury of its own motion." These are the only assignments of error which are even debatably presented for review by the record. And but one of these is presented by the brief of learned counsel; nevertheless, our statute-enjoined duty will call for a brief examination of the other, since we deem it to logically arise in the case.

I. The court nisi instructed for manslaughter in the fourth degree under section 4467 of our statute, which section involves the phase of an involuntary homicide by a weapon, in a heat of passion. Defendant contends (1) that the instruction on the above phase of manslaughter in the fourth degree, as given by the court, was erroneous, and (2) that under the facts in the case there was no evidence on...