State v. Neufeld, 74412

• Decision Date: 08 November 1996
• Docket Number: No. 74412,74412
• Citation: 260 Kan. 930,926 P.2d 1325
• Parties: STATE of Kansas, Appellant, v. Melvin NEUFELD, Appellee.
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Page 1325

926 P.2d 1325

260 Kan. 930

STATE of Kansas, Appellant, v. Melvin NEUFELD, Appellee.

No. 74412.

Supreme Court of Kansas.

Nov. 8, 1996.

Syllabus by the Court

1. The privilege created by the Speech or Debate Clause of the Kansas Constitution prohibits the admission at trial of evidence which is protected by the clause. A legislator can be prosecuted for a crime occurring anywhere, but acts protected by the Speech or Debate Clause cannot be introduced as evidence against the legislator.

2. The purpose of the Speech or Debate Clause is to insure that legislators may perform legislative functions independently, free from outside interference or fear of such interference. To preserve legislative independence, legislators should be protected not only from the consequences of litigation's results but also from the burden of defending themselves.

3. The Speech or Debate Clause provides protection against civil as well as criminal actions, and against actions brought by private individuals as well as those initiated by the Executive Branch. Legislative immunity was not written into the Kansas Constitution for the purpose of protecting the private or personal benefits of legislators. Rather, immunity was provided to protect the integrity of the legislative process by insuring the independence of individual legislators. Further, legislative immunity was developed to reinforce the carefully established separation of powers doctrine. The Speech or Debate Clause is to be read broadly to carry out these purposes.

4. Legislators are absolutely protected from the burden of defending lawsuits if the conduct which the suit is based upon falls within the sphere of legitimate legislative activity. In deciding whether particular activities other than literal speech or debate fall within the legitimate legislative sphere, we must determine whether the activities took place in a session of the legislature by one of its members in relation to the business before it.

5. The Speech or Debate Clause does not apply to criminal prosecutions of legislators if the prosecution does not draw in question the legislative acts of the defendant member of the legislature or his or her motives for performing them. The Speech or Debate Clause does not prohibit inquiry into activities that are casually or incidentally related to legislative affairs but not a part of the legislative process itself.

6. When consideringthe immunity provided by the Speech or Debate Clause, it is not the alleged criminal act that is examined to determine whether it falls within the sphere of legislative action and whether a legislator's conduct qualifies as a legislative act. If this court looked only at the specific act in question and determined that the act constituted a crime and was not entitled to protection as a legitimate legislative act, then the constitutional protection afforded by the Speech or Debate Clause would not serve its intended purpose. Rather, this court should look at the context in which the conduct occurred to determine whether it falls within a legitimate legislative sphere.

7. The passing of acts and resolutions is the very essence of the legislative process. Trying to persuade a legislator to change his or her vote is an integral part of the communicative processes by which members participate in legislative proceedings with respect to the passage or rejection of proposed legislation.

8. The Speech or Debate Clause protects legislators from liability for their actions within the legislative sphere, even though their conduct, if performed in other than legislative contexts, would be unconstitutional or otherwise contrary to criminal or civil statutes.

Melanie S. Pfeifer, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause, and Carla J. Stovall, Attorney General, was with her on the briefs for appellant.

Mark L. Bennett, Jr., of Bennett & Dillon, L.L.P., Topeka, argued the cause, and was on the brief for appellee.

Robert Drean, Legal Intern, and Michael Kaye, Supervising Attorney, of Washburn Law Clinic, Topeka, were on the brief for amicus curiae Washburn Law Clinic.

ABBOTT, Justice:

The State of Kansas appeals from the trial court's dismissal of blackmail charges against State Representative Melvin Neufeld. Neufeld cross-appeals. The case was dismissed by the trial court after both parties presented evidence at the preliminary hearing.

On the last night of the veto session of the 1994 legislative session, the bell which officially calls the Kansas House of Representatives to order for a vote was ringing. At that time, in the lobby of the House chamber, Representative Neufeld engaged Representative Richard Alldritt in a conversation.

The conversation took place in the lobby within 10 feet of the door to the House chambers. The lobby area of the House is sometimes used by legislators for the purpose of discussing and conducting "legislative business." The only business before the House was the omnibus appropriations bill that had to be passed before the legislature could adjourn. The defendant, Neufeld, is a Republican. Alldritt is a Democrat. Neufeld had been voting "Yes" on the omnibus bill and Alldritt had been voting "No" on the bill. According to Alldritt, Neufeld told him, "You're voting with us this time." Alldritt replied, "Excuse me?" Neufeld again stated, "You're voting with us this time. We know you were caught up in the [fifth floor] lounge in a compromising position with two [female] lobbyists earlier this evening. You're voting green or we'll call your wife." A green vote indicates a legislator is voting "Yes" on a bill. Alldritt testified that he considered Neufeld's statements a threat.

Alldritt testified that he did not respond to the defendant's threat. Instead, Alldritt walked into the House chamber and called his wife to advise her of the threat. A short time later, a vote was taken on the appropriations bill and Alldritt voted "No." Alldritt testified he had no intention of changing his vote as a result of Neufeld's statement and he did not do so at any time. His intention at all times was to vote "No."

After Alldritt voted "No" on the omnibus appropriations bill, a call of the House was taken. The bill had not passed and efforts were being made to salvage it. A call of the House means that no member can come into the chamber or leave the chamber unless he or she has permission of the Speaker or whoever is in the Speaker's chair. At this time, Alldritt was seated at his desk on the House floor, and he received a phone call from Neufeld, who was seated at his desk on the House floor. According to Alldritt, the defendant stated, "This is Melvin. What's going on? Don't you--you're not voting right?" Alldritt replied that he was voting red and that he was not going to change his vote. Neufeld then stated, "Well, you know what this means." Alldritt replied, "Yeah, I know what this means," and hung up.

During the call of the House, Representative Ed McKechnie also received a telephone call from Neufeld. Neufeld told McKechnie that Alldritt had been caught in the fifth floor lounge in a very compromising situation. Neufeld advised McKechnie that they were going to pass the appropriations bill that night and that Alldritt needed to change his vote to green or "[w]e are going to call his wife and let her know he'd been caught in this compromising situation." Neufeld told McKechnie, "You need to make sure that Alldritt knows we're serious." McKechnie testified that it was his belief the purpose of the call was to have McKechnie communicate to Alldritt that if he did not change his vote from "No" to "Yes," a phone call would be made to Alldritt's wife telling her that Alldritt had been caught in a compromising position.

A short time later, McKechnie received another telephone call from Neufeld, asking him if he had delivered the message to Alldritt. When McKechnie told him he had not, Neufeld replied, "Well, he needs to know that we're serious. He needs to know we're serious." After talking to Neufeld, McKechnie called Alldritt and asked him how he was doing. McKechnie told Alldritt that he understood what was going on and that Alldritt had to do what he had to do. McKechnie made no effort to change Alldritt's vote.

Alldritt's wife, Carmen Alldritt, testified that she received a call from Neufeld shortly before midnight near the end of the legislative session. Neufeld told her that he was sorry to have to call and tell her that her husband's conduct was unbecoming of a member of the House of Representatives. He advised her that he was concerned about her marriage and her husband's conduct. Neufeld advised her that her husband had been seen in a lounge with two women employees who stood to benefit from the passage of the bill on which they were voting. Mrs. Alldritt responded, "What do you want me to do now, call my husband up to get him to change his vote?" Neufeld replied, "Well, yes." Alldritt then received a phone call at his desk on the House floor from his wife, who was very upset. She advised Alldritt that Neufeld had called and told her that there were problems in her marriage and that her husband was behaving in a way unfit for a legislator.

Alldritt testified that during the time of all these phone calls, the call of the House was still on, which would have allowed him to change his vote at any time until the final tally was taken. However, Alldritt did not change his "No" vote on the bill, and he had no intention of doing so. Ultimately, the bill failed to pass that evening. The bill passed the next day. Soon thereafter, Alldritt contacted the Speaker of the House, the House Majority Leader, and the Attorney General's office to report the defendant's conduct.

Alldritt did not speak with Neufeld again until after the legislative session had adjourned. At his home in Harper, Alldritt received a telephone call from Neufeld, who stated, "I'm calling to apologize. I did a really stupid thing. ...