State v. Munafo

• Decision Date: 05 August 2015
• Docket Number: A-6 September Term 2014, 074142
• Citation: 222 N.J. 480,120 A.3d 170
• Parties: STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. Elise N. MUNAFO, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

222 N.J. 480

120 A.3d 170

STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff–Respondent

v.Elise N. MUNAFO, Defendant–Appellant.

A-6 September Term 2014, 074142

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Argued March 17, 2015.

Decided Aug. 5, 2015.

Monique D. Moyse, Designated Counsel, argued the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney).

Joseph A. Glyn, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General of New Jersey, attorney).

Opinion

Chief Justice RABNER delivered the opinion of the Court.

After a fight at a club in Newark, defendant Elise Munafo ran over someone with a car and fled the scene. A jury convicted defendant of endangering a helpless victim, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:12–1.2.

On appeal, defendant argued that the statute requires proof that a defendant's flight increased the risk that further harm would come to the injured victim. Like the Appellate Division, we conclude that the statute does not include that element. We therefore affirm.

I.

The facts are taken from the record of defendant's jury trial. On March 1, 2009, Erica Ortiz and a few friends went to the XL Lounge, a dance club in Newark, where they socialized and had drinks. Defendant and her boyfriend, Oscar Rodriguez, went to the club that night as well. Defendant and Ortiz had never met before.

At about 1:35 a.m., Ortiz was in the bathroom with a friend, Jessica Machado, when defendant entered the restroom escorted by Rodriguez. He guided defendant to a stall, while speaking to her, and then left the bathroom. Ortiz heard Rodriguez's voice and called out from another stall to ask Machado whether a man was in the bathroom. Soon after, defendant got into a fight with Ortiz and Machado about whether the women were talking about her boyfriend. A security guard broke up the fight and escorted defendant and Rodriguez out of the club.

Ortiz left the club at closing time, around 3:00 a.m., with two friends, Christina Gratacos and Nihar Patel. As the three walked to Patel's car, defendant and Rodriguez drove up to Ortiz and her friends. Defendant confirmed, “that's the girl”; Rodriguez jumped out of the car; and Rodriguez punched Ortiz in the face and reignited the fight. Patel, who stepped in to help Ortiz, fought with Rodriguez. Meanwhile, defendant left the car and fought with Ortiz again. At one point, Rodriguez kicked Ortiz in the ribs.

Bystanders eventually intervened and broke up the fight. Defendant and Rodriguez then got back in their car, and Rodriguez drove off. Minutes later, they returned and double-parked outside the club. Rodriguez got out of the driver's side of the car and began to fight with Patel again; others also joined in the fight.

Ortiz was not involved in this part of the brawl. From the sidewalk, she saw a jacket on the ground that she thought belonged to Patel. She went to pick up the jacket, which was in front of defendant's car. At that moment, defendant moved from the passenger's to the driver's seat. Ortiz testified that when she stood up with the jacket, defendant looked straight at her, put the car into gear, turned the wheel, and drove into Ortiz.

The car's front tire ran over Ortiz, who became lodged under the car and was dragged about fifty feet. Patel and others banged on the car to get defendant to stop, but she did not. When defendant turned a corner, the back tire ran over Ortiz, who was dislodged from the car. Defendant drove off.

Ortiz's friends and some bystanders surrounded her to offer help and called for an ambulance. Because Ortiz's clothes had ripped off while she was dragged through the street, a number of people put jackets over her to protect her from the cold.

Ortiz had a number of injuries including a shattered pelvis, a dislocated hip

, a ruptured bladder, significant bruising to her lung, injuries to both of her eyes, scarring, and road rash. She spent twenty days in the hospital, underwent multiple surgeries and radiation treatment, spent about two weeks at an in-patient rehabilitation facility, and had additional out-patient treatment and physical therapy through September 2009. A treating physician from the University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey testified that had Ortiz not been treated for her injuries, she could have died.

The police investigated the assault and, based on an anonymous tip, tried to find defendant at her workplace. On March 11, 2009, defendant voluntarily went to a Newark police station with an attorney and gave a recorded statement. She described the events at the club and stated that she fled the scene of the fight because she was scared. She claimed that she did not realize she had hit anyone. Defendant also stated that she and Rodriguez sold the car several days after the incident. The police tried to locate the car, but it had been sold a second time. The State played defendant's statement for the jury; defendant did not testify.

A grand jury in Essex County returned an indictment that charged defendant with first-degree attempted murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:5–1 and N.J.S.A. 2C:11–3 (count one); second- and third-degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12–1(b)(1) and N.J.S.A. 2C:12–1(b)(2) (counts two and five); third-degree possession of a weapon (the car) for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39–4(d) (count four); fourth-degree aggravated assault by automobile, N.J.S.A. 2C:12–1(c) (count six); third-degree endangering an injured victim, N.J.S.A. 2C:12–1.2 (count seven); and fourth-degree obstructing the administration of law, N.J.S.A. 2C:29–1 (count eight). Prior to trial, the State dismissed an additional count: fourth-degree unlawful possession of a weapon (the car) (count three).

The trial began on June 30, 2010, and continued over the course of about two weeks. Toward the end of the trial, defense counsel submitted a proposed jury charge to the court. It is not part of the record. The trial judge later gave counsel the court's draft jury instructions to evaluate over the weekend.

At the charge conference the following week, the court and counsel reviewed certain standard instructions and then turned to specific instructions about the offenses in the indictment. With regard to the endangering charge, the court explained that it would “read the entire statute, and then read the elements.” The court then tailored the charge to the facts of the case-and both counsel agreed with the court's changes.¹

Before the jury, the judge read both the endangering count in the indictment and the abridged version of the statute, and then tracked the model jury charge, as modified:

To find Miss Munafo guilty of endangering an injured person, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following elements. One, that she caused bodily injury to another. Two, that the injured person was physically helpless or otherwise unable to care for herself, and three that she left the scene of the injury knowing or reasonably believing the injured person was physically helpless or otherwise unable to care for herself.

See Model Jury Charge (Criminal), “Endangering Injured Victim (N.J.S.A. 2C:12–1.2 )” (Apr. 18, 2005). The court then expanded upon the above elements and defined certain terms, once again relying on the model jury charge.

Defense counsel did not object to the charge. After reading it in full, the trial court invited counsel to sidebar and asked them if anything had been omitted. Defense counsel did not comment in response.

The jury acquitted defendant of attempted murder, found her guilty of the lesser-included offense of fourth-degree aggravated assault by recklessly causing bodily injury with a deadly weapon (on count five), and found her guilty of all the remaining charges.

After the court merged certain counts and ran others concurrently, the judge imposed a five-year term of imprisonment for second-degree aggravated assault, subject to the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43–7.2, and a consecutive term of three years' imprisonment for the endangering conviction.

Defendant appealed. For the first time, she argued that the judge omitted an element of the offense for endangering: that a defendant's flight increased the risk of further harm to the victim. Defendant also raised certain other issues that are not part of this appeal.

The Appellate Division disagreed with defendant's claim about the endangering count. The panel concluded that the jury charge complied with the law and fully recited the three statutory elements of the offense. The panel found no fourth element under the statute and rejected defendant's reliance on language from an unpublished opinion. The Appellate Division also found sufficient evidence to support the endangering conviction.

We granted defendant's petition for certification, which challenges the endangering charge. 219 N.J. 631, 99 A. 3d 835 (2014).

II.

Defendant presents a focused argument—that the crime of endangering an injured victim includes as an element “that a defendant's flight from the scene of the injury increased the risk that further harm would come to the victim left in a vulnerable state, or that the victim's condition would further deteriorate.” Defendant contends that both the plain language of the statute and extrinsic sources require the State to prove that additional element. Because the trial court did not instruct the jury accordingly, defendant argues that her conviction for endangering must be reversed.

The State maintains that defendant's conviction for endangering should stand. The State initially asserts that defendant waived any challenge to the jury charge and invited any alleged error. The State also argues that the trial court properly charged the jury on the endangering count. The State contends that the plain language of the statute focuses on defendant's conduct and state of mind, as well as the victim's injuries at the time of flight, and not the risk of increased harm because of a defendant's flight. The State submits that defendant's interpretation would nullify the statute's...