Stivers v. Beshear
| Decision Date | 29 December 2022 |
| Docket Number | 2021-SC-0139-TG,2021-CA-0479 |
| Parties | ROBERT STIVERS, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OF THE KENTUCKY SENATE; DAVID W. OSBORNE, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE KENTUCKY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES; AND THE LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMMISSION APPELLANTS v. ANDY BESHEAR, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS GOVERNOR OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY; ERIC FRIEDLANDER, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE CABINET FOR HEALTH AND FAMILY SERVICES APPELLEES |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky |
ROBERT STIVERS, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OF THE KENTUCKY SENATE; DAVID W. OSBORNE, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE KENTUCKY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES; AND THE LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMMISSION APPELLANTS
v.
ANDY BESHEAR, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS GOVERNOR OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY; ERIC FRIEDLANDER, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE CABINET FOR HEALTH AND FAMILY SERVICES APPELLEES
Nos. 2021-SC-0139-TG, 2021-CA-0479
Supreme Court of Kentucky
December 29, 2022
ON APPEAL FROM THE FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT HONORABLE PHILLIP J. SHEPHERD, JUDGE NO. 21-CI-00089
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANTS:
David Earl Fleenor Office of the Senate President David Eric Lycan Office of the Speaker of the House
Gregory Allen. Woosley Legislative Research Commission
Paul Emmanuel Salamanca
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEES:
Steven Travis Mayo Taylor Allen Payne Marc Griffin Farris Laura Crittenden Tipton Office of the Governor
LeeAnne Edmonds Applegate Wesley Warden Duke Office of Secretary of the Cabinet for Health and Family Services
COUNSEL FOR AMICUS CURIAE, COMMONWEATH OF KENTUCKY EX. REL. ATTORNEY GENERAL DANIEL CAMERON:
Matthew Franklin Kuhn Office of Solicitor General
OPINION
MINTON CHIEF JUSTICE
Legislative immunity protects legislators from lawsuits arising from speech or debate in the General Assembly. At issue in this case is whether the President of the Kentucky Senate, the Speaker of the Kentucky House, and the Legislative Research Commission (collectively "the Legislative Defendants") are immune from a declaratory judgment action brought by executive branch officials challenging the constitutionality of certain laws. We conclude that the Legislative Defendants are immune from suit on this record. Thus, we reverse
the circuit court's denial of the Legislative Defendants' motion to dismiss and remand the case to the circuit court with instruction to dismiss all claims against the Legislative Defendants with prejudice.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In the 2021 session, the General Assembly passed several laws limiting the Governor's power during emergencies. Specifically, HB 1[1] provided businesses, school districts, and other specified groups could remain open and fully operational during the COVID-19 pandemic and during future emergencies related to illness or disease so long as they comply with all guidance from the Centers for Disease Control or the Executive Branch, whichever guidance is least restrictive. SB 1[2] amended Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) Chapter 39A, the emergency response statutes, by, among other provisions, limiting declared states of emergency to thirty days absent extension by the General Assembly; granting the General Assembly the power to terminate a declaration of emergency at any time; and requiring the Attorney General's written approval before the Governor may suspend a statute during an emergency by executive order. SB 2[3] limited the Governor's ability to respond to emergencies through emergency administrative regulations and amended KRS 214.020, the statute governing the ability of the Cabinet for
Health and Family Services ("CHFS") to respond to infectious or contagious disease. Finally, HJR 77[4] terminated several executive public-health orders, including the order and regulation requiring that facial coverings be worn in many public places.
The Governor and Secretary of CHFS[5] filed a legal action in the Franklin Circuit Court seeking a declaration that SB 1, HB 1, SB 2, and HJR 77 were unconstitutional in February 2021. Simultaneous to the filing of the action, the Governor moved the circuit court for injunctive relief to prevent enforcement of the challenged legislation. The suit named Kentucky Senate President Robert Stivers, Speaker of the Kentucky House David Osborne, the Legislative Research Commission ("LRC"), and Daniel Cameron, in his official capacity as Kentucky Attorney General, as defendants.
On March 3, 2021, the circuit court granted a temporary injunction in favor of the Governor that stayed implementation of HB 1, SB 1, SB 2, and HJR 77 (which was included by amendment to the temporary injunction on April 7, 2021). March 1, amid litigation concerning injunctive relief, the Legislative Defendants moved the circuit court to dismiss them from the case, asserting that they were shielded from legal action by legislative immunity. The Franklin Circuit Court denied the Legislative Defendants' motions to dismiss on April 12, 2021.
Following the circuit court's grant of injunctive relief, the case moved on two separate trajectories. On one path, the Attorney General sought appellate relief from the circuit court's temporary injunction, which was decided by our decision in Cameron v. Beshear.[6] On the other path, the Legislative Defendants appealed the circuit court's denial of their motion to dismiss.
The present action addresses only the Legislative Defendants' appeal from the circuit court's order denying their motion to dismiss, which rejected the Legislative Defendants' claims that they were immune from suit because of legislative immunity. We address the parties' arguments below.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
In the present appeal, we review the circuit court's denial of the Legislative Defendants' motion to dismiss. Ordinarily, a trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss is not appealable.[7] However, this Court has applied the collateral order doctrine to interlocutory appeals of government officials claiming immunity and held orders denying such immunity are "appealable even in the absence of a final judgment."[8] "[T]he purpose of allowing an immunity issue to be raised by interlocutory appeal is 'to address substantial claims of right which would be rendered moot by litigation and thus are not subject to meaningful review in the ordinary course following a final
judgment.'"[9] Because the Legislative Defendants in this case claim that they are entitled to legislative immunity and, thus, dismissal of the claims against them, we find their interlocutory appeal on this matter appropriate for our review. And in performing this review, we consider the application of legislative immunity de novo, granting no deference to the trial court's determination.[10]
III. ANALYSIS
Like the federal constitution, the Kentucky Constitution divides the powers of the government into three distinct departments or branches: the legislative, executive, and judicial departments.[11] The Kentucky Constitution also expressly forbids one department from exercising powers belonging to the others, except in specified instances.[12]
This case illuminates the tension among the three branches of government. The Governor argues that the challenged legislation encroaches on his authority as the executive to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed."[13] Alternatively, the Legislative Defendants contend that the Governor's lawsuit hinders the legislative power by quelling speech and debate
within the legislative chambers.[14] And the judicial branch has already been involved in round one of the clash between the other two branches when the trial court enjoined enforcement of the challenged legislation during the 2021 Legislative Session.
As the court of last resort in the Commonwealth, we are in the unenviable position of resolving the dispute between the branches of government. We conclude that the Legislative Defendants are constitutionally entitled to immunity from suit on this record under Section 43 of the Kentucky Constitution. As a result, we reverse the circuit court's denial of the Legislative Defendants' motion to dismiss.
A. The History of Legislative Immunity
Legislative immunity in the United States traces its origins to a multi-century struggle between the English Crown and Parliament.[15] "In England's earliest days, 'all powers were royal,' including the power to legislate, and it was only 'over time, as a result of specific struggles,' that Parliament assumed 'various of those powers.'"[16]
In the 1600s, "[e]fforts to constrain the Crown produced the Petition of Right, which imposed 'institutional checks' designed to 'wrest lawmaking . . . power from the King.'"[17] And the Glorious Revolution of 1688 "confirmed" the legislative supremacy of Parliament,[18] giving rise to the English Bill of Rights in 1689.[19] So the English Bill of Rights first codified the privilege of legislative immunity, declaring that "the freedom of speech, and debates or proceedings in Parliament, ought not to be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of Parliament."[20]
Before independence, many colonial assemblies adopted the English concept of legislative immunity.[21] After independence, jurisdictions in the United States followed suit. The federal constitution provides that "for any Speech or Debate in either House, [legislators] shall not be questioned in any other place."[22]
And, like most states' constitutions, the Kentucky Constitution includes a speech or debate clause that is nearly identical to that in the federal
Constitution. Section 43 of Kentucky's Constitution states that "for any speech or debate in either House they shall not be questioned in any other place."[23]
B. Exploring the Parameters of Legislative Immunity
We begin our analysis, as we must, with the constitutional text. "[W]ords used in the Constitution must be given their plain and ordinary meaning."[24]Similarly, "where the language of the Constitution leaves no doubt of the intended meaning of the section under consideration, courts may not employ rules of construction."[25] Finally, "in construing one section of a Constitution a court should not isolate it from other sections, but all the sections bearing on any particular subject should be brought into consideration and be so interpreted as to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution."[26]
The plain...
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