State v. Naas
| Decision Date | 22 June 1981 |
| Docket Number | No. 80-KA-2446,80-KA-2446 |
| Citation | 409 So.2d 535 |
| Parties | STATE of Louisiana v. Richard Glen NAAS. |
| Court | Louisiana Supreme Court |
William J. Guste, Jr., Atty. Gen., Barbara Rutledge, Asst. Atty. Gen., J. Carl Parkerson Dist. Atty., John R. Harrison, Asst. Dist. Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.
James D. Sparks, Jr., Monroe, for defendant-appellant.
Richard Glen Naas was charged by bill of indictment on March 30, 1978, with second degree murder, a violation of R.S. 14:30.1. Trial was held before a jury of twelve and a conviction was returned by an eleven to one vote. The court imposed a sentence of life imprisonment at hard labor without probation or suspension of sentence, and without parole eligibility for forty years. Defendant appeals his conviction to this Court on the basis of numerous assignments of error.
At trial, the following facts were adduced. In the early morning hours of March 8, 1978, officers of the Monroe Police Department were called by the manager of the local Ramada Inn to investigate a possible homicide at that motel. Upon entering room 428, the officers discovered the body of the victim, John J. Mirambell, Jr., submerged in the bathtub. The victim's hands were tied behind his back and, according to the pathologist's report, the victim had received multiple cuts, bruises, and lacerations, along with two non-fatal stab wounds to the back and a fatal gunshot wound to the left temple.
The victim was a resident of the New Orleans area and had been in Monroe on business. At the time of his death, he was engaged to be married to Ms. Amanda Keller, also of the New Orleans area. Ms. Keller had previously dated the defendant, Richard Naas, but had broken off her relationship with him. On March 4, 1978, several days before the murder, Ms. Keller announced to the defendant her plans to marry Mirambell.
The state's case against defendant consisted of the following: the testimony of several witnesses that the defendant several days after the homicide had a black eye, suggestive of the possibility that shortly before, he was involved in some sort of fracas, or struggle; a money clip found in possession of the defendant which several witnesses said was similar to one owned by the victim; the testimony of one Mary Kelly, a waitress at Monroe's Kokomo Restaurant, who identified the defendant as having been present in that establishment on the evening prior to the murder; 1 the testimony of Sylvester Grant, a cellmate of the defendant following defendant's arrest for the instant crime, that the defendant admitted committing the Ramada Inn murder; the testimony of the victim's mother, sister, and receptionist that they had received telephone calls shortly before the murder from an unknown male inquiring concerning the whereabouts of the victim; and the testimony of Amanda Keller's roommate that she had received a call from the defendant on the night of the murder which in her opinion sounded as if it was being made long distance.
Because we find merit in defendant's assignment of error number 40-A, pertaining to the Motion for New Trial, and reverse on that grounds, discussion of defendant's other assignments of error is unnecessary.
In connection with defendant's Motion for New Trial, a post-trial hearing was conducted at which pertinent testimony from the following witnesses was given: Gene Juergens, who was a co-worker of defendant, stated that he had informed Detective Cummings upon being asked by the officer to inspect a money clip seized from the defendant's apartment that the clip appeared to be the one belonging to the defendant ; 2 Paul Scoriels, an acquaintance of defendant, testified that he had seen defendant at the Jefferson Parish Courthouse on Monday, March 6, 1977, one day before the murder, and had at that time observed defendant to be sporting a mustache; 3 Kenneth Walker and Johnny Jackson, both former cellmates of Sylvester Grant and of defendant, testified that they heard Grant brag repeatedly that he himself had committed the homicide at the Ramada Inn; Connie Naas, defendant's ex-wife, stated that the money clip taken by police from the defendant's apartment was a gift to defendant from his employer in New Orleans some years prior to the homicide; Trudy Defrene, a waitress at the Round Table Lounge in Gretna, Louisiana, testified that she had told police a week after the murder that she saw defendant in the Round Table between 8:30 and 10:00 p. m. on Tuesday, March 7, 1978. 4
The law pertaining to the granting of Motions for New Trial is set out in C.Cr.P. art. 851, which provides:
"The motion for a new trial is based on the supposition that injustice has been done the defendant, and, unless such is shown to have been the case the motion shall be denied, no matter upon what allegations it is grounded.
The court, on motion of the defendant, shall grant a new trial whenever:
(1) The verdict is contrary to the law and the evidence;
(2) The court's ruling on a written motion, or an objection made during the proceedings, shows prejudicial error;
(3) New and material evidence that, notwithstanding the exercise of reasonable diligence by the defendant, was not discovered before or during the trial, is available, and if the evidence had been introduced at the trial it would probably have changed the verdict or judgment of guilty;
(4) The defendant has discovered, since the verdict or judgment of guilty, a prejudicial error or defect in the proceedings that, notwithstanding the exercise of reasonable diligence by the defendant, was not discovered before the verdict or judgment; or
(5) The court is of the opinion that the ends of justice would be served by the granting of a new trial, although the defendant may not be entitled to a new trial as a matter of strict legal right."
Defendant's motion is grounded on C.Cr.P. art. 851(3). It is urged that the testimony offered post-trial constitutes new and material evidence, which was not discovered before or during trial, defendant's diligence notwithstanding, and which would probably have changed the verdict. The motion is further based on C.Cr.P. art. 851(4), the defendant's position being that a newly discovered error or defect is present by reason of the state's knowledge of and failure to disclose the statements of Gene Jurgens and Trudy Dufrene, which statements are arguably exculpatory in nature. 5
While defendant's claims as they relate to C.Cr.P. art. 851(4) and to the Brady motions are not entirely without merit, the state's failure to disclose the arguably exculpatory statements was not "prejudicial error" as would be required by the statute. Furthermore, the new evidence offered in the form of Paul Scoriels' testimony that defendant was in the Jefferson Parish Courthouse on March 6, 1978, while material and substantial, cannot conclusively be said to "probably have changed the verdict or judgment of guilty if introduced at trial." C.Cr.P. art. 851(3). However, because in our view the single most damaging piece of evidence against defendant was Sylvester Grant's account of the defendant's admission of guilt, we hold that the impeaching testimonies of Kenneth Walker and Johnny Jackson are evidence which, if given at trial, would have cast serious doubt upon the credibility of Grant and would probably have changed the verdict or judgment of guilty. 6 C.Cr.P. art. 851(3).
We need not find that Grant probably committed the murder, rather than defendant. Rather, it suffices that these accounts of Grant's own confessions strongly impeach Grant's testimony.
Our holding with regard to newly discovered evidence requires that such evidence "... notwithstanding the exercise of reasonable diligence by the defendant, was not discovered before or during trial." C.Cr.P. art. 851(3). Discussion of the defendant's reasonable diligence requires mention of another of his arguments to this Court, namely, the one dealing with the pre-trial Prayer for Oyer. 7
The defense, in preparation for trial, made a Motion for Prayer for Oyer toward the end of April, 1978. The motion was granted by the trial judge under C.Cr.P. art. 716B 8 in response to a prayer asking "... the State to furnish (defendant) copies of all oral, taped and/or written confessions, statements, and/or admissions allegedly made by the Defendant either before or after his arrest for the alleged offense for which he is charged herein." On April 26, 1978, the state answered the prayer with a transcript of the recording of a statement made by the defendant to the police. 9 Sylvester Grant was placed in the Ouachita Parish Jail with defendant on May 25, 1978, and approached the police with his account of defendant's confessions on June 2, 1978. At that time, Grant's statement was recorded and transcribed as was a similar statement made by him to police several days later, on June 5th. 10 Testimony of witnesses at trial indicate that the District Attorney was made aware of the content of both of Grant's statements within a week of their having been made to the police. The defense was not informed of the existence of this purported confession made by defendant to Grant until February 5, 1979, the very first day of trial, when the state in accordance with C.Cr.P. art. 768 11 related its intention to use the statement at trial.
C.Cr.P. art. 729.3 provides:
"If, subsequent to compliance with an order issued pursuant to this Chapter and prior to or during trial, a party discovers additional evidence or decides to use additional evidence and such evidence is or may be, subject to discovery or inspection under the order issued, he shall promptly notify the other party and the court of the existence of the additional evidence, so that the court may modify its previous order or allow the other party to make an appropriate motion for additional discovery or inspection."
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