State v. Murray

• Decision Date: 03 January 1940
• Docket Number: 729.
• Citation: 6 S.E.2d 513,216 N.C. 681
• Parties: STATE v. MURRAY et al.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

6 S.E.2d 513

216 N.C. 681

STATE v. MURRAY et al.

No. 729.

Supreme Court of North Carolina

January 3, 1940

confessions, and at time respective confessions were made in presence of other defendant, such other defendant had full opportunity to make denial thereof.

R M. Gantt and Bennett & McDonald, all of Durham, for defendants, appellants.

Harry McMullan, Atty. Gen., and T. W. Bruton and Geo. B. Patton Asst. Attys. Gen., for the State.

SCHENCK Justice.

The defendants were each convicted of murder in the first degree and from sentence of death appealed to the Supreme Court assigning errors.

The State's evidence tended to show that on the night of September 22, 1938, one Alford Marshall Snipes received fatal wounds from which he died three days later; that Snipes was a tobacco farmer and had sold his tobacco at a warehouse in Durham and had a cashier's check for $100 in his possession which he had received from the sale of his tobacco; that the defendants worked in and about the warehouse and knew that Snipes had the check; that the defendants planned between themselves to rob Snipes of the check; that after the defendants and Snipes had drunk a pint of whiskey one of the defendants put Snipes on a pallet in a room at the warehouse used for sleeping quarters for farmers selling their tobacco there; that after Snipes had fallen asleep the defendants returned to where he was, and one of them struck him over the head with a bottle and then with a piece of iron, while the other defendant kept watch; that then both of the defendants ransacked the clothing of Snipes and took from him the cashier's check, which they took to the bank and cashed, one defendant getting the money from the cashier while the other waited on the outside of the bank; that the defendants divided the money between them.

The defendants did not testify in their own behalf, but offered evidence tending to show that they, and each of them, were insane at the time the alleged crime was committed, and did not possess mental capacity to understand the consequences of their acts.

We will adopt for the discussion of the exceptive assignments of error the order in which they are brought forward in the appellants' brief.

Exceptions 3, 4, and 5 relate to the warning given to the defendants before they made the confessions offered in evidence by the State. The defendants contend that the warning was not sufficient. With this contention we cannot concur, since it appears from the testimony of the officer by whom the confessions were sought to be proven that he did not offer the defendants any reward or inducements to make the confessions, did not threaten them, and warned them of their rights and said to them "This is a very serious matter, and I presume you know what it is about. It is about this man that has been hit at the warehouse." Ordinarily, confessions are to be taken as prima facie voluntary and admissible in evidence unless the contrary is shown and the burden is upon the party against whom they are offered to so show. State v. Sanders, 84 N.C. 728, 729, State v. Rodman, 188 N.C. 720, 125 S.E. 486. The defendants produced no evidence of involuntariness and no such evidence appeared in that of the State.

Exceptions 11, 12, 13 and 14 relate to his Honor's permitting the witness Featherstone to relate what the defendants said to him, an officer. "Where there is no duress, threat, or inducement, and the court found there was none here, the fact that the defendants were under arrest at the time the confessions were made does not ipso facto render them incompetent. State v. Newsome, 195 N.C. 552, 143 S.E. 187; State v. Drakeford, 162 N.C. 667, 78 S.E. 308. 'We are not aware of any decision which holds a confession, otherwise voluntary, inadmissible because of the number of officers present at the time it was made; nor has the diligence of counsel discovered any.' State v. Gray, 192 N.C. 594, 135 S.E. 535." State v. Stefanoff, 206 N.C. 443, 174 S.E. 411, 412.

Exception 17 relates to his Honor's instruction as to the confessions made by the respective defendants as testified to by the witness Featherstone. His Honor instructed the jury that any statement made by the defendant Murray when the defendant Stephens was not present was competent only against Murray, and any statement made by the defendant Stephens when Murray was not present was competent only against Stephens; and that statements made by Murray in Stephens' presence, and statements made by Stephens in Murray's presence, were competent against both defendants. This was a correct instruction under the circumstances of this case since both defendants had made substantially the same confessions. Declarations of one conspirator or codefendant, although made after the termination of the conspiracy, are competent against another conspirator or codefendant if uttered in his presence and he assented thereto; and the necessary assent may be evidenced by the accused making statements practically the same as those made by his coconspirator or codefendant. 16 C.J. pp. 658, 659, par. 1312. At the time the respective confessions were made in the presence of the other defendant, such other defendant had full opportunity to make denial thereof, and, if untrue, a reply from him might have been properly expected. State v. Jackson, 150 N.C. 831, 64 S.E. 376.

Exception 25 relates to his Honor's permitting, over objection, the Solicitor to read the signed statements of the defendants for the reason that part of such statements involved the defendant other than the makers thereof. While it is true such statements involved the defendant other than the makers thereof, the entire statements related to the defendants making them, and were therefore as a whole competent against the makers thereof. The Court was careful to instruct the jury that the statements were only competent against the respective makers thereof. This exception cannot be sustained.

Exceptions 31 and 55 are to the Court's refusal to sustain the demurrers to the evidence and motions for dismissal lodged...