State v. Nelson
| Decision Date | 10 February 2023 |
| Docket Number | S-22-082 |
| Parties | State of Nebraska, appellee, v. Brent L. Nelson, appellant. |
| Court | Nebraska Supreme Court |
1. Judgments: Speedy Trial: Appeal and Error. Generally, a trial court's determination as to whether charges should be dismissed on speedy trial grounds is a factual question which will be affirmed on appeal unless clearly erroneous.
2 Statutes. Statutory interpretation is a question of law.
3. ___. The application of a statute to undisputed facts is a question of law.
4. Judgments: Appeal and Error. On questions of law, an appellate court is obligated to reach a conclusion independent of the determination reached by the court below.
5. Speedy Trial: Statutes. The statutory right to a speedy trial is set forth in Neb. Rev. Stat §§ 29-1207 and 29-1208 (Reissue 2016).
6. Speedy Trial. To calculate the time for speedy trial purposes, a court must exclude the day the information was filed, count forward 6 months, back up 1 day and then add any time excluded under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(4) (Reissue 2016) to determine the last day the defendant can be tried.
7. Speedy Trial: Proof. The State bears the burden to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, the applicability of one or more of the excluded time periods under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(4) (Reissue 2016).
8. Speedy Trial: Pretrial Procedure. As a matter of law, Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(4)(a) (Reissue 2016) dictates the exclusion of all time between the filing of a defendant's pretrial motion and the final disposition of such motion, regardless of the reason for the delay of its disposition.
9. Speedy Trial: Appeal and Error. Factual determinations pertaining to the exceptions listed in Neb Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(4)(a) through (f) (Reissue 2016) must be supported by specific findings, which appellate courts review for clear error.
10. Speedy Trial. The proper interpretation of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(4) (Reissue 2016) and its application to the undisputed historical facts of a case are questions of law.
11. Judgments: Appeal and Error. A correct result will not be set aside merely because the lower court applied the wrong reasoning in reaching that result.
12. Speedy Trial: Pretrial Procedure. The plain terms of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(4)(a) (Reissue 2016) dictate the exclusion of all time between the filing of a defendant's pretrial motion and the final disposition of such motion, regardless of the promptness or reasonableness of the delay of disposition.
13. ___: ___. The period excludable under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2017(4)(a) (Reissue 2016) for a defendant's pretrial motion commences on the day immediately after the filing of a defendant's pretrial motion and ends at final disposition, which occurs on the date the motion is granted or denied.
14. Speedy Trial: Legislature: Intent: Words and Phrases. If the Legislature had intended to limit the scope of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(4)(a) (Reissue 2016), it would have inserted limiting phrases such as "reasonable period of delay" in § 29-1207(4)(e) and "good cause" in § 29-1207(4)(f).
15. Speedy Trial: Pretrial Procedure. There is no exception to the mandate of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(4)(a) (Reissue 2016) for delays in hearing a defendant's pretrial motions due to continuances granted to the State.
16. Speedy Trial. The power of the trial court to rule on a motion for discharge is not bound in any way by its prior interlocutory rulings.
17. Judgments: Final Orders. A court's judgment is not final until no further action of the court is required to dispose of the cause pending, and when the cause is retained for further action, it is interlocutory and nonappealable.
18. Judgments: Judges. The proposition that a successor judge should respect a decision made by a predecessor judge on the same case is a matter of policy rather than a limit on the successor judge's power.
19. Judgments: Judges: Pretrial Procedure. The important consideration when dealing with a trial court ruling that conflicts with an earlier interlocutory ruling by a judge in the same case is that the ultimate ruling be legally correct.
20. Judgments: Final Orders. A trial court is not precluded from changing its interlocutory rulings so as to arrive at the correct legal outcome in a later ruling or final judgment.
21. Speedy Trial: Appeal and Error. Specific findings of those facts necessary to facilitate appellate review of the trial court's ultimate speedy trial calculation for a motion to discharge are required, and findings of fact concerning irrelevant interlocutory rulings do not facilitate such review.
22. Speedy Trial: Time: Appeal and Error. A trial court must make specific findings of fact in order to facilitate appellate review of all determinations of excludable periods under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(4) (Reissue 2016), including the date and nature of the proceedings, circumstances, or rulings which initiated and concluded each excludable period; the number of days composing each excludable period; and the number of days remaining in which the defendant may be brought to trial after taking into consideration all excludable periods.
23. Speedy Trial: Judgments: Appeal and Error. A trial court must make specific findings of the excludable periods under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207(4)(a) (Reissue 2016) because a trial court's determination of whether charges should be dismissed on speedy trial grounds is a factual question, and an appellate court cannot review whether the trial court's determination was erroneous without specific findings of fact.
Appeal from the District Court for Adams County: Terri S. Harder, Judge. Affirmed.
T. Charles James, of Langvardt, Valle & James, PC, L.L.O., for appellant.
Douglas J. Peterson, Attorney General, and Stacy M. Foust for appellee.
Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke, Papik, and Freudenberg, JJ.
In a criminal case, the district court denied the defendant's motion for absolute discharge upon determining that a 42-day continuance granted at the request of the State was excluded from the speedy trial calculation under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1207 (Reissue 2016). The defendant argues that the district court was bound by its prior oral ruling that the speedy trial clock would run during the State's continuance, unless it considered and specifically addressed the prior order in its order denying the motion for discharge. We affirm.
The State filed a criminal complaint against Brent L. Nelson in the county court for Adams County, charging him with his fourth offense of driving while under the influence of alcohol. A preliminary hearing was held, and the matter was bound over to the district court. On December 23, 2020, the State filed an information against Nelson, charging him with the same offense. The district court scheduled a jury trial to begin on March 22, 2021.
On March 9, 2021, Nelson moved to suppress evidence law enforcement obtained during the traffic stop, which had led to Nelson's arrest. The district court scheduled a hearing on the motion to suppress for April 15.
On April 15, 2021, the State filed a motion to continue the hearing on the motion to suppress. In support of its motion the State asserted that it had requested the preparation of a transcript of the preliminary hearing held in the county court. However, the State was informed on April 12 that the preliminary hearing transcript had mistakenly been delivered to Nelson's counsel. The State needed to prepare a second transcript for itself because Nelson's counsel refused to return the original transcript. The State claimed it required the transcript of police officer Cale Neelly's testimony at the preliminary hearing to prepare for Neelly's testimony at the suppression hearing.
The district court held a hearing on the State's motion to continue. No evidence was presented at the hearing. The court granted the State's motion but concluded: The court then asked the prosecutor to journalize the hearing. The journal entry, entered on April 21, 2021, did not reflect the court's statements about speedy trial.
At the suppression hearing, held on May 27, 2021, the State called Neelly to testify. The State did not explicitly reference Neelly's preliminary hearing testimony, but Nelson's counsel referred to the transcript during the hearing.
The district court overruled Nelson's motion to suppress in a written order on September 2, 2021. The court scheduled a jury trial, without seeking input from the parties, for November 8. On November 8, Nelson filed a motion for absolute discharge on the ground that he had been denied his right to a speedy trial. The district court held a hearing on Nelson's motion for discharge before a new judge.
The parties stipulated that the original judge had counted the April 15 to May 27, 2021, continuance against the State for the speedy trial calculation. The court then received into evidence certified copies of the complete record and the preliminary hearing testimony. The State also offered an affidavit sworn by the prosecutor. The court reserved ruling on Nelson's objection to the affidavit. The affidavit stated the State's grounds for good cause for the continuance, namely that it could not prepare for the April 15 hearing despite reasonable diligence because of the county court's mistaken delivery of the preliminary hearing transcript to defense counsel. Paragraph 17 of the prosecutor's affidavit admitted that the district court at the time of...
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