State v. Nadal

• Decision Date: 11 October 1886
• Citation: 29 N.W. 451,69 Iowa 478
• Parties: STATE v. NADAL.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

69 Iowa 478

29 N.W. 451

STATE

v.NADAL.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

October 11, 1886.

Appeal from Madison district court.

Defendant was indicted for bigamy, and, upon conviction, was sentenced to the penitentiary for two years and six months. He now appeals to this court.Ruby & Wilkin, for appellant.

A. J. Baker, Atty. Gen., for the State.

BECK, J.

1. The objections to the judgment of conviction complained of by defendant will be considered in the order of their discussion in the printed arguments of counsel.

The statute defining the crime of bigamy (Code, § 4009) is in the following language: “If any person who has a former husband or wife living marry another person, or continue to cohabit with such second husband or wife in this state, he or she * * * is guilty of bigamy.”

The district court, in substance, instructed the jury that if defendant and Mrs. Loftus, the woman with whom he contracted the unlawful marriage within the time limited by the statute for the indictment of one charged with bigamy, lived and cohabited with each other in Madison county, where the indictment was found, the jury were authorized to find him guilty. Counsel object to this instruction on the ground that the cohabitation contemplated by the statute “must be persisted in” or be of a continuous character in the county, or the parties must have cohabited together after entering such marriage relation in Missouri, (where the unlawful marriage was celebrated,) or some other place, and then continued such cohabitation in the county.” Counsel base their position upon the language of the statute above quoted, insisting that its meaning is in accord therewith. We are clear in the opinion that the statute will bear no such interpretation. The purpose of the statute is to define a crime committed by marrying within the state, or by cohabiting under an unlawful and void marriage celebrated without the state. Where the marriage is entered into without the state, the criminal act could not be punished here, for the reason that it was not committed in the state; so the law provides that cohabitation after the void act constitutes bigamy. The words “to cohabit” mean “to live together.” As soon as a husband and wife are married, unless they live separately in fact, they commence to live together, in contemplation of law. Therefore upon the celebration of the Missouri marriage cohabitation began, and when the parties came to Iowa, however brief their sojourn may have been in Missouri, it continued here. The letter and the spirit of the statute declares that cohabitation in this state, under a void marriage in another state, is a crime. The courts will not draw such subtle distinctions as are made by counsel for the purpose of shielding the violaters of the law and contemners of good morals.

2. It is next insisted that the evidence fails to establish the marriage of defendant and Mrs. Loftus. She testifies positively and clearly to the marriage in St. Joseph, Missouri. Their cohabitation is admitted by defendant without hesitation and without a blush. He recognized her as his wife to his business associates; introduced her into good society--church society, to the governor of a state, to all--as his wife. He visited her parents with her, and received visits at his house from them, while she was discharging the duties of a wife, all the time recognizing her as such. He wrote numerous letters acknowledging the marriage relation. In short, no husband by his acts could give more full recognition of the marriage relation than he did for about four years and a half. But he denies the marriage in his testimony, and while admitting the cohabitation, and the fact of his recognition of the woman as his wife, without trepidation or confusion, declares that she was only his mistress, and, for business and social reasons and advantages, he recognized her as his wife. He insists that she is unworthy of belief, because she has a bad reputation for chastity, and introduces witnesses to so testify; claiming that his own evidence must be accepted, and hers rejected. Thus, with characteristic effrontery, confessing his own wickedness and shame, he pretends to credibility, while attempting to brand his victim with falsehood by reason of practices and reputation which, even if his charges be true, are better than his own. He claims that her reputation is bad; some witnesses so testify, others say to the contrary. His reputation is shown to be bad; no witness testifies that it is good. He confesses that he is a debauchee, a frontless hypocrite, and a deceiver of his business associates and acquaintances generally. Of the two, the jury were justified in accepting her testimony and discarding his. We cannot interfere with the verdict on the ground that it lacks the support of evidence.

3. A witness testified that Mrs. Loftus had occupied, for two or three days, a room at the hotel in Omaha of which he was clerk with a man other than defendant. The evidence, on motion, was rightly excluded. If it was intended to show her lewdness, it was incompetent, for defendant would be none the less guilty of bigamy by reason of his victim's want of virtue. It was incompetent to establish her reputation, under familiar rules of evidence. It was not introduced to show that she was the wife of another man. It was not competent for any purpose.

4. Counsel insist that admissions by the defendant of the void marriage were erroneously admitted. They cite numerous authorities in support of their position, which, however, fall far short of it. They only teach that admissions of the defendant will not alone establish a void marriage, or are not of much weight. The same objection is made as to...