State v. Nadeau, 83-526
| Decision Date | 21 February 1985 |
| Docket Number | No. 83-526,83-526 |
| Citation | 126 N.H. 120,489 A.2d 623 |
| Parties | The STATE of New Hampshire v. Renee NADEAU. |
| Court | New Hampshire Supreme Court |
Gregory H. Smith, Atty. Gen. (T. David Plourde, Asst. Atty. Gen., on the brief and orally), for the State.
James E. Duggan, Appellate Defender, Concord, by brief and orally, for defendant.
The defendant was convicted of aggravated felonious sexual assault under RSA 632-A:2 (Supp.1983) following a jury trial in Superior Court (Johnson, J.). The defendant's first trial had ended in a hung jury. The defendant argues on appeal that the judge in the second trial made three errors. These asserted errors were: first, that the judge erred by effectively overruling the decision of the first trial judge regarding the admission into evidence of a confession by the defendant; second, that the judge erred in instructing the jury that the defendant's confession, which was admitted during cross-examination of the defendant and in rebuttal testimony, could be used to determine guilt or innocence; and, third, that the judge erred in failing to exclude testimony in which a police officer stated his opinion concerning the victim's credibility. We find no error and affirm the defendant's conviction.
The defendant was arrested on February 14, 1983, and charged with aggravated felonious sexual assault on a nine-year-old boy, shortly after the boy gave an account of the incident to the Canaan police. At the Canaan police station, the defendant, who is illiterate, was read a Miranda rights waiver form. He told police that he understood his rights and then signed the waiver form in the presence of a literate friend, who signed as a witness. Two police officers testified at the second trial that, after initially denying the charge, the defendant was taken to a room where he spoke first to one police officer and then to both officers and orally confessed to them that he had committed the offense. However, the two officers testified that they did not make a report of the confession because the Canaan police chief told them that, due to the defendant's illiteracy, the confession would be inadmissible as evidence at trial.
On the day of the defendant's first trial, the police for the first time informed the county attorney of the post-arrest confession. The judge at the first trial excluded the defendant's statement from being admitted into evidence. See Super.Ct.R. 98 (). When the jury failed to reach a verdict, the judge declared a mistrial. Prior to the second trial, the prosecution supplied the defendant with copies of police reports on the confession, but apparently did not state that the prosecution would seek to use the confession at trial.
The judge at the defendant's second trial ruled that the prosecution could not use the confession in its case in chief. However, following a hearing on a motion to suppress the confession, the trial court ruled that the confession was made voluntarily, and that it could be used on cross-examination of the defendant and in rebuttal testimony. Relying on the test set out in State v. Goddard, 122 N.H. 471, 446 A.2d 456 (1982), the court ruled that the State had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the confession was made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. The court further ruled that the defendant, although illiterate, was read and understood his Miranda rights before making the confession. Finally, the court ruled that at the time of the second trial the defendant was fully aware that the State had a confession and that court rules intended to avoid the surprise use of evidence were therefore inapplicable and were waived by the court in the interest of fairness.
The confession was subsequently admitted into evidence during the State's cross-examination of the defendant (who could not recall making an incriminating statement), and later referred to in rebuttal testimony by two police officers.
One of the policemen, Officer Deery, testified on rebuttal that, prior to obtaining the confession during the station-house interrogation, he had said to the defendant: "Mr. Nadeau, this is a nine year old boy we are talking about, and the story that he has told is much to [sic] elaborate to really disbelieve." The defense counsel objected to this testimony on the ground that the witness was offering his opinion as to the boy's thoughts. The court overruled the objection and issued a limiting instruction to the jury that it should consider the officer's statement "merely to set the scene" for the defendant's statements and not for the truth of the matter asserted concerning the boy's statement to the police.
During final instructions to the jury on what use it may make of evidence regarding the confession, the judge stated: "Now, if you find that there was a confession and that it was made in keeping with the constitutional safeguards that I have spelled out for you ... then you may utilize that confession in deciding whether or not the accused is guilty or not guilty of this crime."
The defendant did not object or take an exception to this jury instruction. He had, however, requested alternative jury instructions, one of which stated in part: "The earlier contradictory statements are admissible only to impeach the credibility of the witness, and not to establish the truth of these statements." Because the defendant's requested jury instructions were filed after closing arguments, the trial judge ruled that the requested instructions were late, and he did not in fact use the defendant's requested instruction on prior inconsistent statements.
The defendant first argues that it was error to permit the use of the defendant's confession at the second trial during cross-examination and rebuttal testimony, when it was not admitted in the first trial. He contends that the second trial judge was bound by the first trial judge's ruling that the confession was not admissible and, also, that because Superior Court Rule 98 was violated, the confession should have been excluded.
Superior Court Rule 98 (Rule 98) requires that, within five days after a not guilty plea, the prosecution furnish the defendant with a copy of a confession and notify the defendant whether the confession will be used at trial. Rule 98, however, provides no sanction for failure to comply with its terms. In State v. Comtois, 122 N.H. 1173, 1175, 453 A.2d 1324, 1325 (1982), we discouraged the overly technical application of court rules.
Discovery rules have become liberalized in recognition of the concept that "the ends of justice are best served by a system which gives both parties the maximum amount of information available, thus reducing the...
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...RSA 632–A:3 (2007), and one count of aggravated felonious sexual assault (AFSA), RSA 632–A:2 (2007). He argues that the Superior Court ( Nadeau, J.) erred when it conditioned the giving of a so-called “ Williams instruction,” see State v. Williams, 137 N.H. 343, 629 A.2d 83 (1993) (requirin......
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