State v. Nelson
| Decision Date | 16 May 1896 |
| Citation | 34 A. 990,19 R.I. 467 |
| Parties | STATE v. NELSON. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
John Nelson was convicted of crime, and petitions for a new trial. Petition granted.
Edward C. Dubois, Atty. Gen., for the State.
Wilson & Jenckes and J. Jerome Hahn, for defendant.
Upon a trial of the defendant in the common pleas division in February, 1895, he was convicted of the crime of receiving stolen property, knowing the same to have been stolen. Before the trial, he moved for a discharge, upon the following grounds, viz.: That he had been put upon trial on the same indictment in January, 1895, before a jury duly impaneled and sworn; that the trial proceeded on the 17th, 18th, 19th, and 21st days of January; that on said 21st day of January, 1895, the presiding justice notified him that some officer in attendance upon the court had received information by telephone that one of the jurors was sick, and unable to proceed with the trial; that no other information as to the sickness of the juror was communicated to the presiding justice; that the defendant, insisting upon his right to be tried by the jury so sworn and impaneled, asked that the case be continued until the next day, in order that the real physical condition of the juror could be ascertained, which request was refused, and the jury was dismissed; that, having thus been once placed in jeopardy of his liberty, he was entitled to be discharged. This motion, made in the form of a plea, was demurred to by the attorney general. The demurrer was sustained by the court, and the plea dismissed. The defendant now petitions for a new trial, upon several grounds, but the only one which needs to be considered is whether the ruling that the allegations of the motion to discharge were not sufficient in law was erroneous.
The language of the constitution of this state (article 1, § 7) is: "No person shall, after an acquittal, be tried for the same offence." The constitution of the United States (article 5 of amendments) says: "Nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb." State constitutions differ in the same way. These provisions grow out of the common-law maxim that no one shall be twice vexed for the same cause. One provision implies a verdict of acquittal, and the other a liability to conviction, or, as it is termed, a "jeopardy"; but both stand for recognized rights,—the right to absolute immunity from a charge after an acquittal, and the right to have a trial go on after it is begun. The latter right must necessarily be subject to exceptions in cases where the trial may be abortive, as from the illness of judge, juror, or prisoner, inability of a jury to agree, and other well-known causes. In such cases there is now no question that there may be another trial, under either form of constitutional provision. The constitutional provisions are a guaranty of rights, and not a limitation of them. The fact, therefore, that our constitution speaks only of an acquittal, does not imply that the right of an accused to have his trial proceed, except in cases of necessity, is taken away. It is, doubtless, on account of these constitutional provisions that the rule is held more strictly in favor of the accused in this country than it seems to be in England. In Reg. v. Charlesworth, 1 Best & S. 460, it was held that where the jury was improperly discharged, against the will of the defendant, it was not equivalent to an acquittal, and the defendant was not entitled to go without day. But in this country courts have felt constrained by the constitutional guaranties in favor of a defendant, and have followed a much stricter rule. Thus, it was early held that the inability of a jury to agree upon a verdict did not justify the court in discharging a jury, and that in such case the defendant could not again be put in jeopardy. Williams v. Com., 2 Grat 568; Wright v. State, 5 Ind. 200; State v. Alman, 64 N. C. 364; Mahala v. State, 10 Yerg. 532. But this is not: now the law in two of the states cited. State v. Jefferson, 66 N. C. 309; State v. Walker, 26 Ind. 346; State v. Leach, 120 Ind. 124, 22 N. E. 111.
It is now well settled by general practice and concurrent authority that a jury may be discharged when it is unable to agree upon a verdict, or when, for other causes, it becomes impossible to proceed to a verdict, and that the accused may still be held for trial. In such cases the jeopardy is interrupted, but no new jeopardy is imposed; nor is the right of the accused to go on with his trial disregarded because the completion of the trial as begun has become practically impossible. It follows, therefore, that the existence of such facts as...
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