State v. Murray
| Decision Date | 18 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. CR-19-0368-PR,CR-20-0008-PR,CR-19-0368-PR |
| Citation | 250 Ariz. 543,482 P.3d 1038 |
| Parties | STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Easton Courtney MURRAY, Appellant. State of Arizona, Appellee, v. Claudius C. Murray, Appellant. |
| Court | Arizona Supreme Court |
Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General, Brunn (Beau) W. Roysden III, Solicitor General, Michael O'Toole, Chief Counsel, Criminal Appeals Section, Linley Wilson (argued), Assistant Attorney General, Phoenix, Amy Thorson, Assistant Attorney General, Attorneys for State of Arizona
Amy P. Knight (argued), Knight Law Firm LLC, Tucson, Attorney for Easton Courtney Murray
Carol Lamoureux (argued), Joshua F. Hamilton, Law Office of Hernandez & Hamilton PC, Tucson, Attorneys for Claudius C. Murray
Kathleen E. Brody, Molly Brizgys, Mitchell Stein Carey Chapman PC, Phoenix; and David J. Euchner, Erin K. Sutherland, Pima County Public Defender's Office, Deputy Public Defender, Tucson, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Arizona Attorneys for Criminal Justice
¶1 We consider whether a prosecutor's single misstatement of the reasonable-doubt standard during a rebuttal argument constitutes fundamental, prejudicial error. Applying the fundamental error paradigm set forth in State v. Escalante , 245 Ariz. 135, 425 P.3d 1078 (2018), we conclude that the prosecutor's material misstatement of the reasonable-doubt standard was both fundamental and prejudicial error because it went to the foundation of the case and deprived Defendants of an essential right. Accordingly, because on this record neither the court's jury instructions nor the presumption that the jury followed their instructions cured the prejudice, we vacate the court of appeals’ decisions and remand these consolidated cases for new trials.
¶2 In December 2016, brothers Easton Murray ("Easton") and Claudius Murray ("Claudius") went to the apartment of O.C., a friend and Claudius's former roommate. Claudius carried a rifle, and Easton held a black bag. According to O.C.’s trial testimony, the brothers asked O.C. to store something for them. O.C., believing the bag contained marijuana, refused and asked them to leave. Easton insulted O.C., pulled a Taser from his pocket, and shocked O.C.
¶3 O.C. testified that, as he grabbed Easton, Claudius tried to free Easton from O.C.’s grasp, leading to a melee outside the apartment door. Easton then told Claudius to "shoot him, shoot the boy." Easton spoke in Jamaican Patois, the three men's native language. Claudius, who was less than six feet away, then shot O.C. in the leg. O.C. retreated into his apartment as Easton and Claudius fled. O.C. was taken to a hospital, where he was treated for a gunshot wound. O.C.’s neighbor testified that—although he could not understand what the men were saying—he saw two men attempt to force their way into O.C.’s apartment and heard a scuffle, an argument in a foreign language, and multiple gunshots.
¶4 Following the shooting, police searched O.C.’s apartment and discovered an eight-pound bale of marijuana, scales, cell phones, and packing and shipping materials. O.C. testified at trial that he did not own the marijuana, that Defendants stored their marijuana in his apartment, and that Defendants had previously placed the scales and the shipping and packaging items there. Police also located a shell casing outside O.C.’s apartment, which they determined was fired from Claudius's rifle.
¶5 The State charged Easton and Claudius with aggravated assault and the brothers’ cases were consolidated. At the trial, O.C., who spoke Jamaican Patois and was the sole witness to the shooting, testified about the altercation's details. O.C.’s neighbor's testimony generally corroborated O.C.’s account. Easton and Claudius did not testify. However, Defendants’ counsel highlighted inconsistencies in O.C.’s testimony, as well as his purported motive to testify in exchange for immunity from drug charges and the State's assistance in delaying his deportation.
¶6 During his closing argument, the prosecutor highlighted the court's reasonable-doubt instruction, explaining that reasonable doubt "is a firmly convinced standard" that imposes "a high burden of proof." Following the defense's closing arguments, the prosecutor delivered his rebuttal argument, including the following explication of the reasonable-doubt standard, which is the crux of this case:
So here is how to think when you might hear somebody say back there, well, I think one or both defendants might be guilty but I'm not sure it's beyond a reasonable doubt. Now, stop and ask yourself another question at that point. Why did I just say that? Why did I just say that I think the defendants might be guilty? You are a fair and impartial juror. If you are thinking that, if you are saying that, is it not proof that you have been persuaded by the evidence in the case beyond a reasonable doubt? Because why else would you say that were you not convinced by the State's evidence? So when you hear yourself say that, ask yourself the second question why, why do I think he is guilty? Because he is guilty because you have been convinced by the State's case beyond a reasonable doubt. That's why you think as you do being fair and impartial.
¶7 Defense counsel did not object to the prosecutor's statement, nor did the court comment on or correct it. The court did, however, instruct the jury to "review the written instructions," which included a correct reasonable-doubt charge; remind them that they "must follow the instructions and refer to them to answer any questions about applicable law, procedure and definitions"; and advise that, during closing arguments, "[w]hat the lawyers say is not evidence, but it may help you understand the law and the evidence."
¶8 The jury convicted Defendants of aggravated assault and sentenced both to five years’ imprisonment. Claudius and Easton separately appealed, alleging (among other things) that the prosecutor's statements about the reasonable-doubt standard constituted fundamental, prejudicial error.
¶9 The court of appeals affirmed Claudius and Easton's convictions in separate panel decisions. State v. (Claudius C. ) Murray , 247 Ariz. 583, 597 ¶ 49, 454 P.3d 1018, 1032 (App. 2019) (upholding Claudius's conviction); State v. (Easton C. ) Murray , 247 Ariz. 447, 459 ¶ 39, 451 P.3d 803, 815 (App. 2019) (upholding Easton's conviction). Each panel held that the prosecutor's statement about the reasonable-doubt standard did not constitute fundamental, prejudicial error. (Claudius C. ) Murray , 247 Ariz. at 596–97 ¶ 46, 454 P.3d at 1031-32 ; (Easton C. ) Murray , 247 Ariz. at 457–58 ¶ 34, 451 P.3d at 813-14. In Easton's case, however, Judge Eckerstrom filed a partial dissent, finding fundamental, prejudicial error. (Easton C. ) Murray , 247 Ariz. at 464 ¶ 61, 451 P.3d at 820 (Eckerstrom, J., dissenting in part).
¶10 Defendants separately appealed to this Court. We granted review and consolidated these cases to determine the applicable standard of review when a prosecutor makes a single but material misstatement of the reasonable-doubt standard, without objection, during rebuttal argument. This is a recurring issue of statewide importance. We have jurisdiction pursuant to article 6, section 5(3) of the Arizona Constitution.
¶11 A prosecutor's misstatement of the reasonable-doubt standard, to which a defendant fails to object, implicates both fundamental error review, see Escalante , 245 Ariz. at 138 ¶ 1, 425 P.3d at 1081, and review for prosecutorial error or misconduct, see State v. Vargas , 249 Ariz. 186, 188 ¶ 1, 468 P.3d 739, 741 (2020). As an initial matter, we note the extant confusion concerning the interplay between fundamental error review and review for prosecutorial misconduct. See, e.g. , Vargas , 249 Ariz. at 189 ¶ 11, 468 P.3d at 742 (). Although we recently clarified the proper fundamental error review applicable to allegations of cumulative prosecutorial misconduct in Vargas , we have yet to do so for an allegation of a single instance of prosecutorial misconduct. This is the task before us.
¶12 Defendants contend that the prosecutor's misstatement of the reasonable-doubt standard constitutes prosecutorial misconduct. We agree. We briefly pause here, however, to clarify our finding of prosecutorial misconduct. In re Martinez , 248 Ariz. 458, 469 ¶ 45, 462 P.3d 36, 47 (2020) (emphasis added). The characterization of the prosecutorial misconduct makes no difference to our ultimate decision in this case, but it makes a world of difference to the prosecutor by whom the error was committed. See id. at 470 ¶47, 462 P.3d at 48 (). Here, we find that the prosecutor's misstatement of the reasonable-doubt standard, although noteworthy, is better characterized as inadvertent error rather than intentional misconduct. There is no evidence in the record that the prosecutor's actions were designed to infringe Defendants’ rights. We note, however, that prosecutors should heed the lesson that dilution of the reasonable-doubt standard may have consequences for the outcomes of their cases, and potentially their standing with the Bar.
¶13 Turning to the inquiry here, "[t]o prevail on a claim...
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