State v. Nakamura, 6258
| Citation | 581 P.2d 759,59 Haw. 378 |
| Decision Date | 28 July 1978 |
| Docket Number | No. 6258,6258 |
| Parties | STATE of Hawaii, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Dennis Minoru NAKAMURA, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Hawaii Supreme Court |
Marie N. Milks, Deputy Public Defender, Honolulu, for defendant-appellant.
Lee Nakamura, Deputy Pros. Atty., Honolulu, for plaintiff-appellee.
Syllabus by the Court
1. Conditions imposed by a court upon granting probation must be reasonable.
2. Where the time for performance of a condition of probation is not otherwise expressly specified by order of the court or by statute or rule, such a condition shall be performed within a reasonable time.
3. Probation may be revoked only where the court is satisfied that the defendant has inexcusably failed to comply with a substantial requirement imposed as a condition of probation.
Before RICHARDSON, C. J., and KOBAYASHI, OGATA, MENOR and KIDWELL, JJ.
This is an appeal from a revocation of probation. The defendant, after pleading guilty to burglary in the second degree, was placed on probation by the circuit court for a period of five years. A special condition of probation was that he should remain in Habilitat until he was clinically discharged. The defendant was a resident of Habilitat at the time of sentencing; however, seventeen days after he was placed on probation, he left the center without clinical authorization. He explained to his probation officer that his mother was having financial problems and he wanted to get a job to help her. The State thereafter moved for revocation of his probation. The motion was denied, but the circuit court amended the terms of probation by adding the condition that the defendant serve six months in the Halawa Correctional Facility. A further condition was:
That upon Defendant's release from the Halawa Correctional Facility, Defendant is to enter and remain in Habilitat until clinically discharged.
The defendant served six months at Halawa as directed and was released from custody on March 25, 1976, when his mother and brother came to take him home. Prior to his discharge he had apprised his Halawa counselor and the Habilitat representative, a Mr. Henry Perritt, of his desire to spend up to ten hours with his mother before reporting to Habilitat. The problem was that Habilitat would have none of this. The very same day the defendant was discharged from Halawa, Mr. Perritt wrote to the judge:
This letter is in regard to our decision to reject Dennis Nakamura as a resident in the Habilitat Program.
At the time of Dennis' impending release from Halawa Correctional Facility he was told that when released he should come directly to the Habilitat Induction Center. Dennis stated that he wished to visit with his mother prior to entering the Habilitat but we explained that if he did so we would not be able to accept him into the program. On a later visit we advised Dennis that we would pick him up from Halawa when he again stated that he wanted to go home first, again we explained our position and told him that he would not be accepted into the program on those terms. Unfortunately Dennis decided that he would rather spend some time with his mother than make a serious effort to change his life. (Emphasis added)
Habilitat's rejection of the defendant as a resident was based on unreasonable and arbitrary grounds. The short visit the defendant desired with his family was not unreasonable. There was nothing to indicate that either his relationship with his mother or the home environment was such that the visit with her would have been detrimental to his rehabilitation. After being confined for six months, it was only natural that he and his mother would want to spend some time together, however brief that period might be, before he was again compelled to take up residence elsewhere. The bonds of familial love and society are extremely important in promoting development and maturity in an individual. Such relationships are to be encouraged as a meaningful tool in the rehabilitative process. It is incomprehensible to us, therefore, that Habilitat should have taken the rigid stance that it did. There is nothing in the record to show that it could not have accommodated the defendant's wishes without material effect to its program. Conditions imposed by a court upon granting probation must be reasonable. HRS § 706-624. It ought not to be expecting too much of a private agency to be guided by similar considerations, at least where it chooses to participate in court-approved programs.
HRS § 706-624(4) mandates that the defendant "be given a written copy of any requirements imposed (as a condition of probation), stated with sufficient specificity to enable him to guide himself accordingly." And where the time for performance of a condition of probation is not otherwise expressly specified by order of the court or by statute or rule, such a condition shall be performed within a reasonable time. Cf. State v. Huggett, 55 Haw. 632, 525 P.2d 1119 (1974). The defendant reasonably believed that under the court's decree, he could spend a few hours with his mother before reporting to Habilitat. And while a valid argument could be made that the language of the trial court's special condition required that the defendant proceed immediately and directly to Habilitat upon his discharge from Halawa, such an interpretation is not absolutely compelled. Certainly, it cannot seriously be argued that had Habilitat chosen to accept the defendant for enrollment the day after or several days after his discharge from Halawa, the defendant would nonetheless have been in violation of the terms of his probation. Moreover, there is nothing in the record to show that the court, at the time it imposed its special condition, was even aware of the existence of the so-called Habilitat "house rule" which was applied to the defendant.
The court may revoke a defendant's probation only where it is satisfied "that the defendant has inexcusably failed to comply with a substantial requirement imposed as a condition of (probation)." HRS § 706-628(1). The defendant's enrollment at Habilitat, following this brief visit, was made impossible by Habilitat's arbitrary rejection. Cf. State v. Moretti, 50 N.J.Super. 223, 141 A.2d 810 (1958). Under these circumstances, there is a serious...
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...appeal unless it was mistakenly exercised. State v. Johnson, 133 N.J.Super. 457, 461, 337 A.2d 387 (App.Div.1975). See State v. Nakamura, 59 Haw. 378, 581 P.2d 759 (1978). The sentencing principles of State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 363-364, 471 A.2d 370 (1984), apply, mutatis mutandis, to the ......
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