State v. Neal

• Decision Date: 06 September 2001
• Docket Number: No. 70199-7.,70199-7.
• Citation: 144 Wash.2d 600,30 P.3d 1255
• Parties: STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Lisa Marie NEAL, Petitioner.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

30 P.3d 1255

144 Wash.2d 600

STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Lisa Marie NEAL, Petitioner.

No. 70199-7.

Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc.

Argued May 8, 2001.

Decided September 6, 2001.

Knapp, O'Dell & Lewis, R.A. Lewis, Camas, for Petitioner.

Bradley Andersen, Skamania County Prosecutor, Peter Banks, Deputy, Stevenson, for Respondent.

MADSEN, J.

Lisa Marie Neal seeks reversal of the Court of Appeals decision affirming her conviction for possession of a controlled substance. In the trial court, Ms. Neal moved to exclude a certified copy of a toxicologist's report because the certification failed to name the person from whom the substance was received as required by CrR 6.13(b). She also moved to suppress evidence discovered as a result of a search of her vehicle. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, holding that the certificate substantially complied with the requirements of CrR 6.13(b) and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the report. The Court of Appeals also upheld the trial court's ruling denying suppression of evidence. We hold that the trial court erred in admitting the expert's report and that the defendant was prejudiced by the error. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals.

Facts

At a little after 10 p.m. on August 8, 1997, Skamania County Deputy Sheriff Calvin Owens was driving past the IGA store in Carson on routine patrol when he noticed two people in the cab of a small pickup truck in the parking lot.¹ He observed the person in the driver's seat, Ms. Neal, reach out and strike the passenger three times on the head. Deputy Owens pulled into the parking lot behind the pickup truck and activated his emergency lights.

The passenger exited the vehicle and began walking away from the scene. Ms. Neal also exited the vehicle and stood by the door yelling over the truck at the passenger. Deputy Owens ordered Ms. Neal to get back into her truck and wait. Ms. Neal complied. Deputy Owens then contacted the passenger who indicated that there had been an argument. Ms. Neal confirmed the argument and added that she and the passenger had a previous dating relationship. Deputy Owens informed Ms. Neal that domestic violence laws contain a mandatory arrest provision and he arrested her for assault in the fourth degree.

Following the arrest, officers searched the truck's passenger compartment and found Ms. Neal's purse which contained a packet of white substance. The substance, which was sent to the Washington State Patrol Crime Lab, tested positive for methamphetamine. Ms. Neal was charged by information with possession of a controlled substance and assault in the fourth degree.

Prior to trial, the State notified Ms. Neal of its intent to use a certified copy of the crime lab report in lieu of the toxicologist's personal appearance. Defense counsel requested a continuance at the status conference held on October 29, 1997, and trial was reset to February 9, 1998. On February 3, 1998, Ms. Neal's attorney objected to the use of the certified copy and demanded the expert witness testify at trial.

At trial, the defense moved in limine to exclude the lab report because the certificate accompanying the report failed to name the person from whom the tested substance was received as required by CrR 6.13(b). The report listed "The Tacoma Crime Laboratory Evidence Vault" as the "person" from whom the tested substance was received. Clerk's Papers (CP) at 44. The court denied the motion, ruling the certificate substantially complied with the rule because "I guess [the crime lab's] like a corporation who's also can stand in for a person." Suppl. Report of Proceedings (RP) at 7. The court also ruled that the demand for the toxicologist's presence was untimely under CrR 6.13(b)(3)(iii), which requires that the demand be served on the prosecutor seven days before trial. Ms. Neal also moved in limine to exclude the testimony of Deputy David Cox because he was not listed as a prosecution witness. The State agreed to withdraw the witness.

At trial, the State offered the toxicologist's report through one of the investigating officers, Officer Mercer. Ms. Neal objected, arguing that Officer Mercer lacked personal knowledge as to the chain of custody of the evidence, thus his testimony was hearsay as to the foundation for the report. The court sustained that objection but then permitted Deputy Cox to testify, over defense objection, that he took the evidence "from Location 161 to the lab on 8/22/97 at 13:20." RP at 140. The court then admitted the report.

Ms. Neal was convicted of possession of a controlled substance but acquitted of assault. The Court of Appeals affirmed in a partially published opinion. State v. Neal, 102 Wash. App. 99, 6 P.3d 632 (2000). We granted Ms. Neal's petition for review and now reverse the Court of Appeals.

Analysis

The dispositive issue in this case is whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting into evidence a certified copy of the laboratory test report when the certificate lacked the name of the person from whom the evidence was received for testing as required by CrR 6.13(b). Ms. Neal argues that the crime laboratory report is hearsay and, because it does not fully comply with the hearsay exception provided by CrR 6.13(b), the trial court abused its discretion by admitting the test report.² The first question we must answer is whether admissibility of the report pursuant to CrR 6.13 requires strict compliance with certification requirements of the rule.

The toxicology report at issue here is hearsay because it is an out-of-court statement by the expert who tested the substance found in Ms. Neal's purse and that statement was offered for the truth of its contents-that the substance tested was methamphetamine. Unless the report falls within a hearsay exception it is inadmissible. The rules of evidence provide that "[h]earsay is not admissible except as provided by these rules, by other court rules, or by statute." ER 802. CrR 6.13(b) establishes such an exception to the hearsay rule and provides a method for a lab report to be self-authenticating. State v. Sosa, 59 Wash.App. 678, 682, 800 P.2d 839 (1990). CrR 6.13(b)(1) states in pertinent part:

"[T]he official written report of an expert witness which contains the results of any test of a substance or object which are relevant to an issue in a trial shall be admitted in evidence without further proof or foundation as prima facie evidence of the facts stated in the report if the report bears" or has attached a certification stating that the certifier has performed a test on the substance or object in question, the name of the person from whom the substance or object was received, the certificate is attached to a true and complete copy of the certifier's official report, the report was made by the certifier, and the qualifications of the certifier to make such tests. The certificate shall be signed by the certifier with the title of his office and his business address and telephone number.

(Emphasis added.)

Ms. Neal maintains that the rule mandates the certificate contain all of the information specified in CrR 6.13(b) as a prerequisite to admissibility of the expert's report. The certificate here is insufficient, Ms. Neal claims, because it does not list "`the name of the person from whom the substance or object was received.'" CP at 42. Instead, the certificate states that the tester, Ms. Tami S. Kee, "received the substance in question from: The Tacoma Crime Laboratory Evidence Vault." CP at 44.³ Ms. Neal contends that the court abused its discretion by admitting the report because strict compliance with the rule is required. She bases this contention on the fact that the rule was amended to specifically require the certification to state the name of the person from whom the tester received the substance. Prior to 1976, the rule provided that the certification contain only a statement that the tester had "received the (substance)(object) in question from_____." Former CrR 6.13(b) (1975), reprinted at 84 Wash.2d 1101-02. The comment to the 1975 amendment states that "a person rather than an agency must appear in paragraph 2 of the certification of the report." In the Matter of Amending Criminal Rule for Superior Court (CrR 6.13) and Criminal Rule for Justice Court (JCrR 4.09), No. 25700-A-204 (Aug. 26, 1975).

The Court of Appeals found, based on the language of the rule and the comment on the amendment to the rule that "[a]lthough the rule contemplates substantial compliance with the form of the certificate, the rule requires strict compliance with the content of the certificate, at least in regard to the name of the person providing the substance or object in question to the tester." Neal, 102 Wash.App. at 105-06 n. 6, 6 P.3d 632. We agree with this conclusion.

Court rules are interpreted as though they were drafted by the Legislature and are construed consistent with their purpose. Wiley v. Rehak, 143 Wash.2d 339, 343, 20 P.3d 404 (2001); State v. Wittenbarger, 124 Wash.2d 467, 484, 880 P.2d 517 (1994). The court employs principles of statutory construction when interpreting court rules. State v. Greenwood, 120 Wash.2d 585, 592, 845 P.2d 971 (1993). The application of a court rule to the facts in a case is a question of law subject to de novo review on appeal. Wiley, 143 Wash.2d at 343, 20 P.3d 404.

CrR 6.13(b) provides an exception to hearsay, allowing for the admissibility of a certified lab report in lieu of the forensic scientist's live testimony. As the Court of Appeals observed, the report does double duty as well, furnishing prima facie evidence of both the test results and the chain of evidence custody to and from the testing expert. Neal, 102 Wash.App. at 103, 6 P.3d 632. The fact that this Court amended the rule in 1975 to specifically require a named person instead of an agency to establish the chain of custody to and from the tester indicates the...