State v. Williams

• Decision Date: 16 July 1996
• Docket Number: No. 15325,15325
• Citation: 679 A.2d 920,237 Conn. 748
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of Connecticut v. Gregory WILLIAMS.

Page 920

679 A.2d 920

237 Conn. 748

STATE of Connecticut v. Gregory WILLIAMS.

No. 15325.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued June 5, 1996.

Decided July 16, 1996.

Susann E. Gill, Assistant State's Attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Donald A. Browne, State's Attorney, and Linda N. Howe, Assistant State's Attorney, for appellant (State).

Deborah DelPrete Sullivan, Assistant Public Defender, for appellee (defendant).

Before PETERS, C.J., and BERDON, NORCOTT, KATZ and PALMER, JJ.

PETERS, Chief Justice.

The dispositive issue in this appeal is whether the Appellate Court properly concluded that the intent to cause death and the intent to cause serious physical injury are mutually exclusive states of mind under the circumstances of this case. After a jury trial, the defendant, Gregory Williams, was convicted of attempted murder in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-49 and 53a-54a, ¹ and assault in the first degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-59(a)(1). ² The trial court rendered judgment on the jury verdict and the defendant appealed to the Appellate Court, which reversed his convictions. State v. Williams, 39 Conn. App. 18, 663 A.2d 436 (1995). We granted the state's petition for certification, ³ and now reverse the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The opinion of the Appellate Court sets forth the facts that the jury reasonably could have found. "In April, 1991, the defendant and the victim had been living together on and off for about five years, and had a two year old son. On April 12, 1991, the victim traveled to California with her parents and her son. After spending time in California, the victim's son returned to Connecticut with the victim's parents. The victim traveled to North Carolina to attend a training course offered by her employer. At that time, the victim decided not to resume living with the defendant upon her return. Accordingly, when she returned to Connecticut on April 19, she and her son moved in with her parents in Stratford.

"On April 20, 1991, the defendant came to the parents' home in Stratford looking for the victim. When the victim's father told the defendant that he was not welcome on the property and asked him to leave, the defendant began yelling at the victim's father that he would be sorry, that it may take one or two weeks but he would live to regret this day. The defendant also attempted to challenge the victim's father out into the street to fight him.

"The following morning, the victim received a call from a coworker informing her that the defendant had just called from a mental hospital. The victim's former next-door neighbor also called to let her know that there was a pile of women's and children's clothing stacked behind the fence in the back of the victim's former residence. Believing that the defendant would not be at the house, the victim, her son and her sister went to the victim's former residence to retrieve their belongings.

"The victim's sister, who had driven, parked behind the house near a pile of clothing. The women hurried from the car and began putting clothes into garbage bags. While the women were collecting the clothes, the defendant appeared. The victim ran, yelling to her sister to call the police. The defendant caught her and fell to his knees begging her not to leave him. The victim attempted to keep the situation under control by pretending to go along with him, but winked at her sister signaling her to go for help.

"The victim's sister screamed at the victim to get into the car. The defendant then ran to the car, removed his son from the car seat and ran into the house. While holding his son, the defendant pushed the victim through the door of the house. The defendant then punched the victim in the face and hit her in the head with a baseball bat from the neighbor's yard. The defendant delivered eight blows to the victim's head until the baseball bat finally broke. The victim suffered serious head injuries and was close to death." Id., at 20-21, 663 A.2d 436.

The defendant appealed to the Appellate Court, claiming, inter alia, that the trial court had improperly instructed the jury. ⁴ During its final charge, the trial court stated that "the law does recognize that a person who is acting intentionally--was found to be acting intentionally can simultaneously intend to cause some injury--to cause the victim some injury and at the same time, intend to cause that person's death...." The defendant claimed that the trial court's instruction improperly permitted the jury to render inconsistent guilty verdicts on the counts of attempted murder under §§ 53a-49 and 53a-54a and assault in the first degree under § 53a-59(a)(1). Id., at 21, 663 A.2d 436.

The Appellate Court held that although a jury may properly find that, during an attack on a victim, a defendant's intent changed from the intent to cause serious physical injury to the intent to cause death, ⁵ a jury cannot properly find, as a matter of law, that a defendant possessed these intents simultaneously with respect to the same victim. Id., at 22, 22 n. 6, 663 A.2d 436. In light of this holding, the Appellate Court concluded that the trial court's instruction improperly permitted the jury to render legally inconsistent verdicts for attempted murder under §§ 53a-49 and 53a-54a and assault in the first degree under § 53a-59(a)(1), and thus necessitated a new trial. Id., at 22-23, 25, 663 A.2d 436.

On appeal to this court, the state claims that the trial court properly instructed the jury because, under the circumstances of this case, the intent to cause the victim's death was not legally inconsistent with the simultaneous intent to cause her serious physical injury. The defendant contends, to the contrary, that, as a matter of law, the two intents are mutually exclusive and thus that the trial court's instruction impermissibly permittedthe jury to render inconsistent verdicts. ⁶ We agree with the state that, under the circumstances of this case, the trial court properly instructed the jury that the defendant simultaneously could have possessed the specific intents required for conviction of attempted murder under §§ 53a-49 and 53a-54a and assault in the first degree under § 53a-59(a)(1).

The issue, broadly stated, is whether the intent to cause death and the intent to cause serious physical injury are mutually exclusive as a matter of law. We conclude that such mutual exclusivity is not to be presumed. Indeed, we have already held that, under some circumstances, these intents can be possessed simultaneously. In State v. Hinton, 227 Conn. 301, 305, 630 A.2d 593 (1993), the defendant fired a single shotgun blast into a group of men, killing three and injuring another. Addressing the defendant's claim that the trial court improperly accepted inconsistent verdicts of guilty on counts of attempted murder and assault in the first degree, we concluded that "[i]t is clear that an assault in violation of § 53a-59(a)(1) and (2) would be consistent with an attempted murder count in violation of §§ 53a-49 and 53a-54a if [the actual victim] were the defendant's intended victim, because those statutory sections require intentional conduct." Id., at 318-19, 630 A.2d 593. Because the counts of attempted murder and intentional assault had been premised on a single act of violence, our approval of verdicts of guilty for both offenses with respect to the same victim and the same act necessarily acknowledged that a defendant may simultaneously possess the intent to cause death and the intent to cause serious physical injury. Accord People v. Mayes, 257 Ill.App.3d 137, 152-53, 196 Ill.Dec. 713, 723-24, 630 N.E.2d 878, 888-89 (1993), cert. denied, 156 Ill.2d 563, 638 N.E.2d 1121 (1994) (intents for aggravated battery and attempted murder not mutually exclusive); People v. McDavis, 97 App.Div.2d 302, 304-305, 469 N.Y.S.2d 508 (1983) (intents for assault in the first degree and attempted murder not mutually exclusive); see also People v. Kynette, 15 Cal.2d 731, 761, 104 P.2d 794 (1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 703, 61 S.Ct. 806, 85 L.Ed. 1136 (1941) ("[t]here is no repugnancy between an intent to kill the victim and an intent to injure him"), overruled in part on other grounds, People v. Snyder, 50 Cal.2d 190, 197, 324 P.2d 1 (1958), and People v. Horn, 12 Cal.3d 290, 301 n. 8, 524 P.2d 1300, 115 Cal.Rptr. 516 (1974).

The defendant contends that, because the intent required to violate § 53a-54a differs from the intent required to violate § 53a-59(a)(1), it is legally impossible to possess these two intents simultaneously. We are unpersuaded.

Although §§ 53a-54a and 53a-59(a)(1) require the same mental state, namely, a specific intent; State v. Hinton, supra, 227 Conn. at 318-19, 630 A.2d 593; the particular intents required to violate these statutes are not the same. For each intent, a distinct conscious objective is sought. A verdict of guilty of attempted murder requires a finding of the specific intent to cause death. General Statutes §§ 53a-49, 53a-54a and 53a-3(11). A verdict of guilty of assault in the first degree in violation of § 53a-59(a)(1), in contrast, requires a finding of the specific intent to cause serious physical injury. General Statutes §§ 53a-59(a)(1) and 53a-3(11).

The defendant's argument founders on the mistaken presumption that one who intends to kill a person may not also intend to cause serious physical injury to that person. We can perceive no logical reason to preclude, as a matter of law, the simultaneous possession of these intents by a defendant toward the same victim. It is entirely consistent and reasonable, under the facts of a particular case, for a jury to find that a defendant intended to inflict serious wounds upon a victim while also intending to cause that victim's death. A defendant "can intend both to cause the victim a serious physical injury and to kill the victim. No temporal separation is required for the intent, but obviously one is...