State v. Natsuhara

• Decision Date: 05 November 1925
• Docket Number: 19146.
• Citation: 136 Wash. 437,240 P. 557
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE v. NATSUHARA et al.

240 P. 557

136 Wash. 437

STATE v. NATSUHARA et al.

No. 19146.

Supreme Court of Washington

November 5, 1925

Department 1.

Appeal from Superior Court, King County; Austin E. Griffiths, Judge.

Action by the State against Cecil Natsuhara and another. From judgment of dismissal, the State appeals. Affirmed.

Ewing D. Colvin, of Seattle, for the State.

Guie &amp Halverstadt, of Seattle, for respondents.

MAIN, J.

By this action the state sought to escheat a leasehold interest in real estate owned by an alien. To the complaint a demurrer was interposed and sustained. The plaintiff elected to stand upon the complaint, and refused to plead further. A judgment was entered dismissing the action, and the state appeals.

On the 17th day of August, 1916, one Joseph Kraus, being the owner of six and one-half acres of land, by written contract leased it to the respondents for a period of 10 years. The lease provided that the greater portion of the land covered thereby should be devoted to the raising of berries and asparagus. The rent was $120 per year. The respondents went into possession and occupied under the lease up to and including the time when the action was brought. The lease by its terms expires on the last day of December, 1929.

At the 1921 legislative session a law was passed, which, among other things, prohibited the leasing of land in this state to aliens (Laws 1921, c. 50). It was after this act took effect that the present action was begun. By this proceeding the attempt is made to escheat the leasehold interest of the respondents on the ground that they are aliens, being subjects of the emperor of Japan. The general question is whether the act of 1921 applies to leases which were in existence at the time it became effective. Under this general question the first particular question to be determined is whether prior to that act a lease of real estate to an alien for a reasonable length of time was valid. There is no claim in this case that the term of the lease involved was for an unreasonable length of time. In determining this question it is necessary to ascertain the meaning of section 33, art. 2 of the state Constitution, which provides:

'The ownership of lands by aliens, other than those who in good faith have declared their intention to become citizens of the United States, is prohibited in this state, except where acquired by inheritance, under mortgage or in good faith in the ordinary course of justice in the collection of debts; and all conveyances of lands hereafter made to any alien directly, or in trust for such alien, shall be void: Provided, that the provisions of this section shall not apply to lands containing valuable deposits of minerals metals, iron, coal, or fire clay, and the necessary land for mills and machinery to be used in the development thereof and the manufacture of the products therefrom. Every corporation the majority of the capital stock of which is owned by aliens, shall be considered an alien for the purposes of this prohibition.'

It will be observed that by the Constitution the right of aliens to own real estate in certain respects is secured and in other respects prohibited. No mention is made of leasehold interests. The Constitution therefore does not prohibit the leasing of land to aliens for a reasonable length of time. Terrace v. Thompson (D. C.) 274 F. 841; Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 44 S.Ct. 15, 68 L.Ed. 255. Construing the constitutional provision above quoted in State ex rel. Winston v. Morrison, 18 Wash. 664, 52 P. 228, it was held that a lease for 99 years was prohibited because such a lease was for an unreasonable term, and came within the meaning and spirit of the constitutional prohibition against alien ownership. It was there plainly recognized, and the court had before it the question as to whether leasehold interests were valid, that a lease to an alien for a reasonable length of time was valid. It was there said:

'After a vain search for authority bearing directly upon the question we have concluded that a lease of lands in this state to an alien for a reasonable term might be upheld, but that the lease in question is for an unreasonable term, and consequently void.'

It State ex rel. Winston v. Hudson Land Co., 19 Wash. 85, 52 P. 574, 40 L. R. A. 430, a lease for 49 years was held void under the doctrine announced in the Morrison Case. Both of those cases undoubtedly recognized that a lease for a reasonable length of time would be valid. It is probably correct to say that since those decisions were rendered it has been the understanding of the bench and bar of this state that leases to aliens for a reasonable length of time were not under the constitutional ban. Undoubtedly many such contracts have been made and valuable rights acquired thereunder. The appellant argues that the question was not directly before the court in either of those cases, and therefore they cannot be deemed controlling.

We think the court there deliberately expressed its view that, if the lease was for a reasonable length of time, it would be valid. That view having been expressed, and it having been generally understood that such was the law, we think it should be adhered to under the rule of stare decisis.

In re Fifth Avenue, 62 Wash. 218, 113 P. 762, it was said:

'The rule of stare decisis is peculiarly applicable to the construction of the Constitution. The interpretation of that document should not be made dependent upon every change in the personnel of the court. When one of its clauses has been once construed, that construction should not be set aside except for the most cogent reasons. Certainty in the law is of the first importance.'

What the common law of England with reference to the right of an alien to lease real estate may have been and whether that law has ever been adopted in this country need not be here determined. As stated, the two decisions above referred to seem to us to have settled the question so far as this state may be concerned.

The lease here involved being valid when made, the question arises whether the act of 1921 intended to operate against such interests. By subdivision (b), sec. 1, the word 'land' is defined to mean, among other things, leasehold interest. Section 2 of that act provides:

'An alien shall not own land or take or hold title thereto. No person shall take or hold land or title to land for an alien. Land now held by or for aliens in

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