State v. Nakamitsu
| Decision Date | 29 June 2017 |
| Docket Number | SCWC-14-0001151 |
| Citation | 398 P.3d 746 |
| Parties | STATE of Hawai‘i, Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ryan NAKAMITSU, Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Hawaii Supreme Court |
Alen M. Kaneshiro, for Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant.
Keith M. Kaneshiro, Honolulu, Sonja P. McCullen, for Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellee.
Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant Ryan Nakamitsu (Nakamitsu) was convicted of one count of Operating a Vehicle Under the Influence of an Intoxicant (OVUII) in violation of Hawai‘i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 291E-61(a)(1) and/or § 291E-61(a)(3).1 The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) vacated the conviction for OVUII based on HRS § 291E-61(a)(1), reversed the conviction for OVUII based on HRS § 291E-61(a)(3), and remanded for proceedings consistent with its opinion.
In essence, Petitioner Nakamitsu argues that his conviction under HRS § 291E-61(a)(1) should be reversed rather than vacated and remanded for a new trial. Four principal issues are presented on certiorari. The first three issues are raised by Nakamitsu: (1) whether the ICA gravely erred in holding that the charge was not fatally defective for failing to include the statutory definition of the term "alcohol"; (2) whether the ICA gravely erred in holding that the district court did not err in denying Nakamitsu's motion to strike Officer Desiderio's testimony; and (3) whether the ICA gravely erred in holding that there was substantial evidence to support Nakamitsu's conviction under HRS § 291E-61(a)(1). We consider sua sponte a fourth issue, whether the district court's admonishment of Nakamitsu for his decision to pursue trial violated his constitutional rights to due process and against self-incrimination.
We hold that the ICA did not err concerning the first and third issues. We find it unnecessary to consider the second issue as to whether the ICA erred in affirming the district court's denial of Nakamitsu's motion to strike Officer Desiderio's testimony. On the fourth issue, we find that the district court's admonishment of Nakamitsu may have violated his constitutional rights to due process and against self-incrimination. We affirm the judgment of the ICA vacating the conviction for OVUII in violation of HRS § 291E-61(a)(1), reversing the conviction for OVUII in violation of HRS § 291E-61(a)(3), and remanding for a new trial.
Nakamitsu is an engineer at Pearl Harbor. In June, 2014, the State charged Nakamitsu with one count of Operating a Vehicle Under the Influence of an Intoxicant as a first time offender.2
Nakamitsu filed a Motion to Dismiss Count 1 for Failure to State an Offense.3 He argued that the OVUII charge in Count 1 was insufficient because it failed to include the definition of "alcohol" as defined in HRS § 291E-1. The State opposed the Motion, arguing that the Complaint's reference to "alcohol" was consistent with its commonly-understood meaning. After a hearing, the court denied the Motion.4
At trial, Officer Desiderio testified that he responded to a vehicular accident on June 1, 2014 around 4:50 a.m. Upon arriving at the scene, he saw a vehicle on the side of the road in front of a light post that had fallen to the ground. A man (later identified as Nakamitsu) walked from the vehicle and knelt on the side of the road. Nakamitsu told Officer Desiderio that he had been driving the vehicle, and then began crying. Officer Desiderio detected the smell of alcohol on Nakamitsu's body and breath. Officer Desiderio testified that Nakamitsu was attempting to balance himself and uttering something approximating "I'm fucked, I'm fucked." Officer Desiderio then conducted a Standardized Field Sobriety Test (SFST). Nakamitsu exhibited six clues, and failed the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus (HGN) portion of the test. According to Officer Desiderio, during the Walk-and-Turn section of the test Nakamitsu kept trying to keep his balance.
On direct examination, in regard to the Walk-and-Turn and One-Leg Stand segments of the test, the State refreshed Officer Desiderio's recollection with a copy of his SFST report:
After a further exchange regarding the Walk-and-Turn segment of the test, the State then asked Officer Desiderio about Nakamitsu's performance on the One-Leg Stand test:
During cross-examination, Officer Desiderio described the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) standards for administering and grading the SFST. He testified that, in order to be valid, the SFST must be administered and graded in accordance with the NHTSA. Nakamitsu's counsel proceeded to ask Officer Desiderio about Nakamitsu's performance on the SFST:
Officer Desiderio continued to testify without the aid of his report that while Nakamitsu performed the Walk-and-Turn test, the officer was facing the sidewalk, standing mid-way between the starting and turn points of the imaginary line used for the test. When asked if Nakamitsu walked off the line during the first set of steps, Officer Desiderio said he would need his report to refresh his memory. Nakamitsu's counsel then asked Officer Desiderio if he had any independent recollection of the SFST, or if his testimony was solely based on his reading the SFST report:
Nakamitsu's counsel moved to strike Officer Desiderio's testimony describing Nakamitsu's SFST on the grounds that the officer could not testify without his report. The State responded that Officer Desiderio could recall details surrounding the SFST, but could not be expected to remember all details about Nakamitsu's performance without the aid of his report. The district court denied Nakamitsu's motion.
Officer Tabanera testified that on June 1, 2014, at approximately 4:15 a.m., he arrived at the scene of the accident and observed that Nakamitsu's eyes were red and glassy. Officer Tabanera also testified that Nakamitsu smelled like alcohol. Officer Tabanera investigated the accident and observed Nakamitsu's vehicle resting at the base of a street light pole, and the pole dislodged and laying on the ground. The front bumper and engine area of Nakamitsu's vehicle were severely damaged. Officer Tabanera did not see any marks on the road that would have resulted from use of a vehicle's brakes, and he did not observe any other vehicles or obstructions on the road.
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