State v. Myrland
Decision Date | 04 June 2002 |
Docket Number | No. CX-01-2238., No. C8-01-2223 |
Citation | 644 N.W.2d 847 |
Parties | STATE of Minnesota, Appellant, v. Brian Victor MYRLAND, Respondent, Mark Robert Norlander, Respondent. |
Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
Mike Hatch, Attorney General, St. Paul, MN; and James C. Backstrom, Dakota County Attorney, Kathryn M. Keena, Lawrence F. Clark, Assistant Dakota County Attorneys, Hastings, MN, for appellant.
Jeffrey Dean, Minneapolis, MN, for respondents.
Considered and decided by HANSON, Presiding Judge, KLAPHAKE, Judge, and FOLEY, Judge.
In these consolidated appeals, the state challenges the dismissal of charges against respondents for possession of child pornography. The state contends that the district court erred in finding that the affirmative defense in Minn.Stat. § 617.247, subd. 8 (2000), unconstitutionally requires defendants to prove the age of the person in the pornographic work. Because we find the statute only imposes on the defendant the burden of production, we reverse and remand.
On March 22, 2001, respondent Mark Robert Norlander was charged with possession of pornography involving minors under Minn.Stat. § 617.247, subd. 4 (2000). He moved to dismiss the charge on the constitutional grounds that (1) the affirmative defense in Minn.Stat. § 617.247, subd. 8 (2000), shifts the burden of proof by requiring that he prove the age of the persons in the pornographic work; (2) the statute contains no mens rea element; and (3) the statute is overbroad. Several months later, respondent Brian Victor Myrland was charged under the same statute in an unrelated incident. He moved to dismiss for the same reasons.
The district court granted both motions and dismissed the cases in separate orders, finding that the affirmative defense violates respondents' due process rights by requiring them to prove an essential element of the crime, namely, the age of the persons in the pornographic work. The court denied respondents' motions to dismiss on the other grounds. The state filed separate notices of appeal, respondents cross-appealed, and we consolidated the appeals.2
Does the affirmative defense in Minn. Stat. § 617.247, subd. 8 (2000), unconstitutionally shift the burden of proof to the defendant?
Minn.Stat. § 617.247, subd. 4 (2000). "Pornographic work" is defined as:
Minn.Stat. § 617.246, subd. 1(f) (2000); see Minn.Stat. § 617.247, subd. 2(a) (2000) ( ). A "minor" is a person under the age of 18. Minn.Stat. § 617.246, subd. 1(b) (2000). Finally, the defense at issue provides:
It shall be an affirmative defense to a charge of violating this section that the pornographic work was produced using only persons who were 18 years or older.
Minn.Stat. § 617.247, subd. 8 (2000).
The state argues the statute is constitutional because it requires the state, not respondents, to prove that the person in the pornographic work is a minor. It contends that the affirmative defense only requires respondents to make a prima facie showing that the age of the person is a disputed issue, at which point the burden shifts back to the state to disprove the defense. Respondents counter that the statute is unconstitutional on its face because it requires them to prove the person is older than 18.
Whether a statute is constitutional is a question of law, which we review de novo. State v. Grossman, 622 N.W.2d 394, 396 (Minn.App.2001). Due process requires that the state prove every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 204, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 2324, 53 L.Ed.2d 281 (1977); State v. Auchampach, 540 N.W.2d 808, 816 (Minn.1995). It also prohibits the state from imposing the burden of persuasion on the defendant to disprove or negate an element of the crime. State v. Hage, 595 N.W.2d 200, 204 (Minn.1999). But once the state proves each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, it may impose on the defendant the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that his or her conduct should be excused by some mitigating circumstances or issues. Id. at 207 ( ).
However, if these mitigating circumstances or issues disprove or negate an element of the crime, then "the greatest burden a state may impose upon a defendant is that of shouldering the burden of production." Id. at 205; see State v. Charlton, 338 N.W.2d 26, 30-31 (Minn. 1983)
(. ) A defendant meets this lesser burden by making "a prima facie showing that the proffered defense is an issue in the case," at which point the burden of persuasion reverts to the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defense does not exist. Hage, 595 N.W.2d at 205. Therefore, due process is violated if (1) the proffered defense disproves or negates an element of the charged crime, and (2) the defendant has the burden of persuasion with respect to the defense.
It is the duty of courts to interpret statutes as the legislature intended. Minn.Stat. § 645.16 (2000) ( ). To that end, we first look to the legislature's guidance before employing other interpretative devices. Our state legislature has at times imposed the burden of persuasion on defendants when raising affirmative defenses. See Minn.Stat. §§ 609.344, subd. 1(b) (2000) ( ); 609.205(4) (regarding provocation of animal in second-degree manslaughter); 169A.46 (regarding drinking and driving). But at other times the legislature has provided for affirmative defenses without addressing whether the burden of persuasion or production applies. See Minn.Stat. §§ 609.26, subd. 2 (2000) ( ); 169.09 (regarding leaving the scene of an accident). This inconsistent treatment also exists in our appellate court decisions, which at times impose the burden of persuasion for affirmative defenses and other times impose only the burden of production. See Auchampach, 540 N.W.2d at 817 n. 7
( inconsistent treatment); 9 Henry W. McCarr & Jack S. Nordby, Minnesota Practice § 7.1 (2001) (same). Without resolving the dilemma, the Minnesota Supreme Court instructed those encountering the inconsistency to look beyond the classifications and, in the words of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, "think things, not words." Auchampach, 540 N.W.2d at 817 n. 7 ( ). Thus, the proper approach is to disregard labels such as "affirmative defense" and instead focus on what the defense substantively requires. See Auchampach, 540 N.W.2d at 817...
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State v. Cannady, A05-811.
...subdivision 8, on the basis that only the burden of production is shifted to the defendant and not the burden of persuasion. 644 N.W.2d 847, 851 (Minn.App.2002), rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 6, 2002). While we agree with the court of appeals that section 617.247, subdivision 8, shifts the burden......
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State v. Kramer, C8-02-2054.
...burden of persuasion[4] reverts to the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defense does not exist." State v. Myrland, 644 N.W.2d 847, 850 (Minn.App.2002) (citing Hage, 595 N.W.2d at 205), review denied (Minn. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1019 (2002). In sum, the burden revert......
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State v. Cannady, No. A05-811 (MN 4/18/2006)
...Constitutions by shifting the burden of proof of the element of age to the defendant. Citing this court's opinion in State v. Myrland, 644 N.W.2d 847 (Minn. App. 2002), review denied (Minn. Aug. 6, 2002), the district court denied appellant's Appellant waived his right to a jury trial and a......
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State v. Simons, No. A05-2121 (Minn. App. 2/6/2007)
...state statutes violate due process if they fail to provide the affirmative defenses provided in federal statutes"); State v. Myrland, 644 N.W.2d 847, 851 (Minn. App. 2002) (holding that statute constitutionally places the burden of production on Simons next argues that the state violated di......