State v. Murdock

• Decision Date: 04 January 1979
• Docket Number: No. 45377,45377
• Citation: 588 P.2d 1143,91 Wn.2d 336
• Parties: STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Duane Edward MURDOCK, Petitioner.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

Page 336

91 Wn.2d 336

588 P.2d 1143

STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Duane Edward MURDOCK, Petitioner.

No. 45377.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

Jan. 4, 1979.

Kessler & Sever, Keith Kessler, Seattle, for petitioner.

Christopher T. Bayley, Pros. Atty., Seattle, for respondent.

HOROWITZ, Justice.

This case raises the question of the proper use of Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS) prison record "packets" as evidence in a habitual offender trial. The State submitted three such information packets as proof of prior convictions in appellant Murdock's trial below. We adhere to the long standing rule in this state that institutional prison records are not admissible as proof of prior convictions, and remand for a new trial.

Following a conviction for armed robbery in March 1976, appellant was tried under RCW 9.92.090 on the charge of being an habitual criminal. At that trial the State offered three DSHS packets in evidence. Each packet was a record maintained by the Department regarding a commitment to a correction facility, and included copies of the judgment, sentence, and commitment order. The first packet entered into evidence documented a commitment of appellant Duane Edward Murdock in 1959, following a plea of guilty to second degree burglary. It included appellant's picture, signature, and a copy of his fingerprints. The second packet documented appellant's 1961 commitment following a plea of guilty to carnal knowledge. This packet also included photos, fingerprints, and appellant's signature. The third pertained to appellant's commitment in 1964 following a plea of guilty to second degree burglary. It included a document containing appellant's signature and fingerprints. Each of these packets was duly attested by the custodian of records of the Adult Corrections Division of DSHS, whose signature was certified by the Secretary of State. The DSHS packets were the only evidence the State offered to prove appellant had been previously convicted, as required by the statute.

Appellant first objected to admission of these packets on the ground the guilty pleas underlying the convictions were not knowingly and voluntarily made. While we do not reach this issue for the reasons stated below, the relevant facts are pertinent to the circumstances of this appeal. Appellant made an offer of proof in the absence of the jury, during which he admitted he had pleaded guilty to charges of burglary and carnal knowledge in the past, but maintained the pleas were entered without full knowledge of their consequences. He claimed specifically that he did not know the plea constituted a waiver of constitutional rights to a jury trial and to confront his accusers. His counsel argued under the rule of Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 88 S.Ct. 258, 19 L.Ed.2d 319 (1967), which held an involuntary guilty plea renders the resulting conviction void and inadmissible at a subsequent punishment enhancement proceeding. Counsel maintained appellant's prior convictions were also void and inadmissible at the habitual offender trial. Noting that appellant had been represented at each prior proceeding by counsel, the trial court ruled there was no evidence he had been unfairly treated. The court did not examine the records pertaining to the guilty pleas.

Appellant and amici attempt to raise before this court the question whether appellant should have been allowed to collaterally attack the validity of the prior convictions by introducing evidence the pleas were void. Appellant did not raise this issue in his petition for review, however, and we are thus precluded from considering it. Pursuant to our court rule governing the scope of review when a petition for review has been granted, we review only those questions which are raised in the petition. RAP 13.7(c). Appellant raised only the evidentiary question of the proper use of DSHS institutional packets in his petition. We are thus restricted to consideration of this latter issue. We do not consider either the constitutional question raised under Burgett, or a third issue pertaining to the conduct of the 1976 robbery trial which was considered by the Court of Appeals.

The second ground upon which appellant objected to admission of the DSHS packets at the habitual offender trial, which was the basis for the argument in appellant's petition for review, is that the packets were not admissible as proof of the prior convictions charged in the information. The form of the documents, appellant in effect claimed, was inadequate under RCW 5.44.010 to show they were authentic copies of originals, admissible to prove the fact of the convictions.

In admitting the packets as proof of the convictions, the trial court relied on RCW 9.92.080(4), which requires DSHS to provide a sentencing court with information concerning the existence of prior judgments against the defendant. The Court of Appeals looked instead to the requirements for admission of court records at trial, which are set out in RCW 5.44.010. The appellate court noted the packets did not meet those requirements, but held appellant had waived his right to require compliance with the statute by admitting in his offer of proof that he had pleaded guilty to such crimes in the past.

This court has consistently held that institutional records documenting commitments, which include copies of the judgments, sentences, and identification materials, are admissible Solely to prove the identity of the defendant. Copies of the judgment and sentence which are to be admitted to prove the fact of any...