State v. Murphy

Decision Date10 January 1928
Docket Number37381
Citation217 N.W. 225,205 Iowa 1130
PartiesSTATE OF IOWA, Appellee, v. D. J. MURPHY, Appellant
CourtIowa Supreme Court

REHEARING DENIED APRIL 5, 1928.

Appeal from Howard District Court.--JAMES D. COONEY, Judge.

The defendant was indicted for the crime of uttering a forged instrument. He was tried to a jury, and convicted. But because of preliminary proceedings in the district court relative to the investigation of his sanity the appeal was taken.

Affirmed.

E. H Estey, Trewin, Simmons & Trewin, and McCook & Lyons, for appellant.

Elmer F. Pieper, A. E. Sheridan, J. A. Nelson, John A. Senneff John Fletcher, Attorney-general, and Neill Garrett, Assistant Attorney-general, for appellee.

KINDIG, J. EVANS, FAVILLE, DE GRAFF, ALBERT, MORLING, and WAGNER, JJ., concur.

OPINION

KINDIG, J.

There is no error assigned because of any discrepancies occurring at the trial on the indictment. Attack, however, is centered, first, on the court's assumption of jurisdiction, and second, on alleged errors said to have been committed during the examination of the appellant's soundness of mind, to determine whether or not the main cause should proceed.

On April 1, 1925, the grand jury of Allamakee County returned "the indictment" in question against D. J. Murphy, the appellant, whereupon he was arrested, and furnished bail for his appearance. Afterwards appellant, on April 8th, pleaded not guilty, filed a motion for a change of venue, and, upon proper proceedings, the transfer was granted to Howard County, where the "trial" date was fixed for May 18, 1925. Then, at the appointed time, the appellant appeared, and by his attorneys moved to quash the "indictment." After argument thereon, the relief was denied, following which appellant then presented his objection to the jurisdiction of the district court and the power thereof to try him, because, prior to this "indictment," said Murphy had been adjudicated insane, March 30, 1925, by the commission of insanity, under Chapter 197 of the Code of 1924, while he was a patient at the psychopathic hospital in Iowa City, and that the "commission" committed him to the state hospital at Independence. Therefore he alleged that the district court had no "jurisdiction to try him on the indictment named until the finding of said commission of insanity is set aside, or until the superintendent of the hospital for the insane at Independence, or other competent authority, shall determine that appellant is cured and has recovered his reason."

In resistance, the State asserts that the appellant was arrested and held to answer under eight previous and different "indictments" pending in the same court, which said accusations were "returned" the preceding January, and, due to this state of the record, the district court had "jurisdiction" of appellant by virtue of the former "indictments." Necessarily, appellee contends this "jurisdiction" includes the present judicial action, its theory being that "jurisdiction" acquired for one must by necessity cover all criminal hearings. Thus confronted by the controversy, the district court overruled the exception to its "jurisdiction," and first called the jury to decide the mental condition of appellant, resulting in a pronouncement of "sanity." Hence, a "trial" was had to another panel of twelve men on the charge named in "the indictment," culminating in a verdict of guilty.

Grounds for reversal will now be considered in the order first above named.

I. At the outset, there is to be met the contention against "jurisdiction."

Appellant's major premise is based upon Stone v. Conrad, 105 Iowa 21, 74 N.W. 910, and Quaintance v. Lamb, 185 Iowa 237, 170 N.W. 398. Stone v. Conrad, supra, was in certiorari, and presented a situation where a jury in the district court found the defendant insane, whereupon he was confined in the department for such in the penitentiary at Anamosa. This he resisted, upon the theory that the condition of his mentality should have been determined by the county "commissioners of insanity," before whom application was pending at the time "the indictment was returned." We said there:

"The district court has exclusive jurisdiction in criminal matters, save where otherwise conferred. Certainly it will not be contended that the commissioners of insanity have any criminal jurisdiction. When the jurisdiction of the district court has once attached in a criminal case, it continues; and it extends, by express terms of the statute, to the investigation of the sanity of a defendant. When does this jurisdiction attach? * * * Can it be that, after the jurisdiction of the district court has attached, but before the trial of the case has actually begun, the commissioners of insanity can open the jail door, take out the criminal defendant, and dispose of him as they may think best? Surely this is not the law. It must be that the jurisdiction of the district court attaches at the time of the service of a warrant issued upon an indictment, and that from this time it has control of the person of defendant, not only for the purpose of the criminal investigation, but for all matters incident thereto."

Quaintance v. Lamb, supra, involved a writ of habeas corpus. Defendant was in the jail of Mahaska County, charged with the crime of murder, but neither convicted nor "indicted." Information charging him with insanity was duly filed. Thereupon, investigation was had before the "commissioners," ending in an order issued for his commitment to the hospital at Mt. Pleasant. That command was placed in the hands of the sheriff for service. However, instead of obeying it, he removed the accused from the Mahaska County jail to that of Poweshiek County, for detention, pending trial for the crime. Injunction was sought to stay this action, but refused, and the prisoner ordered into court for arraignment; when objection was made that he was in the custody of the superintendent of the hospital for the insane, and not subject to the "jurisdiction" of the court for "trial." These protestations were overruled, arraignment was had, and a plea of not guilty entered. Over defendant's remonstrance, the trial date was fixed; but in the meantime, application was made to this court for the writ. Language of the opinion is to the effect that:

"This [the statute] plainly contemplates that the prisoner shall be treated at the Hospital for the Insane until restored to reason. He could not be put on trial before. The superintendent of the hospital is to determine when he is cured, and issue his warrant accordingly. There seems to be no escape from the conclusion that, under these statutes, the accused should have been taken to the Hospital for Insane, and there retained as a prisoner, and treated as a patient, until the superintendent found his reason restored, and issued a warrant for his return to the jail of the county, after which he would be subject to being put on trial. * * * It must be that the jurisdiction of the district court attaches at the time of the service of a warrant issued upon an indictment, and that from this time it has control of the person of the defendant, not only for the purpose of the criminal investigation, but for all matters incident thereto."

Before us in the case at bar is the situation where, under the citations made, the district court had "jurisdiction" of appellant for the purpose of the eight "indictments" returned in January, and for all legal objects directly and indirectly connected therewith the right of the district court to proceed was supreme. Pending at the same time was the present "indictment." The district court had a right to try the defendant on any one or all of the previous eight charges. When so doing, that court was entitled to have adjudged, through the intervention of the jury, the question of appellant's "sanity." Had the present inquiry for that purpose been instituted under any one of the eight offenses named, the result no doubt would have been the same. Can it be said that, while that is true so far as the January "indictments" are concerned, yet, because of the action of the psychopathic commission, it is not so in reference to the April "indictment," even though all are existing at the same time in the same court? To put the proposition in another way is to say that, within the contemplation of the law, the appellant is "sane and insane" at the same moment. Surely there cannot be attributed to the legislative intention a ridiculousness approaching an absurdity.

Section 3540 of the Code of 1924 provides:

"Said commission shall, except as otherwise provided, have jurisdiction of all applications for the commitment to the state hospitals for the insane, or for the otherwise safe-keeping, of insane persons within its county, unless the application is filed with the commission at a time when the alleged insane person is being held in custody under an indictment returned by the grand jury or under a trial information filed by the county attorney."

Code of 1924, Section 3993, contains this enactment:

" The medical director, the assistant medical director, and one other member of the medical staff of the state psychopathic hospital shall constitute a commission of insanity; and said commission is hereby vested with all the rights, powers duties, and obligations of the commission of insanity as now constituted by law, except as herein provided, with full power to receive and act upon all applications filed hereunder, as fully as the commission of insanity is empowered and authorized by law to do. ...

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