State v. Myhre
| Decision Date | 02 March 2015 |
| Docket Number | A14-0670 |
| Parties | State of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Joshua Lee Myhre, Appellant. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
Affirmed; motion granted
Houston County District Court
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Jamie Hammell, Houston County Attorney, Kathleen L. Franklin, Assistant County Attorney, Caledonia, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Jessica Merz Godes, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Halbrooks, Judge; and Connolly, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant challenges his conviction of DWI test refusal, arguing that his guilty plea was invalid because (1) the parties did not strictly comply with Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4, to obtain review of a dispositive pretrial ruling; and (2) the test-refusal statute is unconstitutional under Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013). Because the record clearly reflects the parties' intent to proceed under Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4 (b), the plea was not invalid and because a warrantless breath test falls under the search-incident-to-a-valid-arrest exception and does not violate the Fourth Amendment, we affirm.
At about 9:52 p.m. on September 29, 2012, a police officer observed a car going south in the northbound lane of a highway. The officer activated his lights and followed the car, which did not slow down. When the officer activated his siren, the car stopped.
The officer asked the driver, later determined to be appellant Joshua Myhre, if he knew why he was being stopped; appellant said he had no idea. The officer said appellant had been driving south in the northbound lane; appellant denied it. The officer, observing that appellant's eyes were red and watery and that his speech was slow, slurred, and confused, asked appellant how much he had had to drink; appellant answered "Like an hour and a half ago." Appellant was unable to perform two field sobriety tests. He agreed to give a breath sample for the preliminary breath test (PBT), but, when provided with the apparatus, would not make a seal around the tube and would not blow.He was told he was not blowing into the tube, but continued to not make seal and blow air past the tube. The PBT nonetheless registered .13.
Appellant was arrested and taken to the sheriff's office, where, at about 10:42 p.m., he was read the implied-consent advisory. He asked to speak to an attorney and was given a phone and directories. He made several calls, including one to the sheriff. At 11:06 p.m., appellant was asked to sit down if he was through using the phone, and he did so. He was then asked to take a breath test, which he refused, saying his reason was "I don't know what I should do."
A review of appellant's Minnesota driving record showed he had alcohol-related losses of his license in 2003 and 2005; a review of his criminal record showed he was convicted in Wisconsin in 2007 of Operating While Intoxicated (3rd). He was charged with first-degree refusal to submit to testing, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 2 (2012).1
Appellant moved to dismiss the charge on the ground that Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 2, is unconstitutional; his motion was denied. To preserve the issue for appeal, appellant agreed to proceed under Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4. But he filed a guilty plea, contrary to the requirement of Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4(b), that a defendant plead not guilty, and neither appellant nor the prosecutor acknowledged, in writing or on the record, that an appellate ruling on the pretrial issue would be dispositive, contrary to the requirements of Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4(c) and (g).
At the hearing, appellant answered in the affirmative when the district court asked him: (1) if he had heard what the attorneys had said, (2) if he intended to proceed accordingly, (3) if he had signed a petition to enter a guilty plea, (4) if he had reviewed the stipulated facts; (5) if his attorney had discussed the case, possible defenses, and appellant's "right . . . to appeal the [district c]ourt's decision with regard to the pre-trial considerations [i.e. that the implied-consent statute was unconstitutional under McNeely]"; (6) if he had decided to "go forward with a Lothenbach plea" and the court could consider the stipulated facts in determining his guilt or innocence.2 Appellant answered, "Guilty" when the district court asked how he pleaded to "[the] charge of first degree refusal by way of a Lothenbach plea." Appellant also told the district court he understood that: (1) he would have been entitled to "a full blown trial either before a judge or a jury" at which he would have been presumed innocent and the State would have had to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) he was waiving his right to a jury trial, to have witnesses testify in his presence, to cross-examine them, and to subpoena his own witnesses; (3) he was waiving this right knowing that the district court, based on the stipulated facts, would find him guilty and would impose a sentence, which, even if he appealed, "would not be stayed based on the fact that there would be adetermination of guilt just as though [he] had gone to trial"; and (4) he was "in essence, . . . testifying against [him]self based on these facts that are stipulated."
Appellant's attorney told the district court that: (1) appellant would admit to refusal to test "through the Lothenbach method"; (2) there were "joint stipulated facts to submit in support of the Lothenbach plea"; (3) "the intent here [was] to appeal the refusal [to test]"; and (4) appellant understood that he would receive consequences, including jail time and probation, and "all the terms that normally would occur with a felony DUI would occur unless and until . . . the [district c]ourt's sentencing order [was] vacated by the court of appeal[s]". Appellant answered "Yes" when asked if: (1) he and the attorney had discussed possible outcomes; (2) they had worked out an arrangement to submit stipulated facts for a Lothenbach plea; (3) they had reviewed the facts, which were the facts in the complaint; and (4) appellant was expecting the court to read the facts, find him guilty, and impose a sentence, and they would then appeal the finding of guilt. The district court made oral findings based on the stipulated facts and found appellant guilty.
Appellant now argues that the procedural violations of Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4(b), invalidate his guilty plea or, in the alternative, that the refusal-to-test statute violates the Fourth Amendment.3
"The interpretation of the rules of criminal procedure is a question of law subject to de novo review." Ford v. State, 690 N.W.2d 706, 712 (Minn. 2005).
A dispositive pretrial issue may be preserved for appellate review by having the defendant: (1) plead not guilty; (2) acknowledge with the prosecutor, in writing or on the record, that the issue is dispositive; (3) waive the rights to have a jury trial, to testify at trial, to have prosecution witnesses testify in the defendant's presence and to cross-examine them, and to bring in witnesses favorable to the defendant; (4) stipulate to the prosecution's evidence in a trial to the court and acknowledge, in writing or on the record, that the court will consider that evidence and may enter a finding of guilt; and (5) acknowledge, in writing or on the record, that appellate review will be of the pretrial issue but not of the defendant's guilt or other issues that could arise at a contested trial. Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subds. 3, 4.
Appellant argues that his conviction should be reversed and the case remanded because: (1) he entered a guilty plea instead of the not-guilty plea required by Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4(b), and (2) he and the prosecutor did not acknowledge on the record or in writing that the pretrial issue, i.e., whether the implied-consent statute is unconstitutional under McNeely, would be dispositive as required by Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4(c) and (g). For this argument, he relies on three cases: State v. Antrim, 764 N.W.2d 67 (Minn. App. 2009) (); State v. Rasmussen, 749 N.W.2d 423 (Minn. App. 2008) (); and State v. Knoll, 739 N.W.2d 919 (Minn. App. 2007) ().
Because all three cases concern failure to comply with the waiver requirements of Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 3, all are distinguishable. Here, the transcript shows that appellant complied with the waiver requirements of Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4(d), see Rasmussen, and of Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 3, see Antrim and Knoll.
Thus, the issue becomes whether either pleading guilty, see Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4(b), or failing to acknowledge, in writing or on the record, the parties' agreement that the pretrial issue is dispositive, see Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4(c) and (g), invalidates appellant's guilty plea. We conclude that his plea was not invalidated because the record clearly indicates that appellant and his attorney were aware that the...
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