State v. Murphy
Decision Date | 21 March 1990 |
Docket Number | No. 88-2015,88-2015 |
Citation | 49 Ohio St.3d 293,551 N.E.2d 1292 |
Parties | The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. MURPHY, Appellant. |
Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
A court of appeals retains jurisdiction to render a determination in a felony case upon an application for reconsideration unless and until the Ohio Supreme Court exercises its discretionary and exclusive jurisdiction to hear such case pursuant to Section 2(B)(2)(b), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution.
By opinion filed September 24, 1987, defendant-appellant, Joseph D. Murphy, was sentenced to death by the court of common pleas. Subsequently, the Ohio Public Defender ("OPD") was appointed as co-counsel to represent appellant in his capital appeal as of right. In April 1988, Gerald A. Moore, an attorney with the OPD, left that position and began working for the Marion County Prosecutor's office.
Consequently, appellant filed a motion with the court of appeals in order to disqualify the entire Marion County Prosecutor's office on the grounds of conflict of interest and DR 5-105. The plaintiff-appellee, state of Ohio, did not respond to appellant's motion, and on June 27, 1988, the court of appeals granted the motion " * * * that said Marion County Prosecutor and his entire staff be removed from any further prosecution in this appeal."
On June 30, 1988, appellee made an application for reconsideration of the court of appeals' disqualification order. This application was accompanied by a memorandum and supporting affidavits. However, the appellee also filed a notice of appeal to this court on July 25, 1988 in order to appeal the appellate court's disqualification-of-counsel order. In addition, appellee filed a motion requesting that this court defer consideration of the appeal until the appellate court would make its decision on the reconsideration application.
In a judgment entry and opinion filed November 21, 1988, the court of appeals granted the application for reconsideration, vacated its prior disqualification order, and overruled appellant's motion except as to Gerald Moore. Consequently, the appellee moved to dismiss its appeal before this court, and the dismissal was granted on November 25, 1988 (case No. 88-1492).
On November 22, 1988, the appellant filed a notice of appeal in this court in order to challenge the jurisdiction of the court of appeals in granting the motion for reconsideration which occurred subsequent to appellee's motion requesting that this court review the disqualification order.
The cause is now before this court upon the allowance of a motion for leave to appeal.
Jim Slagle, Pros. Atty., for appellee.
Randall M. Dana, public defender Joann Bour-Stokes, Jane P. Perry, Columbus, and Michael Grimes, for appellant.
Jeffrey M. Welbaum, Pros. Atty., and Thomas Petkewitz, Dayton, urging affirmance for amicus curiae, Ohio Pros. Attys. Ass'n.
The dispositive issue before us in this appeal is whether a court of appeals may grant an application for reconsideration while a motion for leave to appeal or to certify the record is pending before this court. Stated differently, we are asked to determine whether the mere filing of such a motion or notice of appeal before this court divests the court of appeals of jurisdiction in toto. Since it is our view that the jurisdiction of the court of appeals does not end, in this context, until this court exercises and accepts exclusive jurisdiction in a case requesting invocation of the court's power of discretionary review, we affirm the decision of the court of appeals below. 1
Appellant argues that pursuant to Section 1, Rule I of the Supreme Court Rules of Practice, the filing of a notice of appeal before this court is sufficient to secure the jurisdiction of this court while severing the jurisdiction of the court of appeals. Appellant contends that R.C. 2505.04 supports the proposition that filing a notice of appeal is the only jurisdictional step necessary in order to perfect an appeal. Appellant further submits that the requisite time period for filing an application for reconsideration (ten days under App.R. 26) and the time period for filing a notice of appeal before this court (thirty days under Section 1, Rule I of the Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court) provide ample opportunity for the court of appeals to decide an application for reconsideration. It is appellant's contention that permitting simultaneous appeal and reconsideration applications will encourage forum shopping in that an aggrieved party will be able to litigate the same issue in both courts in the hope of a favorable decision from either court.
The appellee asserts that the mere filing of a notice of appeal is not enough to obtain the jurisdiction of this court when the matter involves this court's discretionary jurisdiction to review cases. Appellee submits that the notice of appeal filed before this court, while the reconsideration application was pending before the court of appeals, clearly requested this court's discretionary jurisdiction under Section 2(B)(2)(b), Article IV of the Ohio Constitution. Appellee argues that the jurisdiction of this court is not automatically invoked upon the mere filing of a notice of appeal in the context of this court's discretionary powers of review. In support of such argument, appellee points to Sections 4 and 6 of Rule II of the Rules of Practice of the Supreme Court, which require memoranda from both parties to either support or contest the jurisdiction of the court. Appellee contends that a decision in favor of appellant on this issue will put litigants in the unfortunate predicament of having to choose whether to pursue reconsideration of the court of appeals' decision or whether to pursue an appeal to this court, which would result in more appeals to this court on matters that the court of appeals can and should be able to correct itself.
App.R. 26 provides in relevant part:
R.C. 2505.04 states in pertinent part:
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State v. Moore
...to certify the record." State ex rel. LTV Steel Co. v. Gwin, 64 Ohio St.3d 245, 249, 594 N.E.2d 616 (1992), citing State v. Murphy, 49 Ohio St.3d 293, 551 N.E.2d 1292 (1990), and Cincinnati v. Alcorn, 122 Ohio St. 294, 171 N.E. 330 (1930). And "by virtue of the jurisdiction conferred by Sec......
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State v. Williams
...to hear Williams I , the court of appeals had the authority to reconsider and vacate its initial decision. See State v. Murphy , 49 Ohio St.3d 293, 296, 551 N.E.2d 1292 (1990) (a court of appeals retains jurisdiction to rule on an application for reconsideration unless and until this court ......
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Myers, In re
...between civil and criminal cases in Keenan is at odds with dictum in the court's previous decision of State v. Murphy (1990), 49 Ohio St.3d 293, 294, 551 N.E.2d 1292, 1294, fn. 1, which noted that the substantial interest implicated in Russell, i.e., the right to counsel of one's choice, wo......
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In re Rena Fern Myers. Appeal, 95-LW-4949
... ... conferred by Section 3(B)(2), Article IV, Ohio Constitution ... and R.C. 2505.02. See Chef Italiano Corp. v. Kent State ... Univ. (1989), 44 Ohio St.3d 86, 89, 541 N.E.2d 64, 66 ... I ... The ... order denying the admission ... criminal cases in Keenan is at odds with dictum in ... the court's previous decision of State v. Murphy ... (1990), 39 Ohio St.3d 293, 294, 551 N.E.2d 1292, 1294, ... fn. 1, which noted that the substantial interest implicated ... in ... ...