State v. Morse, 31624

• Decision Date: 19 July 1951
• Docket Number: No. 31624,31624
• Citation: 38 Wn.2d 927,234 P.2d 478
• Parties: STATE, v. MORSE.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

Page 927

38 Wn.2d 927

234 P.2d 478

STATE, v. MORSE.

No. 31624.

Supreme Court of Washington, Department 2.

July 19, 1951.

Harold M. Gleeson, Spokane, for appellant.

Hugh H. Evans, Prosecuting Atty., Clarence P. Smith, Spokane, for respondent.

HAMLEY, Justice.

Marvin B. Morse was charged, tried and convicted of the crime of forgery in the first degree. He has appealed and first assigns error upon the failure of the trial court to rule in his favor on demurrers, motions and objections to the admission of evidence, all challenging the sufficiency of the information. It is appellant's position that the information is insufficient to charge the crime of forgery because the bank check there set out lacks the personal signature of any drawer.

The manner of committing the crime, as alleged in the information, was that appellant did.

'* * * willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, with intent to defraud, make, forge, and utter an instrument in writing, to-wit: a bank check in words and figures as follows:

'Spokane, Washington

3/20 1950 No. _____

Main Office

The Old National Bank

of Spokane

Pay to the order of Marvin Morse $85.00

Eighty-five no/100 Dollars

Hillyard Motors

For 1937 Packard'

said check then and there being a written request for the payment of money.'

The crime of first degree forgery may be committed in a number of ways. Among these are the false making, with intent to defraud, of any writing or instrument by which any obligation may be evidenced, created or transferred, Rem.Rev.Stat. §§ 2583, 2590; or the uttering of such a writing with knowledge that it is a forgery and with intent to defraud. Rem.Rev.Stat. § 2587. By definition, the terms 'written instrument' and 'writing' include: '* * * an instrument partly written and partly printed or wholly printed with a written signature thereto, or any signature or writing purporting to be a signature of or intended to bind an individual, partnership, corporation or association or an officer thereof.' Rem.Rev.Stat. § 2590. (Emphasis supplied.)

It will be observed that, under this definition, it is not necessary that there be a signature attached to the writing if the instrument is, without such signature, intended to bind an individual, partnership, corporation or association or an officer thereof.

Appellant contends, however, that a check requires the signature of a personal drawer in order to be binding upon anyone. It is argued from this that, since the check in question has no such signature, the check has no legal efficacy and is therefore not a 'written instrument' or 'writing' within the meaning of the forgery statute.

The recognized rule is that, in order to constitute a forgery, a writing or instrument must be such that if genuine it would have efficacy as affecting some legal right. State v. Kuluris, 132 Wash. 149, 231 P. 782; State v. Taes, 5 Wash.2d 51, 104 P.2d 751. In the latter case it was held that an instrument purporting to be a bank check but not containing the name of any bank would not, if genuine, have such efficacy as to furnish the basis for a charge of forgery.

Whether a check signed only 'Hillyard Motors' would, if genuine, have some legal efficacy depends upon the provisions of the negotiable instruments act relating to the kind of signature necessary to create liability. Rem.Rev.Stat § 3409, § 18 of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act provides that: 'No person is liable on the instrument whose signature does not appear thereon, except as herein otherwise expressly provided. But one who signs in a trade or assumed name will be liable to the same extent as if he had signed his own name.'

The name 'Hillyard Motors' signed to this check, as drawer, is a trade name or assumed name. Had such name been signed by, or upon authority of, the person or persons doing business under this trade name or assumed name, then, under the above-quoted statute, such person or persons would have been liable thereon. The check in question therefore has legal efficacy within the meaning of the rule stated above, and is a 'written instrument' or 'writing' within the meaning of the forgery statute. The trial court did not err in upholding the sufficiency of the information in this respect.

Appellant's remaining assignments of error challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict of guilty. Specifically, it is contended that the evidence does not establish that the signature ...