State v. Dushame

• Decision Date: 04 November 1992
• Docket Number: No. 90-577,90-577
• Citation: 136 N.H. 309,616 A.2d 469
• Parties: The STATE of New Hampshire v. Peter DUSHAME.
• Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court

Page 469

616 A.2d 469

136 N.H. 309

The STATE of New Hampshire v. Peter DUSHAME.

No. 90-577.

Supreme Court of New Hampshire.

Nov. 4, 1992.

John P. Arnold, Atty. Gen. (Peter G. Beeson, Associate Atty. Gen., on the brief and orally, and Anne E. Renner, Asst. Atty. Gen., on the brief), for the State.

James E. Duggan, Chief Appellate Defender, Concord, on the brief and orally, for defendant.

PER CURIAM.

The defendant, Peter Dushame, was found guilty after a jury trial in Superior Court (Dalianis, J.) of manslaughter, RSA 630:2; negligent homicide caused by intoxication, RSA 630:3; simple assault, RSA 631:2-a; and driving after revocation, RSA 263:64. He was sentenced to serve fifteen to thirty years in the New Hampshire State Prison. On appeal, the defendant raises three issues: (1) whether the trial court, by substituting an alternate juror for a disqualified juror after jury deliberations had begun in the case, violated RSA 500-A:13; (2) whether the trial court erred by admitting into evidence under New Hampshire Rule of Evidence 404(b) the complaints, records of conviction and notices of revocation resulting from the defendant's four prior DWI convictions for the purpose of showing that the defendant "recklessly" caused the death of Lacey Packer; and (3) whether the trial court abused its discretion by not allowing a defense expert to testify fully as to the basis of his opinion. We reverse.

Ten-year-old Lacey Packer died on October 3, 1989, as a result of head injuries received when she was struck by a car two days before. She had been a passenger on her father's motorcycle as they returned home to Massachusetts from a charity motorcycle run in Merrimack, New Hampshire. They were accompanied by two friends, Brian and Denise Rhodes, who were also riding a motorcycle. As they approached the Massachusetts border on the return trip, both motorcycles pulled into the breakdown lane of the Everett Turnpike just south of the Exit 1 southbound on-ramp so that the adults could put on helmets. Lacey was already wearing one.

Shortly afterwards, Brian Rhodes saw a car approaching from the on-ramp traveling in the breakdown lane at high speed. Despite his frantic waving, the car did not reduce its speed or steer onto the roadway. Instead, the driver waved back. Immediately before impact, Brian Rhodes grabbed his wife and leapt to safety over the guardrail; Lacey's father, unaware of the approaching car, was thrown over the guardrail upon impact and suffered leg injuries; Lacey was hit from behind as she sat on her father's motorcycle.

The defendant was the driver of the car. Shortly after the accident, the police arrived and the defendant attempted to flee. A police officer ordered the defendant to stop. He complied, and soon after the officer performed a field sobriety test. The defendant failed. He was arrested and taken to the Nashua Police Department, where the police administered a blood alcohol test. The test results showed a .33 blood alcohol content which, according to evidence offered by the State, roughly translates to eighteen alcoholic drinks consumed between the time the defendant was first observed drinking that afternoon and the time the test was administered, nearly eighty minutes after the crash.

Prior to trial, the State moved to be permitted to introduce evidence of the defendant's five prior DWI convictions for the purpose of showing recklessness. With the exception of the defendant's earliest DWI arrest in 1981, the trial court granted the State's motion to admit the evidence. After a subsequent defense motion to suppress, the court limited the admissible evidence to certified copies of the complaints, records of conviction and formal notices of license revocation, thereby excluding from evidence the facts underlying the convictions. On the seventh day of the fourteen-day trial, the State presented the evidence of the DWI convictions to the jury.

I. Substitution of an Alternate Juror

We first consider whether the trial court erred by substituting an alternate juror after deliberations had begun. The evidence shows that the court impanelled fifteen jurors. After trial and at the conclusion of its charge, the court designated three alternates. The trial court instructed them to remain "available" during the course of deliberations and informed the alternates and counsel of its intention to make a substitution in the event that a juror became disabled during the course of deliberations. The defendant did not object to the court's decision to retain the alternates, but reserved the right to object if the court made a substitution during deliberations. Upon the defendant's request, the court instructed the alternates to continue adhering to the media rules.

The jury began deliberations at 9:25 a.m. the following morning and recessed for lunch at 12:25 p.m. Shortly after lunch, the forewoman told the judge that the previous weekend she had inadvertently learned that the defendant was incarcerated. The court suspended deliberations and excused the jury for the day in order to give the court and counsel an opportunity to consider the issue of whether the forewoman could be replaced by an alternate.

On the following morning, after a brief voir dire of the forewoman, the court concluded that she was disqualified from continuing, but that she had not tainted the jury by sharing the information. The defendant requested an opportunity to make an independent inquiry to assess the impact of her presence upon the deliberations up until that time. The court denied the request, and over the defendant's objection recalled an alternate. After a brief line of questioning, the court found that the alternate had not been exposed to media coverage or outside influence concerning the case and that she was qualified to serve on the jury.

The remaining eleven jurors were called into open court and told that the forewoman had become disabled and that an alternate would be added to the panel. The court randomly selected a new foreperson. Before reconvening deliberations, the court issued instructions to ensure that the deliberations with the alternate started again from "square one." The instructions admonished the jury to disregard any opinions previously offered by the disabled forewoman, to disregard any direction their deliberation may have taken, and to disregard any preliminary opinions that they may already have formed.

In order to minimize the disruption and to reduce the potential embarrassment of jurors wishing to withdraw from service, the court gave the jurors a period of time to consider individually, without debating as a group, whether they were able to comply with the instructions. The jurors were instructed to give an answer to the court privately through the court bailiff. None expressed doubt concerning their ability to continue serving and the court instructed the jury to reconvene deliberations. After nearly a day and a half of deliberations the jury returned a guilty verdict on the four counts of manslaughter, negligent homicide, simple assault, and driving after revocation.

Whether the trial court erred by substituting the alternate juror during deliberations involves the application of RSA 500-A:13, which governs the selection, discharge, and impanelling of alternate jurors. The defendant argues that the trial court's decision to substitute an alternate for the disabled juror after the deliberations had begun violates the statute and should have resulted in a mistrial. The State argues that RSA 500-A:13 should be construed to allow the superior court to substitute alternates for jurors who become disabled during the course of deliberations.

"To determine the meaning of a statute, we first look to see if the language used is clear and unambiguous." N.E. Brickmaster v. Town of Salem, 133 N.H. 655, 658, 582 A.2d 601, 602 (1990). RSA 500-A:13, IV provides in part:

"If, before the final submission of the case to the jury, one or more jurors becomes incapacitated, is disqualified or dies, his place shall be taken, upon the order of the court, by an alternate juror who shall become one of the jury and serve in all respects as if selected as an original juror."

(Emphasis added.)

This language is not vague or uncertain. The legislature has clearly stated its intent that courts be allowed to substitute alternate jurors for one or more of the original twelve jurors who might become disabled before the jury begins deliberations. Although acknowledging the clear language permitting pre-submission substitution, the State argues that RSA 500-A:13 does not explicitly prohibit substitution when a juror becomes disabled after submission.

The State's basic premise, that the statute does not consider post-submission substitution, is questionable at best. RSA 500-A:13, III states that, if alternate jurors are not substituted under section IV, they "shall be discharged upon final submission of the case to the jury." (Emphasis added.) We doubt that the legislature implicitly envisioned post-submission substitution while at the same time explicitly mandating courts to dismiss alternate jurors immediately after submission of the case to the jury. See United States v. Hayutin, 398 F.2d 944, 950 (2d Cir.) (no purpose in retaining jurors given legislative failure to provide procedure for substitutions after deliberations), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 961, 89 S.Ct. 400, 402, 21 L.Ed.2d 374 (1968). Taking liberty with legislative silence by fashioning judicial rules in its stead is contrary to well-settled rules of statutory construction. We have consistently held that "the words in the statute itself are the touchstone of the legislature's intention," Greenhalge v. Town of Dunbarton, 122 N.H. 1038, 1040, 453 A.2d 1295, 1296 (1982), and that "legislative intent is to be found not in what the legislature might have intended, but rather, in the meaning of what it did say." Psychiatric Institute v. Mediplex, Inc....