State v. Murphy
| Decision Date | 13 December 1911 |
| Citation | 72 S.E. 1075,157 N.C. 614 |
| Parties | STATE v. MURPHY. |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
In view of Revisal 1905, § 3271, providing that the jury shall determine in their verdict whether the crime is murder in the first or second degree, their determination of guilt in the first degree being necessary to imposition of the death sentence, trial courts should always require juries in such cases to definitely and expressly say in their verdict of what degree of murder they convict.
[Ed. Note.— For other cases, see Homicide, Cent. Dig. §§ 671-675; Dec. Dig. § 313.*]
While voluntary drunkenness is no excuse for crime, yet drunkenness so great as to prevent a killing being "deliberate and premeditated, " necessary for murder in the first degree, and embodying a specific, definite intent, will reduce the degree of the offense, unless, while the killing was during such drunkenness, the purpose to kill was deliberately formed when defendant was sober.
[Ed. Note.— For other cases, see Homicide, Cent. Dig. §§ 45, 46, 133 Dec. Dig. § 28.*] Appeal from Superior Court, Yancey County; Lane, Judge.
Charles Murphy was convicted of murder, and appeals. Reversed, and new trial ordered.
There was evidence tending to show that on the 21st of December, 1910, the prisoner, openly and in the presence of several witnesses, shot John Simmons, the deceased, in the back with a pistol, and killed him, and that the killing was deliberate and premeditated. There was evidence on the part of the prisoner tending to show that the killing was not deliberate, of premeditated purpose; (2) that the mind of the prisoner was at the time so affected by disease that he was incapable of committing crime; (3) that the mind of the prisoner was so affected at the time by voluntary drunkenness that he was incapable of committing murder in the first degree. The court charged the jury as to the degrees of crime embraced in the bill of indictment and on different phases of the evidence elaborately as to nonresponsibility for crime in case of insanity, and in closing, the charge said: The jury rendered a verdict of "Guilty, " and, the same being so recorded, there was sentence of death, and the prisoner excepted and appealed, assigning for error (1) that the court failed and refused to charge, as requested, that if the mind of the prisoner at the time of the killing was so affected by drunkenness, though voluntary, as to be incapable of forming or entertaining a deliberate, premeditated purpose to take the life of the deceased, he could not be convicted of murder in the first degree; (2) that the verdict, as rendered, did not justify the court in pronouncing sentence of death.
Gardner & Gardner and Justice & Broad-hurst, for appellant.
T. W. Bickett, Atty. Gen., and Geo. L. Jones, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
HOKE, J. (after stating the facts as above). [1] Our statute, dividing the crime of murder into two degrees, concluded with the direction that the jury before whom an offender is tried "shall determine, in their verdict, whether the crime is murder in the first or second degree." This portion of the law now appears in Revisal, § 3271, and contains peremptory requirement that, before sentence of death may be pronounced, the trial jury shall determine in their verdict that the prisoner is guilty of murder in the first degree. We have held in several cases that although a verdict, as expressed, may not be sufficiently determinative, it may become so by reference to the pleadings or the charge of the court or even to the evidence, when the same all appears of record. An instance of the verdict cured by reference to the charge of the trial judge is afforded in Richardson v. Edwards, 72 S. E. 482, at the present term. Under this principle and owing to the very definite and precise instructions of the court as to the terms of the verdict, in case the jury should find the prisoner guilty of murder in the first degree, we might not feel constrained to disturb the judgment of the court, but we deem it proper to say that, having regard for the language of the statute and the supreme importance of the issue, our trial courts should always require that juries in capital cases should definitely and expressly say of what degree of murder they convict the prisoner and the verdict should be recorded as...
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State v. Cooper, 89
...560, 567 (1968), and cases cited; State v. Bunn, 283 N.C. 444, 458, 196 S.E.2d 777, 787 (1973), and cases cited. In State v. Murphy, 157 N.C. 614, 72 S.E. 1075 (1911), Hoke, J. (later C.J.), states: '(S)ince the statute dividing the crime of murder into two degrees (G.S. § 14--17) and in ca......
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State v. Kirkley
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... ... Defendant contends that the evidence as to his intoxication is sufficient to require the submission of the question of second degree murder and that the failure of the court to do so was error ... Speaking to the question of intoxication, in State v. Murphy, 157 N.C. 614, 72 S.E ... 1075 (1911), Justice Hoke, (later Chief Justice) said: ... '* * * It is very generally understood that voluntary drunkenness is no legal excuse for crime, and the position has been held controlling in many causes in this State and on indictments for homicide * * *. The ... ...
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