State v. Naple

• Decision Date: 29 September 2006
• Docket Number: No. 05-113.,05-113.
• Citation: 2006 WY 125,143 P.3d 358
• Parties: The STATE of Wyoming, Petitioner, v. Laura Jeanne NAPLE, Respondent.
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

143 P.3d 358

2006 WY 125

The STATE of Wyoming, Petitioner, v. Laura Jeanne NAPLE, Respondent.

No. 05-113.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

September 29, 2006.

Representing Petitioner: Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General. Argument by Mr. Pauling.

Representing Respondent: Kenneth M. Koski, State Public Defender, PDP; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; Ryan R. Roden, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel. Argument by Ms. Domonkos.

Before VOIGT, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL^*, KITE, and BURKE, JJ.

KITE, Justice.

[¶ 1] The district court dismissed with prejudice a controlled substances charge against Laura Jeanne Naple as a sanction for the State's failure to comply with its discovery obligations. We granted the State's petition for a writ of review and conclude the district court had the authority, under W.R.Cr.P. 16(d)(2), to dismiss the criminal charge with prejudice to sanction the State for violating a discovery obligation. That authority must, however, be used cautiously and only after consideration of the proper factors, including the reasons for the discovery violation, the prejudice to the defendant, and the possibility of imposing lesser sanctions such as a continuance. The district court abused its discretion in this case by failing to conduct the appropriate inquiry to determine whether the severe sanction of dismissal with prejudice was justified. Consequently, we reverse and remand.

ISSUES

[¶ 2] The State and Ms. Naple present the same issue for review:

Did the district court abuse its discretion in dismissing with prejudice the charge against respondent?

FACTS

[¶ 3] Many of the underlying facts of this case are not particularly relevant to the question presented on appeal. Therefore, we will discuss only those facts which are pertinent to our decision. Ms. Naple was a passenger in a van stopped by Wyoming Highway Patrol Trooper Bisceglia. During the stop, one of the other passengers admitted to having a small amount of marijuana. Trooper Green was summoned to the scene with his drug detection dog, and the officers performed a search of the vehicle, recovering several small containers and a one pound container of marijuana. All of the occupants of the vehicle were arrested. While Trooper Green was arresting Ms. Naple, she apparently stated the marijuana was her medicine and she had a prescription for it.

[¶ 4] The State charged Ms. Naple with one count of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 35-7-1031(a)(ii) (Lexis-Nexis 2003).¹ The affidavit accompanying the criminal information referred to Ms. Naple's statement to Trooper Green about the marijuana being her medicine. She pleaded not guilty to the charge, and her attorney demanded discovery from the State. The State filed a notice with the district court representing it had complied with its discovery obligations. None of the police reports provided to the defense by the State referenced Ms. Naple's statement to Trooper Green. Relying on the lack of written documentation of her inculpatory statement, the defense attorney told the jury, in his opening statement at trial, that her statement was not referenced in any police report.

[¶ 5] Trooper Bisceglia was the first witness to testify at trial. During his cross-examination, he referred to a report written by Trooper Green which included Ms. Naple's inculpatory statement. Ms. Naple moved for a mistrial, claiming she was prejudiced by the State's failure to produce Trooper Green's report, especially in light of defense counsel's opening statement. The district court granted her request for a mistrial and dismissed the case. In its oral ruling dismissing the case, the district court stated that the State had the option of refiling the charges against Ms. Naple.

[¶ 6] The State filed a motion for reconsideration of the dismissal, requesting the district court to simply set a new trial date rather than require the State to initiate a new prosecution. Ms. Naple filed a response to the State's motion and specifically requested the charge be dismissed with prejudice. In support of her motion, Ms. Naple referred to several other cases in the local district and circuit courts where the State had failed to comply with its discovery obligations and had been warned that future violations would be punished by dismissal with prejudice.

[¶ 7] The district court apparently did not hold a hearing on the pending motions, but it took the parties' motions under advisement and entered an order dismissing the charge against Ms. Naple with prejudice. The State filed a Petition for Writ of Review in the Nature of Certiorari in this Court. After careful review of the petition and related materials, we granted the State's petition.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶ 8] A trial court has discretion in determining the proper sanction for a party's violation of its discovery responsibilities. Lawson v. State, 994 P.2d 943, 946 (Wyo.2000); Lindsey v. State, 725 P.2d 649, 655 (Wyo.1986). "The decision of the court in addressing the breach of a discovery order will be set aside only for an abuse of discretion." Lindsey, 725 P.2d at 655. In determining whether the trial court abused its discretion, "the ultimate issue is whether or not the court could reasonably conclude as it did." Lawson, 994 P.2d at 947.

[¶ 9] Although the State articulates its issue as one of discretion, it also argues the trial court did not have the legal authority to dismiss the charge against Ms. Naple with prejudice and the court's ruling violated the separation of powers doctrine. Because this argument involves questions of law and implicates constitutional issues, we review it de novo. Messer v. State, 2004 WY 98, ¶ 8, 96 P.3d 12, 15 (Wyo.2004).

DISCUSSION

A. Court's Authority to Dismiss Criminal Charges With Prejudice

[¶ 10] The trial court granted a mistrial and dismissed the charge against Ms. Naple with prejudice because the State had violated its discovery obligation by failing to produce Trooper Green's report. At this juncture, the State agrees the mistrial was warranted, and, in any event, the correctness of the district court's decision to grant a mistrial is moot because the jury has been discharged. State v. Newman, 2004 WY 41, ¶ 24, 88 P.3d 445, 453-54 (Wyo.2004). The State claims, however, the district court exceeded its authority when it granted a dismissal with prejudice.²

[¶ 11] The State failed to comply with its discovery obligations under W.R.Cr.P. 16 which requires the State to provide discovery to the defense and specifically addresses sanctions for violations of discovery requirements:

(a) Disclosure of Evidence State.

(1) Information Subject to Disclosure.

(A) Statement of Defendant.

(i) Upon written demand of a defendant the state shall permit the defendant to inspect and copy or photograph:

1. Any relevant written or recorded statements made by the defendant, or copies thereof, within the possession, custody or control of the state, the existence of which is known, or by the exercise of due diligence may become known, to the attorney for the state;

2. The substance of any oral statement which the state intends to offer in evidence at the trial made by the defendant whether before or after arrest[.]

* * *

(d) Regulation by Court.

* * *

(2) Failure to Comply.—If at any time during the course of the proceedings, it is brought to the attention of the court that a party has failed to comply with this rule, the court may order such party to permit the discovery or inspection, grant a continuance, or prohibit the party from introducing evidence not disclosed, or it may enter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances. The court may specify the time, place and manner of making the discovery and inspection and may prescribe such terms and conditions as are just.

W.R.Cr.P. 16. Of particular importance to our discussion is the language which allows the court to "enter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances." W.R.Cr.P. 16(d)(2). The question presented here is whether that language permits a district court to dismiss a prosecution with prejudice because of the State's violation of its discovery obligations.

[¶ 12] Wyoming's Rule 16 is modeled after the comparable federal rule. When a federal rule is similar to a Wyoming rule, "we give great weight to federal precedent" pertaining to that rule. Billis v. State, 800 P.2d 401, 421 (Wyo.1990). Federal courts have considered whether Rule 16(d)(2) allows a trial court to dismiss charges against a defendant as a sanction for the government's failure to comply with its discovery violations. See, e.g., United States v. Dennison, 891 F.2d 255, 259-60 (10th Cir.1989); United States v. Peveto, 881 F.2d 844 (10th Cir.1989). See also, United States v. Anderson, 574 F.2d 1374 (5th Cir.1978) (indicating the trial court had the power to dismiss an indictment with prejudice but did not abuse its discretion by refusing to do so); Government of Virgin Islands v. Fahie, 419 F.3d 249 (3rd Cir.2005) (discussing court discretion to dismiss an indictment with prejudice under Fed.R.Crim.P. 16 and its supervisory powers). The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in Dennison, 891 F.2d at 259-60, the district court had the authority, pursuant to Rule 16(d)(2), to dismiss criminal charges as a sanction against the government for violation of discovery orders. However, the court noted, that authority must be exercised with extreme caution. See Dennison, 891 F.2d at 260. In fact, the "instances where an appellate court has upheld a district court's dismissal of an indictment because of alleged prosecutorial misconduct are `few and far between.'" Id., citing United States v. Anderson, 778 F.2d 602 (10th Cir. 1985). The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals applied the following test to decide the issue:

The Federal Rules of Criminal...