State v. Mulhollen

Decision Date17 December 1915
Docket Number30481
Citation155 N.W. 252,173 Iowa 242
PartiesSTATE OF IOWA, Appellee, v. GEORGE MULHOLLEN et al., Appellants
CourtIowa Supreme Court

Appeal from Dubuque District Court.--J. W. KINTZINGER, Judge.

CRIMINAL prosecution whereby the defendants are charged with keeping a house of ill fame in the city of Dubuque. They pleaded not guilty. Upon trial had, there was a verdict of guilty and judgment accordingly. The defendants have appealed.

Affirmed.

M. C Mathews and E. E. Bowen, for appellants.

George Cosson, Attorney General, and John Fletcher, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

EVANS J. DEEMER, C. J., WEAVER and PRESTON, JJ., concur.

OPINION

EVANS, J.

The defendants are husband and wife and residents of Dubuque. They occupied and operated a so-called rooming house. On May 25, 1914, an official raid was made upon the premises resulting in the arrest of eight women and eleven men, and resulting in the charge against the defendants which is now prosecuted herein. The men taken in the raid were allowed to escape incog. The women were held as witnesses. Six of these women appeared as witnesses, upon the trial of the case, and each testified to her avocation as a prostitute, and that she conducted her avocation in the house of the defendants and divided with them the proceeds of her sin. Several officials testified as witnesses to admissions of each of the defendants, to the effect that such was the nature of the business conducted in this house. None of this testimony was disputed, nor was there any testimony of any kind offered on behalf of the defendants. The case is submitted here upon alleged errors committed in the trial below. No direct error is assigned that the verdict is not supported by the evidence, but it is urged strongly in argument that the defendants are being "railroaded to the penitentiary under the guise of justice". It is sufficient to say at this point that the evidence on behalf of the State is overwhelming, and without a loophole of reasonable doubt at any point.

I. Complaint is first made because of the admission of evidence of a certain written statement signed by the defendant George Mulhollen. The admissions of fact contained in such statement were such as to show guilt of the defendant of the crime charged. Objection was made by the defendants on the ground that it was incompetent, immaterial and irrelevant, and that it had not been shown to have been a voluntary statement, and that it was contained upon several sheets of paper, whereas the signature thereto was contained upon one sheet only. The showing of the State as to the voluntary character of the statement and as to the identification thereof and as to the signature of the defendant was abundant to justify its admission. Nor was such showing denied in any manner at any stage of the trial. It is now further argued that the statement was inadmissible as against the defendant Freda Mulhollen. No such objection was made at the time of the offer. If it had been made, it would not have been ground only for excluding the statement. It would have been ground only for admonishing the jury and confining such evidence to the case of defendant George Mulhollen alone. No such question was raised upon the trial, and it is not open to the defendants to raise it now. It was also shown upon the trial by much undisputed evidence that like admissions had been made by the defendant Freda Mulhollen, although not in writing.

II. Complaint is made of certain redirect examination of certain of the inmates of this house who were examined as witnesses for the State. The complaint as made is that the State was permitted to ask these witnesses if they had signed a written statement, and to ask them, further, if such statement, was true, and to which questions the witnesses answered in the affirmative. The record discloses that the subject of the alleged written statements signed by each of these witnesses was developed in each case by the cross-examination. The only apparent object for the line of such cross-examination was the apparent implication that the prosecuting attorney had entrapped these witnesses into the making of a false statement, and that this accounted for their present testimony. The county attorney was, therefore, permitted by the court to ask the witness whether such statement, referred to in her cross-examination, was true. The statement itself was not before the court. We think it was clearly within the discretion of the trial court to permit the question, under the circumstances here appearing.

III. Other assignments based upon the admission of evidence were that the chief of police was permitted to testify that he found upon the defendants' premises, at the time of the raid, a large quantity of intoxicating liquor, viz., 60 quart bottles of beer; and that the witness Smith was permitted to testify to the reputation of the defendants' place as...

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