State v. Murray

• Decision Date: 05 September 2000
• Docket Number: (SC 16236)
• Citation: 254 Conn. 472,757 A.2d 578
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. TYSON MURRAY

254 Conn. 472

757 A.2d 578

STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. TYSON MURRAY

(SC 16236)

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued April 19, 2000.

Officially released September 5, 2000.

McDonald, C. J., and Borden, Norcott, Katz, Palmer, Sullivan and Vertefeuille, JS.¹ Kent Drager, senior assistant public defender, for the appellant (defendant).

Timothy J. Sugrue, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were James E. Thomas, state's attorney, and Warren Maxwell, senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (state).

Opinion

KATZ, J.

The dispositive issues in this appeal are whether: (1) the trial court violated General Statutes § 54-82h (c)² when it substituted an alternate juror for a regular juror after deliberations had begun; and (2) such violation is subject to harmless error analysis. We conclude that the mid-deliberation substitution of an alternate juror violates § 54-82h (c), and that harmless error analysis does not apply.

Following a jury trial, the defendant, Tyson Murray, was convicted of attempted murder in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49 (a) (2) and 53a-54a,³ and assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-59 (a) (5).⁴ The trial court rendered judgment in accordance with the jury verdict and imposed a total effective sentence of twenty years imprisonment, suspended after fifteen years, and five years probation. This appeal followed.⁵

On appeal, the defendant claims that: (1) the trial court improperly substituted an alternate juror for a regular juror after deliberations had begun in violation of § 54-82h (c); (2) the trial court improperly failed to declare a mistrial after one juror, prior to being excused by the court, made certain remarks to the other jurors; (3) the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted testimony from a police officer concerning his investigative efforts; (4) the trial court abused its discretion when, under the rule adopted in State v. Whelan, 200 Conn. 743, 753, 513 A.2d 86, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 994, 107 S. Ct. 597, 93 L. Ed. 2d 598 (1986), it admitted a prior written statement that a state's witness had made to the police; and (5) the state failed to present sufficient evidence that the defendant had intended to kill the victim when he fired a shotgun at him, and that, in the alternative, if the evidence was sufficient to support his conviction for attempted murder, there was insufficient evidence that the defendant simultaneously had intended to cause physical injury short of death when he fired the shotgun.

We reject the defendant's claims regarding the insufficiency of the evidence of his mental state. We agree, however, with the defendant's claims that the trial court impermissibly allowed the substitution of an alternate juror during deliberations and that such substitution requires a new trial. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of conviction and order a new trial. Because of our disposition of this issue, we need not address the defendant's remaining claims.

The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. On May 4, 1996, Tyrell Boyd was riding in a motor vehicle driven by his friend Daniel Henry. At approximately 6:30 p.m., Henry parked his vehicle on Bedford Street, near the intersection of Bedford and Albany Avenue in Hartford, so that he could purchase cigarettes. When Henry came out of the store, he got into a heated conversation with someone he knew as "Lucius." When Lucius turned toward Boyd and asked him what he was looking at, Boyd got out of the vehicle and a fight began. A crowd of a dozen or more persons gathered around, and someone gave Lucius a baseball bat, which he proceeded to use to chase Boyd around Henry's car. As Boyd attempted to avoid Lucius by keeping Henry's car between them, he saw the defendant raise a shotgun and, from a distance of ten to twelve feet, fire it at him, striking Boyd's left upper thigh. Boyd stumbled into the car and Henry proceeded to drive him to St. Francis Hospital. When they arrived at the hospital, Boyd was bleeding profusely and had no blood pressure. The shotgun blast had blown away skin, muscle and tissue, had destroyed a major vein in Boyd's leg and had torn open a ten centimeter section of his femoral artery. Boyd required immediate surgery and a vein from his right leg had to be harvested for use in his left leg. Boyd received ten units of blood and other blood products during the operation. He was placed in the intensive care unit, and, after four additional surgeries, was released. Thereafter, his wounds created a substantial risk of death and a serious impairment to his health.

Following his release from the hospital, Boyd, who knew the defendant prior to the shooting, selected the defendant's photograph from an array of eight photographs shown to him by the police. He was positive of his identification. Approximately six months before trial, Boyd saw the defendant on the street, at which time the defendant offered to pay him not to appear in court. Additional facts will be provided as needed.

I

Because the defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of evidence, if successful, would necessitate the entry of a judgment of acquittal; State v. Wolff, 37 Conn. App. 500, 507, 657 A.2d 650 (1995), rev'd on other grounds, 237 Conn. 633, 678 A.2d 1369 (1996); we address this claim first. In the present case, the defendant claims that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for attempted murder. In particular, he asserts that the evidence does not support a finding that, when he shot the victim, he bore a specific intent to kill rather than a specific intent to cause physical injury short of death. In the alternative, the defendant asserts that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for first degree assault. Specifically, he contends that if we conclude that the evidence supported the conclusion that, in firing a single gunshot, the defendant had intended to kill the victim, that same evidence could not also establish that he had acted with the specific intent to cause physical injury short of death, an essential element of the first degree assault charge.

We first articulate the standard of review applicable to this claim. "In reviewing a sufficiency [of the evidence] claim, we apply a two part test. First, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict. Second, we determine whether upon the facts so construed and the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom the jury reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative force of the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Greenfield, 228 Conn. 62, 76, 634 A.2d 879 (1993).

We next define the essential element that is involved in this appeal and that is integral to the crimes of which the defendant stands convicted. Although §§ 53a-54a and 53a-59 (a) (5) require the same mental state, namely, a specific intent; see State v. Hinton, 227 Conn. 301, 318-19, 630 A.2d 593 (1993); the particular specific intents required to violate these statutes are not identical. For each intent, a distinct conscious objective is sought. A verdict of guilty of attempted murder requires a finding of the specific intent to cause death. See General Statutes §§ 53a-49, 53a-54a and 53a-3 (11). A verdict of guilty of assault in the first degree in violation of § 53a-59 (a) (5), in contrast, requires a finding of the specific intent to cause physical injury. See General Statutes §§ 53a-59 (a) (5) and 53a-3 (3); see also State v. Williams, 237 Conn. 748, 753-54, 679 A.2d 920 (1996) (discussing §§ 53a-54a and 53a-59 [a] [1]).

A

With this background in mind, we embark upon our analysis, beginning with the more serious charge. The specific intent to kill is an essential element of the crime of murder. "To act intentionally, the defendant must have had the conscious objective to cause the death of the victim. General Statutes § 53a-3 (11) ...." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Raguseo, 225 Conn. 114, 120, 622 A.2d 519 (1993). Because direct evidence of the accused's state of mind is rarely available, intent is generally proven by circumstantial evidence. Therefore, intent is often inferred from conduct, as well as from the cumulative effect of the circumstantial evidence and the rational inferences drawn therefrom. Id., 119. For example, "[i]ntent to cause death may be inferred from the type of weapon used, the manner in which it was used, the type of wound inflicted and the events leading to and immediately following the death." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Sivri, 231 Conn. 115, 127, 646 A.2d 169 (1994). This does not "require that each subordinate conclusion established by or inferred from evidence, or even from other inferences, be proved beyond a reasonable doubt [because this court has] held that a jury's factual inferences that support a guilty verdict need only be reasonable." State v. Crafts, 226 Conn. 237, 244, 627 A.2d 877 (1993). Nevertheless, because intent to cause the death of a person is an element of the crime; State v. Raguseo, supra, 120; that intent must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

The defendant claims that the evidence that he had fired a shotgun only once into Boyd's upper thigh, from a distance of ten to twelve feet, does not support a finding that he had the specific intent to kill because the upper thigh is not a vital portion of the body. The state contends that, because there is no direct evidence that the defendant deliberately targeted Boyd's upper thigh, the jury reasonably might have concluded that he was simply a poor shooter who had actually targeted Boyd's torso generally. The state also argues that, even if the defendant had targeted Boyd's thigh, the jury reasonably could have concluded that he had the intent to kill. We agree with the state that regardless of whether the thigh was the defendant's target when he fired...