State v. Myers

• Decision Date: 20 July 1990
• Docket Number: No. 17900,17900
• Parties: STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Gary Wesley MYERS, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Idaho Court of Appeals

Page 453

798 P.2d 453

118 Idaho 608

STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Gary Wesley MYERS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17900.

Court of Appeals of Idaho.

July 20, 1990.

Alan E. Trimming, Ada County Public Defender, Boise, for defendant-appellant.

Jim Jones, Atty. Gen., Michael A. Henderson, Deputy Atty. Gen. (argued), for plaintiff-respondent.

SWANSTROM, Justice.

Gary Myers appeals, following his conditional plea of guilty to possession of methamphetamine. I.C. § 37-2732. Myers reserved the right to appeal from the district court's order denying his motion to suppress certain inculpatory statements, as well as physical evidence found on his person and on his motorcycle. The issues on appeal are: (1) whether the officer's observation of a traffic violation provided a sufficient basis for the stop, regardless of any underlying motivation to look for evidence of an unrelated offense; (2) whether Myers was in "custody" for purposes of Miranda warnings; and (3) whether Myers' detention, for the purpose of interrogating him concerning possible criminal activity unrelated to the officer's stated reasons for the stop, violated Myers' Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures. For reasons explained below, we reverse.

The district court's findings of certain facts are not challenged. We believe the essential facts are disclosed by the following events and testimony. In the early morning of April 4, 1988, Detective John Tudbury of the Boise City Police Department was on duty in downtown Boise. He was then associated with the "Repeat Offender Program" and was engaged in surveillance. Tudbury was parked in an unmarked police vehicle when he saw Myers drive by on a motorcycle. Tudbury was acquainted with Myers and recognized him. When Myers was about a block away, Tudbury observed him turning right onto another street without signaling. Tudbury then radioed ahead for assistance and proceeded to follow Myers. Myers was later stopped by three marked patrol vehicles on Capitol Boulevard in Boise. Detective Tudbury arrived in his vehicle "within seconds." Upon reaching the scene of the stop, Tudbury exchanged greetings with Myers. Tudbury testified he was acquainted with Myers from prior police contacts and knew that Myers on "several prior occasions ... had methamphetamine on him." This knowledge prompted Tudbury to ask "Gary, are you carrying any drugs on you tonight?" Myers said no. The detective then asked Myers if he was carrying any syringes. According to Tudbury, Myers replied in the affirmative. He stated that he had a syringe in his boot. One of the uniformed police officers then took the syringe from the boot and placed Myers under arrest for possession of drug paraphernalia.

Following the arrest, Myers and his motorcycle were searched. In a locked compartment, the officer found a dental floss case containing white powder, later identified as methamphetamine. In addition to the two drug-related charges, Myers was also given a traffic citation for failure to signal a turn. The charge of possession of drug paraphernalia was later dismissed. Myers initially pled innocent to the charge of possession of methamphetamine; however, he later entered a conditional plea of guilty to the charge, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress.

The issues raised by Myers involve claims of constitutional error. Accordingly the applicable standard of review is one of deference to the district court's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. However, we exercise free review over the district court's determination whether constitutional requirements were satisfied in light of the facts as found. State v. Law, 115 Idaho 769, 769 P.2d 1141 (Ct.App.1989) (review denied).

The first issue on appeal is whether the officer's underlying motive is relevant in determining whether an officer is entitled to stop a motorist. Myers contends that the officer stopped his vehicle as a pretext to search for evidence of an unrelated offense. Myers argues that the stop would not have been undertaken but for the officer's underlying intent to search Myers' person and vehicle for drugs. To support this position, Myers points to the officer's testimony. At trial, the officer testified that absent prior drug contacts between him and Myers, there was no reason to believe that Myers was carrying contraband.

This issue is not one of first impression in this state. This Court addressed this question in the factually similar case of State v. Law, supra. In Law, defense counsel argued that the officer's stop of the defendant was merely a pretext for the officer to search for other incriminating evidence. In that the officer had "reasonable suspicion" to stop the defendant's vehicle for the investigative purpose of determining whether it was being driven by its owner, an unlicensed driver wanted on an outstanding bench warrant. We held that when an officer has an objectively reasonable basis for making an investigative stop, the officer's subjective motive or actual state of mind is irrelevant.

Here, the officer had an objectively reasonable basis for making the stop. In fact, the officer who stopped Myers had probable cause to make the stop because of the observed traffic infraction. I.C. § 49-808. See also In re Griffiths, 113 Idaho 364, 744 P.2d 92 (1987); In re Nowoj, 115 Idaho 34, 764 P.2d 111 (Ct.App.1988) (review denied). Consequently, any underlying motive of Detective Tudbury in stopping Myers' vehicle as a pretext to search for drugs was irrelevant because the stop was justified by an objectively reasonable basis.

The second issue is whether Myers, upon being stopped, was in "custody" for purposes of Miranda warnings. In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the United States Supreme Court held that once a person is in "custody," the police are required to give, prior to any questioning, the well known warnings of right to silence and right to counsel. The test for determining whether questioning is custodial has been generally characterized as whether the person is deprived of his freedom of action in a significant way. This test has been refined by the Court to mean that Miranda is "applicable as soon as a suspect's freedom of action is curtailed to a 'degree associated with formal arrest.' " Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 3150, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984), quoting California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125, 103 S.Ct. 3517, 3520, 77 L.Ed.2d 1275 (1983) (per curiam).

It was not until Berkemer that the United States Supreme Court was faced with the issue of "whether the roadside questioning of a motorist detained pursuant to a routine traffic stop should be considered 'custodial interrogation.' " 468 U.S. at 434, 104 S.Ct. at 3147. The United States Supreme Court held that the "noncoercive aspect of ordinary traffic stops prompts us to hold that persons temporarily detained pursuant to such stops are not 'in custody' for the purposes of Miranda." Id. at 440, 104 S.Ct. at 3150.

However, the language in Berkemer suggests that the Court's holding applies only to "ordinary" or "routine" traffic stops. In Berkemer, the Court compared ordinary traffic stops, which are typically brief in duration and take place in a non-coercive environment, to Terry stops, where an officer lacks probable cause but is still allowed to briefly detain a suspect. Id. at 439, 104 S.Ct. at 3149-50. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). The Berkemer Court additionally noted that both types of roadside questioning represent only minor intrusions upon motorists because of the two crucial underlying features in a typical traffic stop: its public nature and the lack of police domination. Referring to a traffic stop's "public nature," the Berkemer Court noted that passersby may "witness the interaction of officer and motorist. This exposure to public view ..." reduces the likelihood that an officer may obtain incriminating statements through improper means. 468 U.S. at 438, 104 S.Ct. at 3149.

Concerning "police dominated" settings, Berkemer pointed to "[t]he fact that the detained motorist typically is confronted by only one or at most two policemen...." Id. The Court stressed that such a limited show of police force is less intimidating to a motorist and is generally not likely to cause the motorist to feel compelled to admit to incriminating statements. The Berkemer Court stated that "the only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect's position would have understood his situation." 468 U.S. at 442, 104 S.Ct. at 3151. In a footnote, the Berkemer Court noted that the reasonable-person test is an objective rather than a subjective test. The Court then concluded that the defendant had failed to demonstrate that the traffic stop in the case at bar had subjected him to the kind of restraints comparable to those associated with a formal arrest. Id.

We now return to our case. Myers argues that he was in custody at the time that Detective Tudbury elicited inculpatory statements from him. Myers bolsters this position by directing attention to the district court's statement that "excessive amounts of police effort" were used in stopping him. In this case, three marked vehicles and one unmarked police vehicle arrived at the stop. Next, Myers points to the district court's findings that the police had "zeroed in" on him and that the "stop by the police officer was a non-routine stop." In addition, Myers claims that he was not free to leave the scene of the stop once the officer began questioning him. Lastly, Myers contends that the questions asked by Detective Tudbury were not directly related in scope to the purported reason for the stop. In particular, Myers asserts that these questions were not related to the traffic violation but were directed toward eliciting incriminating statements about drugs or drug paraphernalia.

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