State v. Nelson
| Decision Date | 17 June 2019 |
| Docket Number | A18-0777 |
| Parties | State of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Kaylen Demond Nelson, Appellant. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).
Affirmed
Anoka County District Court
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Anthony C. Palumbo, Anoka County Attorney, Kelsey R. Kelley, Assistant County Attorney, Anoka, Minnesota (for respondent)
Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Anders J. Erickson, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Smith, Tracy M., Presiding Judge; Larkin, Judge; and Smith, John, Judge.*
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant Kaylen Nelson was living with M.S.B. and her daughter, K.M.B., when injuries suggesting that K.M.B. was being abused were discovered. Nelson was charged with and convicted of third-degree assault and neglect of a child. A jury found him guilty under both direct- and accomplice-liability theories for each crime. In this direct appeal, Nelson argues that he was denied a speedy trial, that the evidence was insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed third-degree assault under either theory of liability, and that the prosecutor committed reversible misconduct by misrepresenting the law to the jury. We affirm.
This case concerns the abuse of a 22-month-old child, K.M.B., between February and late April 2016. In January 2016, Nelson met and began living with M.S.B., the mother of K.M.B. Not long afterward, Nelson began watching K.M.B. while M.S.B. was out of the house. This arrangement lasted until mid-April, when M.S.B.'s sister, K.S.B., and her sister's boyfriend, T.E., visited the apartment and discovered signs that K.M.B. was being abused. Specifically, K.S.B. noticed bruising on K.M.B.'s neck and face, an injury to the inside of her ear, scratches and bruising on her torso, as well as an unspecified injury to the child's vaginal area. T.E. saw scratches and bruising on the child's neck, bruising on her legs, and a fresh bruise on her arm. After K.S.B. and T.E. informed relatives about what they saw, K.M.B. was taken to the hospital, where the injuries were reported to police and child protection.
At the hospital, it was discovered that K.M.B. also had two fractures in her forearm that were healing but untreated; the breaks were estimated to be three to four weeks old. Blood analysis revealed an elevated level of creatine phosphokinase, an enzyme that is released from skeletal muscle when it is injured. Medical examination revealed numerous bruises and scars that, in the doctor's opinion, were consistent with physical abuse occurring on multiple occasions.
Just before K.M.B. was taken to the hospital, Nelson left the apartment and, apparently, the state. In June 2016, Nelson was charged with first- and third-degree assault. He was arrested in January 2017.
Though initially scheduled for February, Nelson's omnibus hearing was continued twice—once so that he could consider a plea offer, and once so that his new attorney could familiarize himself with the evidence provided in discovery up to that point. On May 4, Nelson waived the omnibus hearing and demanded a speedy trial. A pretrial hearing was set for May 16, and trial was set for June 12.
On May 22, the state amended the complaint. The amended complaint removed the previous paragraphs charging first- and third-degree assault and added paragraphs charging Nelson with aiding and abetting first- and third-degree assault as well as aiding and abetting neglect of a child. Nelson responded by waiving his speedy-trial demand in order to challenge probable cause for the amended complaint. A contested omnibus hearing was scheduled for June 27.
At the June 27 hearing, the state indicated that it intended to also charge those three crimes under direct-liability theories. Additionally, the court noted that the speedy-trialdemand had been withdrawn but said that a trial date and briefing schedule could be set if that was what Nelson wanted. Nelson's attorney responded by raising a discovery issue. The contested omnibus hearing was rescheduled to July 10 to accommodate the amendment to the complaint.
The second amended complaint charging six counts was filed on July 10. At the omnibus hearing on that same date, the parties agreed to argue Nelson's motion to dismiss based on lack of probable cause by simultaneously submitted briefs. In the event the motion was denied, a pretrial hearing was scheduled for September 26 and trial was scheduled for October 23. Nelson indicated at the July 10 hearing that, if his motion to dismiss was denied, he intended to reassert his demand for a speedy trial.
The parties submitted briefs, and, on September 25, the district court denied Nelson's motion to dismiss for lack of probable cause. A pretrial hearing was held as scheduled, at which Nelson reasserted his speedy-trial demand. However, trial was postponed until October 25 because the scheduled judge was unavailable. On October 25, trial was again rescheduled, this time to December 11, because there were not enough jurors available. Though Nelson objected to the second rescheduling on the basis of his speedy-trial demand, the court noted that the delay would be brief—only 16 days beyond the 60-day deadline, counting from September 25—and ruled that there was good cause to delay, because the trial could not start without jurors. The trial began on December 11.
At trial, the state introduced evidence that no one had noticed injuries on K.M.B. before Nelson moved in, that K.M.B.'s injuries occurred over a period of at least three to four weeks, and that Nelson was taking care of K.M.B. on a daily basis while living withM.S.B., as well as testimony from M.S.B. that she witnessed Nelson "whooping [K.M.B.] with a belt." The state also introduced evidence that M.S.B. had pleaded guilty to child neglect for her role in the abuse of K.M.B. In its closing argument, the state argued that Nelson should be found guilty if the jury believed that he had personally assaulted K.M.B. and also should be found guilty if the jury believed that M.S.B. had assaulted K.M.B. but Nelson had aided and abetted her by failing to intervene over the course of the abuse. The jury found Nelson guilty of third-degree assault, neglect of a child, aiding and abetting third-degree assault, and aiding and abetting neglect of a child. Nelson was acquitted of first-degree assault and of aiding and abetting first-degree assault.
Nelson appeals.
Nelson first argues that the district court erred in ruling that the state had not violated his right to a speedy trial.
"Whether a defendant has been denied a speedy trial is a constitutional question subject to de novo review." State v. Osorio, 891 N.W.2d 620, 627 (Minn. 2017). To determine whether the right to a speedy trial has been denied, Minnesota courts use a four-factor balancing test. See id. (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530-33, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 2192-93 (1972)). These factors are: "(1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) whether the defendant asserted his or her right to a speedy trial; and (4) whether the delay prejudiced the defendant." State v. Windish, 590 N.W.2d 311, 315 (Minn. 1999). No single factor is "a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of theright to a speedy trial." Id. (quotation omitted). Rather, all of the factors must be considered. Id.
The first factor is the length of the delay. The length of delay functions as both a factor and a triggering mechanism—there must be some "presumptively prejudicial" delay before consideration of the remaining factors is necessary. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S. Ct. at 2192. The right to a speedy trial attaches either when a defendant is formally charged or when a defendant is arrested. Osorio, 891 N.W.2d at 627. Delay is usually calculated from the point of attachment; a six-month delay is presumptively prejudicial. Id. at 628. However, if a defendant demands a speedy trial pursuant to Minn. R. Crim. P. 11.09, a delay of more than 60 days from that demand is presumed prejudicial. Windish, 590 N.W.2d at 315-16.
Nelson made a speedy-trial demand on May 4, but he withdrew that demand in June. Nelson re-asserted his right to a speedy trial on September 26, 76 days before his trial began on December 11. There is no dispute that Nelson was not brought to trial within 60 days of his speedy-trial demand and that there was a "presumptively prejudicial" delay, requiring consideration of the remaining factors. See id. But the delay was also only 16 days longer than what is permitted by statute, so this factor barely weighs in Nelson's favor.
The second factor is the reason for delay; its purpose is to determine who caused the delay and to weigh the responsible party's culpability in bringing about the delay. See Osorio, 891 N.W.2d at 628-29. Thus, if a delay is due to a defendant's actions, "there is nospeedy trial violation." Id. (quoting State v. Taylor, 869 N.W.2d 1, 20 (Minn. 2015)). But when the delay is due to the government, the reason for the delay becomes more important. The Supreme Court in Barker described three tiers of culpability: deliberate delay intended to impede the defense is "weighted heavily against the government"; "negligence or overcrowded courts" weigh against the government, but not as strongly; and a good reason, "such as a missing witness," will justify a commensurate delay. 407 U.S. at 531, 92 S. Ct. at 2192.
Nelson contends that the delay should be measured from one of three dates—January 23, the date of his arrest; May 4, the date of his first speedy-trial demand; or September 26, the date of his final speedy-trial demand.
If the delay is...
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