State v. Neville

• Decision Date: 25 October 1939
• Docket Number: 44818.
• Citation: 288 N.W. 83,227 Iowa 329
• Parties: STATE v. NEVILLE.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

288 N.W. 83

227 Iowa 329

STATE v. NEVILLE.

No. 44818.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

October 25, 1939

Appeal from District Court, Dallas County; E. W. Dingwell, Judge.

From conviction of the crime of manslaughter, defendant appeals.

Reversed.

Royal & Royal and Xen Q. Lindel, all of Des Moines, for appellant.

Fred D Everett, Atty. Gen., Jens Grothe, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Charles I. Joy, Co. Atty., of Perry, for the State.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant was indicted for the crime of manslaughter, plead not guilty was tried to a jury and convicted. Exceptions to instructions and motion for new trial were overruled, and sentence was pronounced. From said judgment and rulings Defendant prosecutes this appeal which is presented upon a Clerk's Transcript of the Record.

The manslaughter charge resulted from the death of the driver of an automobile in a collision with a car operated by Appellant. One of the grounds of the motion for new trial was alleged misconduct of a trial juror of which appellant first learned after the trial. This juror resided in Perry, across the street from the home of the prosecutor county attorney, with whom she had been acquainted for many years. The trial was held at Adel, twenty miles from Perry, and was of three days duration. At the close of the first day the juror had no means of transportation to her home, and at her request the county attorney permitted her to ride with him in his automobile from Adel to Perry. At her request the juror rode with the county attorney from Perry to the Courthouse in Adel the next morning, from Adel to Perry that evening, and from Perry to Adel the third morning of the trial. The foregoing appears from recitals in affidavits of the juror and the county attorney which also state that the transportation was only a neighborly act which did not inconvenience the county attorney and did not influence the juror nor affect her verdict. On behalf of appellant another affidavit recited that this juror had been overheard to say the county attorney had told her appellant was drunk at the time in question and that people had seen him drinking. This statement was denied by the juror and both the juror and county attorney denied any mention between them of any matter connected with the case. The evidence relating to the alleged misconduct was presented to the trial court in the form of affidavits certified copies of which are before this court in the Clerk's transcript of the record.

It must be assumed the trial court attached no credence to the allegation that the county attorney and juror had discussed the case or any phase of it. Undoubtedly the finding that there had been no mention of the case was based in part upon knowledge had by the court of the high character and integrity of the juror and county attorney and his observations during the proceedings. With that factual finding we are in accord. The frank disclosures made in their affidavits indicate no consciousness on the part of either of any irregularity in their actions. We do not infer anything to the contrary.

Manifestly, this is not a case of intentional misconduct. It has to do with unconscious influence upon jurors as a result of favors from and social intercourse with parties, counsel and others connected with litigation. It has to do with the duty of the court to preserve the purity of the verdict, with public policy and with the effect of such irregularities upon the minds of litigants and the public at large. Lynch...