State v. Murphy

• Decision Date: 01 February 1910
• Citation: 125 S.W. 557,146 Mo. App. 707
• Parties: STATE v. MURPHY.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

125 S.W. 557

146 Mo. App. 707

STATE v. MURPHY.

St. Louis Court of Appeals. Missouri.

February 1, 1910.

1. CRIMINAL LAW (§§ 520, 522)—EVIDENCE— JUDICIAL CONFESSION—STATE'S EVIDENCE.

A judicial confession, obtained from accused by his turning state's evidence in a former trial of S., in which accused testified that he stole the goods in question and sold them to S., was inadmissible against accused, if induced by promise of immunity from prosecution, or by flattery of hope held out, or by reason of fear.

2. CRIMINAL LAW (§ 692)—EVIDENCE — CONFESSIONS —RIGHT OF OBJECTION.

Accused could not object to the admissibility of an alleged judicial confession where it was brought out by his counsel in cross-examining a witness for the state.

3. CRIMINAL LAW (§ 538)—EVIDENCE—CONFESSION.

Confessions voluntarily made by accused, being against his interest, are presumed to be true.

Appeal from St. Louis Circuit Court; Hugo Muench, Judge.

Edward Murphy was convicted of petit larceny, and he appeals. Affirmed.

James R. Claiborne, for appellant. Arthur N. Sager and Cleveland A. Newton, for the State.

NORTONI, J.

The defendant was convicted of the offense of petit larceny. His punishment having been fixed at one year in jail and a fine of $100, an appeal is prosecuted to this court by him.

No briefs are on file for either party, but we have examined the record for error, as is our duty under the statute. The information filed is regular in every respect, and sufficiently charges the offense of which defendant was convicted. Defendant was duly arraigned, pleaded not guilty, and afforded the benefit of a trial by jury which resulted as above indicated. It appears he was employed as a foreman in one of the departments of the Friedman Bros. Shoe Company's factory, and while thus employed stole and carried away 10 pairs of shoes, the property of the Friedman Bros. Shoe Company of the value of $22.50. After having carried away the shoes, he sold them to one Simon Slime, a retail dealer. There is an abundance of testimony tending to prove the theft, besides, after it was discovered, the defendant confessed the same to the superintendent of the shoe factory and other parties as well. The court instructed the jury fully and fairly covering the offense of petit larceny, and directed the defendant's acquittal unless the jury found his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury were told, too, that the law presumed the defendant innocent of the offense charged against him, and that this presumption attended him throughout the trial, and that the burden was on the state to overcome the same and establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; that if the jury entertained a reasonable doubt as to any material fact essential to establish the offense, they should give the defendant the benefit of such doubt and acquit him.

Manifestly, the principal question intended for review here relates to the action of the trial court in receiving in evidence a confession given by defendant in another trial. It appears, upon discovering the theft of the shoes and the sale thereof by defendant to Simon Slime, a retail dealer, both the defendant and Slime were arrested on warrants issued out of the Court of Criminal Correction. The defendant was charged with petit larceny for having stolen the shoes, and Slime was separately charged with the offense of having received stolen property from defendant, with the knowledge that it had been stolen. Slime was tried in that court on the charge preferred against him, and the defendant testified for the state in that prosecution; that is to say, the defendant gave testimony to the effect that he stole the shoes and sold them to Slime. Slime was acquitted, and thereupon the prosecuting officer of that ...