State v. Neddo
| Decision Date | 02 September 1898 |
| Parties | STATE v. NEDDO. |
| Court | Maine Supreme Court |
(Official.)
Exceptions from superior court, Kennebec county.
This was an indictment found against William Coro, as principal, and the defendant. Joseph Neddo, as accessory after the fact. The crime alleged was breaking and entering in the daytime into a dwelling house, no person being lawfully therein, in violation of the provisions of Rev. St. c. 119, § 8: "Whoever, with intent to commit a felony, breaks and enters in the day time, or enters without breaking in the night time, any dwelling-house, or breaks and enters any office, bank, shop, store, warehouse, vessel, railroad car of any kind, or building in which valuable things are kept, any person being lawfully therein and put in fear, shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than ten years, but if no person was lawfully therein and put in fear, by imprisonment for not more than five years, or by fine not exceeding five hundred dollars." The principal pleaded guilty, and was sentenced. The accessory filed a special demurrer, which was overruled by the presiding justice, and the defendant brought his exceptions thereto into this court. Overruled.
Argued before PETERS, C. J., and EMERY, HASKELL, WISWELL, SAVAGE, and FOGLER, JJ.
Geo. W. Heselton, Co. Atty., for the State.
Jos. Williamson, Jr., and L. A. Burleigh, for defendant.
Exceptions by Joseph Neddo to the overruling by the judge of the superior court for the county of Kennebec of the respondent's demurrer to an indictment against one William Coro, as principal, for breaking and entering a dwelling house, and larceny of goods and chattels therein, and against the respondent, as accessory after the fact. The indictment, as to Coro, is under Rev. St. c. 119, § 8, which is as follows:
And, as to Neddo, the respondent, the indictment is under Rev. St. c. 131, § 7, which is as follows:
The demurrer alleges that the indictment is defective in the following respects: (1) That it does not allege whether the breaking and entering and larceny was committed in the daytime or in the nighttime; (2) that it does not allege whether, at the time of the alleged breaking and entering, any person was lawfully in said dwelling house therein mentioned, and put in fear; (3) that it alleges two distinct offenses, viz. a breaking and entering, and a larceny, and is therefore bad for duplicity; (4) that it does not allege that the taking of the bank bills there in mentioned was accompanied with a felonious intent; (5) that it does not allege that the dwelling house therein mentioned was a building for public use, or in which valuable things were kept; (6) that the allegation that the respondent knew that Coro had committed the "crime aforesaid" does not sufficiently charge the respondent with knowledge that Coro had committed any specified offense; (7) that it does not sufficiently allege any harboring, concealing, maintaining, and assisting of said Coro by the respondent, with the intent on the part of the respondent that said Coro might escape detection, arrest, trial, and punishment for any offense set forth in the indictment; (8) that it does not set forth the time at which the respondent did not stand in the relation of parent or child to said Neddo; (9) that the manner of harboring, concealing, maintaining, and assisting are not set forth. We are of opinion that neither of the grounds for demurrer can be sustained, and that the demurrer was correctly overruled.
1. The indictment alleges that Coro broke and entered the dwelling house on a day named. This sufficiently charges an offense, under the statute above quoted, for breaking and entering a dwelling house in the daytime. If the indictment had alleged an entry without breaking, it would have been necessary to aver that such entry was in the nighttime. It is well settled that, if a crime is punishable more heavily when committed in the nighttime, the indictment, to justify the heavier punishment, must charge it to have been committed in the nighttime; but ordinarily, if only the lower punishment is sought to be inflicted, the allegation of daytime is not essential. 2 Bish. Cr. Proc. § 133a; Com. v. Reynolds, 122 Mass. 454; Butler v. People, 4 Denio, 68.
2. The offense defined and made punishable by the statute is the breaking and entering, with felonious intent, of a dwelling house or...
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State v. Michaud
...is limited to the charge of a justice at nisi prius, the form of the indictment is at least an interesting precedent. In State v. Neddo, 92 Me. 71, 42 A. 253, 255, an indictment directed against an alleged accessory after the fact, where the State was required to aver that the alleged acces......
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State v. Smith
...but one offense, they may be charged in the same count. State v. Shannon, 1939, 136 Me. 127, 3 A.2d 899. Our Court in State v. Neddo, 1898, 92 Me. 71, 42 A. 253, said that an indictment charging breaking and entering and larceny in a certain sense sets out two substantive offenses; neverthe......
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Davis v. State
...the defendant has the constitutional right to know the nature and cause of the accusation.' (Emphasis supplied) See also, State v. Neddo, 1898, 92 Me. 71, 42 A. 253: 'It is well settled that if a crime is punishable more heavily when committed in the night time, the indictment, to justify t......
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State v. Thibodeau
...See also, State v. Healy, 1950, Ohio App., 95 N.E.2d 244; Satterfield v. Commonwealth, 1906, 105 Va. 867, 52 S.E. 979; State v. Neddo, 1898, 82 Me. 71, 75, 42 A. 253. While the jury, in a prosecution for breaking, entering and larceny, must be instructed respecting the specific intent to de......