State v. O'Neil Lumber Co.

Decision Date27 October 1902
Citation170 Mo. 7,70 S.W. 121
CourtMissouri Supreme Court
PartiesSTATE, to Use of RAMMING, v. O'NEIL LUMBER CO. et al.

2. The act being in force at the time of the adoption of the constitution, and not being inconsistent therewith, is continued in force by Const. Sched. § 1 (1 Rev. St. 1889, p. 110), providing that laws in force at the adoption of the constitution shall continue in force until altered or repealed.

3. The act is not impliedly repealed by Rev. St. 1889, § 572, providing that a person claiming property attached may interplead in the cause, the provision for the execution of the bond being for the protection of the sheriff.

4. The matters adjudged on appeal of a cause by the court of appeals are res judicata on a second appeal.

Appeal from St. Louis circuit court; Jas. E. Withrow, Judge.

Action by the state, to the use of John Ramming, against the O'Neil Lumber Company and others. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal. Affirmed.

Lubke & Muench and W. Frank Carter, for appellants. Jas. P. Maginn, for respondent.

BURGESS, J.

The facts, as stated by defendants, are as follows: This cause was before the court of appeals on a former appeal, reported in 77 Mo. App. 538. On that appeal relator was the appellant, assigning as error the action of the trial court in sustaining a demurrer to the testimony. On the second trial — the one from which this appeal is taken — there was a verdict for relator in the sum of $886.24, from which defendants have appealed. The action is upon a bond executed by defendants to the sheriff of the city of St. Louis to protect him against any damages he might have sustained by reason of a levy upon and sale of certain property claimed by relator, and was given in consequence of the "sheriff's and marshal's act," approved March 3, 1855. The sheriff of the city of St. Louis, under a special execution in favor of the O'Neil Lumber Company, returnable to the June term, 1897, in the St. Louis circuit court, had levied upon, among other things, as the property of the execution debtor, Shooting the Chutes Company, two boilers, flywheel, two heaters, one steam pump, and certain other accessories, which relator claimed as his property, and by reason of which claim the sheriff required defendants to execute the bond sued on. Subsequently, and on June 5, 1897, the sheriff sold this property, with other property, to one John S. Griffin, to satisfy said execution, and said Griffin took possession of the property. Relator now sues for the value of the property claimed by him. The answer of the defendants set up, first, that this property was, long before the levy of the execution, by and with the consent and co-operation of respondents, incorporated into and made part of all the improvements and erections known as "Shooting the Chutes," and in connection with said erections and improvements the said O'Neil Lumber Company and other contractors and subcontractors in common with the respondent had contributed and furnished material, fixtures, engines, boilers, and machinery, and performed labor in connection therewith, for all of which each of said parties were entitled to perfect a mechanic's lien upon all such erections and improvements for the price or value thereof if not paid; that upon failure of said Shooting the Chutes Company to pay the said O'Neil Lumber Company and certain other parties for furnishing material and labor in and upon said erections and improvements, the O'Neil Lumber Company and such other parties had duly perfected their lien for the amount and value of the material and labor so furnished, and had thereafter duly obtained judgment in the proper courts for the amount of their respective claims, and that the O'Neil Lumber Company sued out a special execution under its judgment. The answer further alleged that prior to the levy of the execution in favor of the O'Neil Lumber Company the plaintiff had, on, to wit, the 20th day of March, 1897, filed his lien for the identical property mentioned in said bond; that upon the faith of such conduct by relator in filing his said lien the O'Neil Lumber Company had secured its...

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19 cases
  • State ex rel. McDaniel v. Schramm
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • December 12, 1917
    ... ... Schedule to the Constitution, for that they were inconsistent ... with the provisions of that instrument. [State to use of ... Ramming v. Lumber Co., 170 Mo. 7, 70 S.W. 121.] By far the ... great majority of such laws continued in force by express ... permission of Section 1 of the Schedule, ... ...
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  • The State ex rel. Nolte v. Reynolds
    • United States
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    • June 19, 1920
    ...special law, and not by the later general law. The commissioner rules contra. To this ruling I do not agree in view of the O'Neil Lumber Company case, supra. I do agree to the reversal of the judgment, and the remanding of the cause, as called for by the opinion. My reasons therefor are dif......
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